Historical Context of the Trans-Karakoram Tract
Historically, the region of Hunza has played a significant role in the territorial assertions of various powers, notably the Mir of Hunza, who claimed extensive areas north of the Karakoram mountain range, including the Raskam Valley and surrounding territories. These claims were a reflection of both the ambitions of local leadership and the strategic importance of these areas in the broader geopolitical context of Central and South Asia. The Mir's interest in these northern lands echoed the ancient trade routes that traversed the region, which were vital for commerce and cultural exchange, linking the Indian subcontinent with Central Asian markets.
The exploration of the Shaksgam Valley by Francis Younghusband in 1889 marked an important milestone as it was the first European expedition to the region, which he referred to as Oprang. Younghusband's expedition laid the groundwork for later geopolitical maneuvering and laid bare the area's strategic significance. The British, concerned about Russian expansion in Central Asia during the decline of the Qing dynasty, sought to delineate their influence through formal boundaries. In March 1899, Sir Claude MacDonald presented a proposal for a new boundary between China and British India, suggesting that China relinquish its claims to suzerainty over Hunza, while Hunza would similarly cede claims to several districts. The suggested boundary was drawn roughly along the main crest of the Karakoram, yet its implications were never fully recognized or adopted, leaving the border questions unresolved.
As the geopolitical landscape evolved, British officials adjusted their stance in response to the pressures of "The Great Game." The MacDonald line was modified in 1905 to incorporate a small area east of the Shimshal Pass into British India, indicating the fluidity of territorial claims in that period. The British administration, however, never extended its governance north of the Karakoram watershed, reflecting a hesitation to engage fully with the complex and difficult terrain of these northern reaches. Concurrently, the publication of the Gazetteer of Kashmír and Ladákh provided a detailed account of the region, highlighting significant geographical features like the Híñdutásh Pass in Aksai Chin, while identifying the Kuenlun range as a boundary marker within Chinese territory.
The complexities continued until the mid-20th century, during which the portrayal of the border in various maps shifted significantly in response to changing political conditions. After India gained independence in 1947, it maintained claims over the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir, dismissing the legitimacy of Pakistani and Chinese claims. The maps from this period, including those published by the Times Atlas in 1954, illustrated the area as "Undefined Frontier," acknowledging the ongoing disputes. These maps are significant as they elucidate the enduring ambiguity surrounding the northern borders, where contours often deviated from recognized watersheds, complicating the understanding and resolution of territorial disputes.
The history of the Trans-Karakoram Tract is a compelling tapestry of exploration, territorial claims, and geopolitical maneuvering fueled by a volatile mix of local aspirations and imperial interests. The ongoing disputes over these lands underscore the lasting effects of historical decisions and the complexities of borders that remain relevant to the political landscape in the region today.
Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement
The Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement emerged from a complex backdrop of historical territorial claims and diplomatic negotiations between Pakistan and China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This period was marked by heightened tensions as various maps published by China depicted significant areas that Pakistan considered part of its own territory as belonging to China. This situation prompted the Pakistani government, under the leadership of Ayub Khan, to formally address its concerns with China in 1961. However, the lack of response from Beijing suggested that China was perhaps unwilling to engage in negotiations, influenced by Pakistan's then fraught relations with India, which strained the dynamics of Pakistan's diplomatic initiatives.
In 1962, the Pakistani government took a decisive step by publishing an official map that outlined the northern border of Kashmir. This map indicated that a substantial portion of the Cis-Kuen Lun Tract was included within the boundaries of Kashmir according to Pakistan's claims. The alignment of this border was largely consistent with the 1954 Times Atlas, yet it also presented deviations, claiming areas far beyond the earlier demarcations. These developments underscored Pakistan's stance that prior to the signing of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement, the northern border with China was aligned with the Kuen Lun range rather than being limited to the Shaksgam Valley. To grasp the geospatial implications of these claims, one could refer to various historical maps, including the one presented in Joe Schwartzberg's Historical Atlas of South Asia, illustrating the territorial extent of the Trans-Karakoram Tract or the Cis-Kuen Lun Tract.
The diplomatic landscape began to shift in early 1962 when Pakistan voted in favor of China’s admission to the United Nations, a gesture that likely contributed to China's willingness to engage in border negotiations. This culminated in formal talks starting on October 13, 1962, paving the way for the Sino-Pakistan Agreement, which was finalized on March 2, 1963, with the foreign ministers of both nations, Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, signing the agreement.
However, the agreement was met with significant opposition from India, which viewed it as a concerning concession by Pakistan of considerable territory to China. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed apprehension about the territorial implications of the agreement, highlighting that according to Pakistani maps, approximately 11,000 square miles of territory in Sinkiang was claimed as part of Kashmir. This led Nehru to assert that Pakistan had effectively surrendered over 12,800 square miles to China via the agreement. The tensions stemming from this assertion continued to resonate throughout the region, shaping the geopolitical narratives and relationships between India, Pakistan, and China in the subsequent decades.