Background of ULFA
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was established on April 7, 1979, in Sivasagar, Assam, by a group of young Assamese leaders including Paresh Baruah and Arabinda Rajkhowa. The founding individuals sought to address what they perceived as the marginalization of the Assamese people within the Indian political landscape, aiming to carve out an independent state for Assam through armed struggle. The organization was emblematic of rising ethnic consciousness and the demand for self-determination that characterized various regions of India during the late 20th century, particularly among indigenous groups in the northeastern states.
Growth and Violent Phase
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, ULFA gained widespread support among the indigenous people of the Brahmaputra Valley. Many Assamese viewed ULFA as a powerful voice advocating for their rights and interests in the Indian political arena, particularly in response to perceived injustices and neglect from the central government. However, this initial wave of support quickly soured as ULFA's shift toward extortion, kidnappings, and arms smuggling began to overshadow its revolutionary aims. The violence escalated, resulting in numerous civilian casualties and a significant loss of life among local youths, with estimates suggesting that about 10,000 individuals died amidst the conflict.
Over time, the violence wrought by ULFA alienated many of its former supporters. High-profile attacks against security forces, political opponents, and infrastructure targets contributed to a growing disillusionment with the organization, which was now being viewed as a terrorist outfit rather than a liberation front. By the mid-1990s, intensified counter-insurgency operations by Indian security forces, combined with diminishing support from the community, led to a steep decline in ULFA's influence and prominence in Assam.
Training and Operations
ULFA's recruitment and operational strategies saw notable advancements in the early years after its formation. Recruitment efforts began in earnest in 1983, and by 1986, ULFA was establishing training camps and initiating arms procurement, often collaborating with other militant groups like the Kachin Independence Army and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland. The organization also engaged in fundraising through extortion, a strategy that further tied its operations to illegal activities and contributed to the atmosphere of violence and fear in Assam.
The Indian government designated ULFA as a terrorist organization on November 7, 1990, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, reflecting the escalating security threat posed to the state. The 1990s marked a particularly violent phase for the organization, including high-profile incidents such as the 1991 abduction of 14 individuals for ransom, which included foreign nationals. These actions highlighted ULFA's increasing audacity and its ability to disrupt socio-political stability in the region.
Cross-Border Activities and Decline
Despite suffering defeats in several operations, ULFA maintained a network of camps in neighboring countries, particularly in Bangladesh and Bhutan, where they found refuge and training. In 2004, Bangladesh security forces intercepted arms destined for ULFA, implicating several high-level officials in arms smuggling operations. Concurrently, the Royal Bhutan Army dismantled ULFA camps in December 2003, further reducing its operational capacities.
By the late 2000s, reports surfaced placing ULFA's leadership in foreign territories such as China's Yunnan Province, indicating a shift in their strategic battleground and potential exile for leadership figures like Paresh Baruah. The complexity of ULFA's relationships with other regional separatist organizations, such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), also shaped its ongoing strategies despite significant territorial and political setbacks.
Present Situation
The decline in ULFA's power and influence continues to impact its standing in Assam. While some factions still pursue military actions and radical politics, there have been calls for dialogue and resolution through political means. The organization's ability to reintegrate itself into the political fabric of Assam remains uncertain, as the changing sociopolitical landscape in the region fosters a new generation of youth politics, moving away from armed struggle towards more democratic processes. The legacy of ULFA ultimately underscores the complex issues surrounding identity, autonomy, and governance in Northeast India, as communities strive to navigate their aspirations within the broader Indian Union.
Secret Killings of Militants' Family Members
During the tenure of the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) leader Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, a chilling counter-insurgency strategy emerged that involved the covert assassination of family members of insurgent group leaders, notably from the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). This campaign of violence was driven by a desire to undermine the insurgents' morale and disrupt their support systems within local communities. The killings, shrouded in secrecy and fear, were executed in a systematic manner, with civilians caught in the crossfire of political conflict. The operational period of these secret killings lasted until the AGP government faced defeat in the elections of 2001, leading to a cessation of this brutal counter-insurgency tactic.
A particularly harrowing instance involved Dinesh Barua, the elder brother of prominent ULFA leader Paresh Barua. In a calculated and sinister operation, unidentified Assamese men abducted Dinesh from his home during the night, illustrating the cold precision of these attacks. His lifeless body was later discovered near a cremation ground in Chabua, symbolizing the tragic fate awaiting many who were targeted. Moreover, Mithinga Daimary, who served as ULFA's self-styled Publicity Secretary, suffered greatly as well, having lost five family members throughout this brutal period—an example of the extensive collateral damage inflicted on families associated with insurgent leaders.
In an attempt to seek justice and accountability for these extrajudicial killings, the government of Assam initiated an investigation that culminated in the formation of the "Saikia Commission." The findings of the commission, presented to the Assam Assembly on November 15, 2007, painted a bleak picture of the state's involvement in these atrocities. It revealed not only the organizational role played by Prafulla Mahanta, who was then the Assam Home Minister, but also implicated law enforcement in the execution of these operations. The report detailed how former ULFA members, who had previously surrendered to the government, were employed as gunmen. They were instructed to approach their targets discreetly at night, often employing calm conversational tactics in Assamese to mitigate suspicions before perpetrating the heinous acts of murder or abduction, further complicating the narrative of insurgency and governance in Assam.
The chilling legacy of these events continues to resonate in Assam's socio-political fabric, raising pressing questions about the ethics and legality of state-sponsored violence in countering insurgency. The cycle of violence not only influenced relations between the government and local populations but also sparked debates on human rights and the moral imperatives in governance. As Assam grapples with the historical implications of these killings, it underscores the critical need for accountability and reconciliation in its ongoing conflict landscape.
Overview of ULFA's Organizational Structure
During the 1990s and 2000s, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was estimated to have a total strength ranging between 3,000 to 6,000 members, underscoring its significant presence in Assam and the surrounding regions. This insurgent group emerged with political intentions of attaining sovereignty for Assam, propelled by a mix of ethnic, social, and economic grievances. The variability in reported strength indicates the challenges in accurately surveying and understanding the dynamic milieu in which the organization operated, including recruitment, desertion, and engagement in active conflict.
The formation of the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF), the military wing of ULFA, on March 16, 1996, marked a pivotal development in the organization's structure. The SMF was designed to enhance operational capabilities and engage in guerrilla warfare against perceived state oppression. Initially, the SMF boasted three designated battalions—7th, 28th, and 709th—which were purportedly tasked with specific regional responsibilities. However, while these battalions were intended to provide a tactical framework, many others functioned nominally, with actual troop numbers being significantly smaller, resembling more the strength of a company than what is typically expected of battalions.
Battalions and Their Responsibilities
Each battalion established by the SMF was assigned a specific geographic area to oversee and defend, establishing a semblance of structure within the organization. The 7th Battalion, headquartered in Sukhini, is responsible for protecting the General Headquarters of ULFA, emphasizing its crucial role in safeguarding the leadership and operational command of the group. The operational reach of the other battalions reflects the areas of influence that ULFA sought to maintain, serving both as a means of asserting authority and managing local community relationships.
The 8th Battalion's area of operations includes Nagaon, Morigaon, and Karbi Anglong, regions that have seen significant ethnic tensions and developmental challenges, thus providing fertile ground for insurgent activities. The 9th Battalion takes charge of Golaghat, Jorhat, and Sivasagar, areas rich in cultural history but often plagued by socio-political strife. The 11th Battalion, located in Kamrup and Nalbari, is critical given the strategic importance of these regions as commercial hubs. Similarly, the 27th Battalion oversees Barpeta, Bongaigaon, and Kokrajhar—districts that are vital for both economic activity and ethnic dynamics. The 28th Battalion is stationed in Tinsukia and Dibrugarh, areas that play significant roles in the region's natural resource management, potentially leading to conflicts over land and resource rights. Lastly, the 709th Battalion operates out of Kalikhola, contributing to ULFA’s operational landscape amidst a backdrop of shifting allegiances and local governance challenges.
In summary, while ULFA’s organizational structure during the late 20th century displayed a clear framework with designated battalions and operational areas, the reality of its effectiveness was often marred by discrepancies in ground strength and the challenges of sustaining a prolonged insurgency amid evolving political and social conditions in Assam.
Overview of Enigma Force
Enigma Force, also referred to as the Enigma Group, was a clandestine unit within the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), a separatist organization based in Assam, India. This group operated with a high degree of secrecy, known only to select top leaders within ULFA, which added to its aura of mystery. The Enigma Force was specifically created to undertake strategic and tactical operations with a focus on hit-and-run missions, allowing them to strike quickly and retreat before substantial retaliation could occur.
Operational Tactics
The Enigma Force was designed to be a highly mobile unit, adept at executing operations that required speed and precision. Unlike other divisions of the ULFA that might engage in prolonged combat or conventional warfare, Enigma Force emphasized guerrilla tactics, capitalizing on their ability to operate independently and without immediate support. This operational style not only maximized their effectiveness in achieving specific goals but also minimized the risks associated with larger confrontations. The group's ability to isolate its members from the broader ULFA organization helped maintain operational security and protect the identities of its operatives.
Leadership and Impact
The Enigma Force was led by Raju Baruah, a significant figure whose leadership was pivotal in shaping the group's overall strategy and execution. Under his command, the unit focused on high-value targets and missions that would create a psychological impact, aiming to both undermine government authority and inspire fear among adversaries. While the Enigma Force's actions contributed to the ULFA's reputation as an insurgent group during a turbulent period in Assam's history, the group's operations also raised complex ethical questions regarding violence, separatism, and local governance in the region. The isolation of the group created a unique dynamic within ULFA, leading to both tension and operational effectiveness as they carved out their niche in the larger conflict landscape of Assam.
Overall, the legacy of the Enigma Force reflects the complexities and challenges of insurgency movements, highlighting issues of leadership, strategy, and the profound impact of localized violence in shaping regional politics.
Background of ULFA Assassinations
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has been notorious for its violent activities in Assam, a state in Northeast India. Their campaign of terror has included a series of high-profile assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings, reflecting the group’s insurgent tactics and its desire for an independent Assam. One of the most shocking acts was the killing of Superintendent of Police Daulat Singh Negi on 29 July 1990, in an ambush that also claimed the lives of his personal security officer (PSO) and driver. This incident not only highlights the perilous landscape for law enforcement officials in Assam but also marked a significant escalation in ULFA's militant operations.
Notable Assassinations and Attacks
The assassination of Surendra Paul, a businessman closely connected to influential figures, in May 1990, contributed to growing political instability in Assam. This event was pivotal as it led to the sacking of the Assam government under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta and triggered Operation Bajrang, a state counter-insurgency initiative. Furthermore, on ULFA's Army Day, 16 March 2003, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated under a bus on National Highway No. 7, resulting in the tragic deaths of six civilians and injuries to over 55 others. These incidents showcase ULFA's intent to instill fear and assert their presence through violence.
The violent trajectory of ULFA included the kidnapping and murder of a Russian engineer in 1991 and social activist Sanjay Ghose in 1997, both of whom underscore the indiscriminate nature of ULFA's actions. The group’s most significant political target was local minister Nagen Sarma of the Asom Gana Parishad, assassinated in 2000. Their attempts extended to an assassination attempt on Chief Minister Mahanta in 1997 and the unsettling discovery of a mass grave at a ULFA camp, indicating a history of executions.
Escalation of Violence Against Migrants
In 2003, unrest escalated after an incident involving the alleged molestation of a Mizo girl, leading to a violent backlash against migrant laborers, particularly those of Bihari origin. ULFA capitalized on pre-existing anti-Bihari sentiments, portraying themselves as defenders of indigenous Assamese rights. This was marked by targeted killings, violence against train passengers, and aggressive measures during railway recruitment examinations, where Bihari candidates were attacked under the pretext of seeking job reservations.
Despite losing ground in Assam, ULFA's violent campaigns continued. The Dhemaji District explosion on 15 August 2004, which killed 13 people, mainly women and children, signaled a new low in the group's acceptance of responsibility for public massacres. A string of similar attacks followed, including the January 2007 slaughter of 62 Hindi-speaking workers from Bihar, further tainting ULFA’s reputation as they also included indigenous Assamese among the victims.
Government Response and Decline of ULFA
The central government’s reaction to ULFA’s escalating violence was severe, leading to a unilaterally declared ceasefire from the ULFA’s 28 Battalion in an attempt to protect themselves from government forces. This response effectively crippled the organization, leading to a significant decline in their influence across Assam. The aftermath of this violence, including a blast in Guwahati on 15 March 2007, which injured six as ULFA marked its Army Day, reflects the ongoing reverberations of their actions and the challenging dynamics between insurgent groups, government forces, and civilian populations in Assam.
In conclusion, the trail of ULFA's violence reveals a complex interplay of political aspirations, ethnic tensions, and a struggle for identity in Assam, while the governmental responses continue to shape the landscape for peace and stability in the region.
Economic Subversion
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has engaged in a systematic campaign of economic subversion within Assam, targeting vital infrastructure as a means to further their political objectives. This insurgent group has claimed responsibility for several high-profile bombings that specifically aim at crippling the economic stability of the region. One of the most notorious incidents occurred on August 7, 2005, when ULFA attacked oil pipelines in Assam, which had severe repercussions on both local and state economies. Such acts of violence are not only an assault on property and resources but also serve to instill fear in the state, amplifying the group's visibility and demands.
A particularly devastating operation took place at the Digboi refinery, where ULFA bombed a five million-liter petrol reservoir, leading to extensive damage and an estimated property loss of Rs 200 million. This incident illustrated the group's capability and willingness to inflict substantial economic harm, thereby disrupting supply chains and affecting fuel availability throughout the region. Furthermore, the simultaneous damage to a gas pipeline in Tinsukia exemplifies the strategy of attacking multiple targets at once to create chaos and draw attention to their cause.
The implications of such economic subversion extend beyond immediate financial losses; they pose long-term challenges to local and national economic development. The consistent targeting of infrastructure fosters a climate of insecurity that can deter investment, crucial for the economic growth of the region. Additionally, such acts of sabotage often lead to increased military and security measures, diverting necessary resources away from development initiatives. Given the strategic importance of Assam's energy sector, further disruptions by groups like ULFA not only threaten regional stability but also have wider implications for India's energy security as a whole.
Recruitment Dynamics of ULFA
In the formative years of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) movement, the organization enjoyed significant support from both urban and rural demographics of Assam, largely among the indigenous Assamese populace. During this period, recruitment was largely concentrated in rural areas and various towns across Lower Assam, Northern Assam, Upper Assam, and the mid-Assam districts. One of the most celebrated leaders of ULFA, Heerak Jyoti Mahanta, emerged from a locality just a few kilometers from the state capital, Guwahati. His leadership, along with the active recruitment from these diverse areas, initially bolstered the organization's footprint and public appeal.
As time progressed, however, the sentiments of the educated urban middle class in Assam began to shift. Growing dissatisfaction with ULFA's militant methods and the perceived impact of violence on societal stability led to a decline in their support from urban residents. In light of this shift, ULFA adjusted its recruitment strategies, increasingly focusing on remote villages and backward regions where marginalized indigenous communities resided. The organization identified disenfranchisement and lack of opportunities in these areas as fertile ground for recruitment, capitalizing on the socio-economic grievances of those communities.
Currently, intelligence reports indicate that the Paresh Baruah faction of ULFA, known for its hardline stance against peace initiatives led by the rival Arabinda Rajkhowa faction, is undertaking an aggressive recruitment campaign. Areas such as Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Sivasagar, Lakhimpur, and Nalbari have become prime targets for this recruitment drive. The appeal of ULFA in these rural locations highlights ongoing issues of identity, autonomy, and socio-political marginalization, which continue to resonate with certain segments of the Assamese population, particularly among indigenous tribes like the Naga people, who also harbor a strong affinity for ULFA’s cause. This complex interplay of socio-political factors indicates that the recruitment landscape for ULFA remains multifaceted and deeply intertwined with local grievances and aspirations.
Political Activities of ULFA
Following its formation, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) became known for its significant political engagement, particularly between 1985 and 1990, before it was officially banned. During this period, it gained considerable media attention due to its active public activities. The group often engaged with local media, particularly newspapers, to disseminate its positions on pivotal political issues concerning Assam's nationality question. This public discourse was part of a broader strategy to influence public opinion and amplify its political ideologies, positioning ULFA as a key player in Assam’s socio-political landscape.
Despite its ban, ULFA's influence did not wane entirely. The organization sought to maintain relevance by participating in public debates with notable figures from Assam. These confrontations were significant as they allowed ULFA to articulate its views and aspirations directly to the public, fostering a connection with its supporters. The media’s coverage of these events highlighted the ongoing struggle over identity, autonomy, and governance in Assam, showcasing ULFA's dedication to its cause even in the face of legal prohibitions.
During the most recent local elections, ULFA exerted its influence by calling for boycotts of the electoral process. This tactic reflected a strategic decision aimed at undermining the democratic legitimacy of the ruling parties at the time, namely the Indian National Congress and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). Media reports have indicated that ULFA utilized coercive measures to intimidate activists and supporters of these parties, thereby stifling dissent and consolidating its power base. Such actions underscore the complex interplay between militant groups and democratic processes in conflict regions, revealing the lengths to which ULFA was willing to go to assert its presence and voice in the Assamese political arena.
Extortion Activities of ULFA
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), a separatist militant organization from Assam, India, has a complex history marked by both ideological struggles and criminal activities. In its early years, ULFA engaged in bank robberies as a means to finance its operations and further its cause. However, over time, the focus of its activities shifted significantly towards extortion, becoming notorious for targeting various sectors within the state.
Currently, ULFA is known to extort money from a wide range of individuals and organizations, including businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians. This practice has created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in many communities, as potential victims are often threatened with violence if they refuse to comply with the demands of the organization. The extortion is typically justified by ULFA under the guise of funding for its political struggle, though it has led many to question the genuine motives behind such actions.
One particularly notable incident occurred in 1997 when the Chief Minister of Assam publicly accused Tata Tea of financing the medical treatment of ULFA's cultural secretary, Pranati Deka, at a hospital in Mumbai. This revelation sparked controversy and debate about the extent to which businesses were complicit or coerced into supporting militant activities. It also highlighted the potentially intricate relationship between the state, private enterprises, and extremist groups, raising concerns about the challenges faced by legitimate businesses in a region affected by militancy.
The ongoing practices of extortion by ULFA exemplify the broader challenges of governance and law enforcement in conflict-prone regions. They bring to light the difficulties faced by the state in restoring order and providing security for its citizens, while also addressing the underlying grievances that contribute to the rise of such militant organizations. As Assam continues to grapple with the legacy of ULFA, the impact of extortion on economic development and social cohesion remains a critical issue for both local and national authorities.
Other Criminal Activities
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has expanded its operations beyond its initial agenda of advocating for the independence of Assam from India. In addition to its core activities, the ULFA is now known to engage in a variety of organized criminal activities that include, but are not limited to, drug trafficking. This involvement in illicit drug trade has become a significant part of their operations, allowing them to fund their insurgency efforts and sustain their activities in the region.
Drug trafficking is a lucrative business in many parts of the world, and Assam is no exception. The northeastern part of India serves as a critical corridor for various drug routes, particularly due to its geographical proximity to countries like Myanmar, which is one of the main sources of illicit drugs in the region. The ULFA not only participates in the importation and distribution of narcotics but also collaborates with other militant groups and organized crime syndicates, further complicating the law enforcement response to drug-related crime in the area.
Moreover, the profits generated from drug trafficking provide ULFA with financial resources that can be used for procuring arms, recruiting new members, and maintaining their operational capabilities. This cyclical relationship between insurgency and organized crime poses a significant challenge for local law enforcement and can hinder regional stability. In addition to drug trafficking, ULFA has also been implicated in extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and other forms of organized violence, all of which erode the social fabric of the region and create a climate of fear among civilians.
The complex interplay between these criminal activities and political insurgency highlights the need for comprehensive strategies that address not only the insurgency itself but also the socio-economic factors that contribute to it. Tackling the issue of organized crime, especially drug trafficking, requires collaboration between government agencies, civil society, and international partners to disrupt the networks that allow such activities to flourish.
Peace Negotiations and Surrenders
Since 1990, the Indian government has actively sought to disband the militant group United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) by encouraging members to surrender. The death of Heerak Jyoti Mahanta, the ULFA's deputy Commander in chief, on December 31, 1991, marked a turning point as his opposition to surrenders left a leadership vacuum that contributed to a shift in the group's dynamics. Growing local opposition to ULFA’s violent activities, alongside increasing public weariness with the conflict, created a fertile ground for negotiations. As violence escalated, support for ULFA waned, leading to a substantial number of surrenders.
The year 1992 saw a significant wave of surrenders, with many second-rung leaders and members laying down their arms to the authorities. These former militants, known as SULFA, were granted some autonomy, including the retention of weapons for self-defense against their former comrades, and financial assistance such as bank loans to help them reintegrate into civilian life. This facilitated their transition into legitimate businesses, thus integrating them into Assam's socio-economic fabric. As the years progressed, the total number of ULFA militants who surrendered reached 8,718, with different waves of surrenders occurring predominantly between 1991-1998 and 1998-2005.
In 2003, the ULFA proposed three preconditions for peace talks with the Indian government, which included the dialogue taking place in a third country, under United Nations oversight, and addressing the goal of Assam's independence. The Indian government rejected these terms, yet ULFA demonstrated a willingness to negotiate by dropping the first two preconditions in 2004. However, negotiations stagnated due to the government's refusal to discuss issues related to sovereignty. The establishment of the People's Consultative Group (PCG) in 2005 was a pivotal move aimed at creating a conducive environment for dialogue, which the government welcomed. Following military operations that significantly impaired ULFA, initial talks commenced at Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's residence in December 2005, leading to a temporary ceasefire in August 2006. Despite this, the truce faltered by September due to resumed attacks by ULFA against civilians and military forces.
The situation took another turn in 2008 when leaders from ULFA's companies announced a unilateral ceasefire in hopes of compelling ULFA's higher command to engage in peace talks. However, this initiative resulted in the expulsion of those advocating for dialogue, culminating in a split within ULFA, resulting in the formation of ULFA (Pro-talk). Between 2009 and 2018, intensified government crackdowns led to the capture or surrender of the majority of ULFA’s leadership, effectively disbanding ULFA’s battalions save for a remnant of the 27th battalion. Amid these shifting dynamics, the anti-talks faction, led by Paresh Baruah, continued to resist the peace process.
In December 2023, a significant peace accord was achieved between the Indian Central government, the Assam government, and the pro-talks faction of ULFA, headed by Arabinda Rajkhowa. This historic agreement led to the disbandment of ULFA, the closure of its camps, and the voluntary surrender of 8,200 militants. The accord also included a substantial financial package aimed at developmental projects in Assam, displaying the government’s commitment to fostering stability in the region. However, Paresh Baruah condemned the agreement as 'shameful' and rejected further negotiations unless sovereignty issues are included in discussions. Meanwhile, the ULFA (I) faction, estimated to number around 200 members, remained active in camps located in Myanmar, continuing to pose challenges to the region's peace and security.
Links to China
Recent reports suggest that the remnants of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) are allegedly seeking refuge in China following their expulsion from both Myanmar (Burma) and Bangladesh. This has raised concerns among regional security agencies, as the ULFA has been involved in separatist activities in Assam since the 1970s. The organization's ties with external entities, including foreign nations, may complicate efforts to address insurgency in the northeastern parts of India.
The self-styled leadership of ULFA comprises various factions with divergent fates. Paresh Baruah, the Commander-in-Chief, remains at large and has been sentenced to death by a court in Bangladesh for his involvement in violent activities. This reflects the broader trends in insurgency dynamics, where leaders often find themselves evading law enforcement while still attempting to maintain a significant influence over their ranks. His situation highlights the challenges faced by governments in tackling long-standing insurgent movements that cross national borders.
Other prominent members of ULFA have had various outcomes in their struggle. Heerak Jyoti Mahanta, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, was captured and killed in 1991, marking a significant blow to the organization at that time. In contrast, several key figures like Raju Baruah and Arabinda Rajkhowa were captured but later released on bail. This discrepancy underscores legal and judicial challenges faced by the authorities in dealing with insurgents. Additionally, Anup Chetia, the General Secretary, was deported to India from Bangladesh and is currently in custody, reflecting international cooperation efforts to curb ULFA's influence.
A tragic element of the ULFA story is the deaths of other members, such as Uddipta Hazarika, who was lynched by a mob in 1989. Such violent outcomes serve as stark reminders of the risks involved in insurgent activities, not only for their leaders but also for ordinary members and supporters. The complex web of leadership, capture, death, and release underscores the multifaceted nature of insurgency in Assam, where the interplay of local grievances and regional politics creates a persistent challenge for peace and stability. As the leftovers of ULFA seek shelter in foreign territories like China, this highlights how insurgent movements adapt and survive, often making it more difficult for governments to eradicate these ideologies from their base.