Escalation and Dialogue: May to June 2020
The month of May 2020 marked the beginning of increased tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India, particularly in the Pangong Tso region. On May 5, violent confrontations occurred as rival Chinese and Indian patrols clashed. In response to the escalating situation, India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla summoned Chinese Ambassador Sun Weidong on May 6, signaling India's concern over the borders. The following days saw skirmishes, including a confrontation in Naku La, Sikkim, on May 9, where both sides reported injuries.
On May 26, high-level meetings took place in China as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, conferred with officials from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Concurrently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi monitored the developments in Ladakh. On May 28, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs emphasized the availability of diplomatic mechanisms to resolve border disputes peacefully. By May 30, India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh confirmed that discussions at both diplomatic and military levels had commenced.
Ongoing Negotiations: June to July 2020
The early days of June saw increased military dialogue, including major-general level talks, with the initial exchanges occurring at Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) points between lower-ranking officers before escalating to three-star corps-commanders level discussions at Chushul-Moldo by June 6. However, tensions escalated dramatically on June 15 with the infamous clash in Galwan Valley, where both nations reported casualties, marking one of the most significant confrontations in decades. This incident prompted further high-level meetings over the following days, culminating in Indian Prime Minister Modi addressing the nation on June 17 regarding the skirmish. Throughout this period, both sides exchanged warnings and maintained a staunch rhetoric about their positions.
As July began, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited military posts in Ladakh and made statements regarding an end to expansionism, which was met with renewed rhetoric from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautioning India against strategic miscalculations. Diplomatic efforts continued with discussions between India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on July 5. By the end of July, dialogue continued via multiple rounds of corps-commanders’ talks and diplomatic discussions aimed at achieving disengagement, though each side reported differing views on the progress made.
Strategic Maneuvers: August to September 2020
August saw another significant round of talks on August 2, as the fifth round of three-star level discussions took place, yet proposed solutions remained contentious, with India rejecting China's proposal for mutual disengagement at Pangong Tso on August 5. Indian forces extended their control over strategic heights along the Kailash Range around August 29-30, leading to a notable face-off with the PLA. This shift marked a critical moment, as the Indian Army and the PLA engaged for the first time on the southern bank of Pangong Tso, further inflaming tensions.
As September unfolded, both nations faced continuous diplomatic and military hurdles. A series of brigade commander-level meetings and high-level exchanges highlighted the tensions stemming from the clashes at Chushul on August 29-30. Illustrating the complexity of these encounters, both sides accused one another of firing warning shots on September 7. High-stakes discussions took place in Moscow later that month, culminating in a joint statement that offered a five-point agreement aimed at deescalating tensions. However, the reality on the ground remained fraught with challenges as more military talks followed, leading into October.
Continued Engagement: October to December 2020
October witnessed ongoing dialogues with the seventh round of corps-commanders talks in Chushul occurring on October 13. During this period, an incident involving a Chinese soldier crossing into Indian territory added an unexpected layer to the already tense relations. Corporal Wang Ya Long was apprehended and later released by Indian authorities on October 21 after appropriate protocols were observed.
As the year drew to a close, the eighth round of corps-commanders talks came about on November 6, aiming to address unresolved issues along the LAC. Diplomacy continued with further meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) occurring into December. The exchanges marked a concerted effort by both nations to navigate the complex landscape of their bilateral relationship amidst the backdrop of military standoffs, a struggle for regional dominance, and a commitment to resolve disputes through dialogue, albeit amid significant challenges and skepticism from both sides.
January 2021 marked a significant period in the ongoing tensions between India and China, particularly concerning their border disputes in the Ladakh region. On January 6, the Indian Defence Ministry released a year-end review for 2020, highlighting China's use of "unorthodox weapons" in the conflict. This term often refers to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics, indicating India's concerns over the potential escalation of military confrontations along the border. Just a few days later, on January 9, the Indian Army captured a Chinese soldier who had strayed across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) into Indian territory; however, he was returned shortly after on January 11, demonstrating some level of diplomatic cooperation amidst heightened tensions.
A notable incident occurred on January 20, when a "minor" border clash was reported in the Naku La region of Sikkim. This confrontation was downplayed by Chinese state media and the foreign ministry, which denied any clash had taken place. Such denials reflect the intricate and often opaque nature of information dissemination regarding military incidents. Following this, on January 24, the ninth round of corps-commanders talks was initiated, signifying ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the border standoff.
February continued to be eventful as Russian news agency TASS reported on February 10 that at least 45 Chinese servicemen were killed during the intense confrontations that took place in May and June 2020, particularly in the Galwan Valley. By February 11, there was a partial disengagement of troops near Pangong Lake, a strategic and contentious area. On February 19, China acknowledged the deaths of four of its soldiers in the Galwan clash, marking a rare admission of casualties on its part. This was followed by the tenth round of corps-commanders talks on February 21, where India's Ministry of External Affairs released a joint press statement that outlined further measures to de-escalate tensions.
On February 22, both Indian and Chinese troops successfully completed the pullback of forces from the Pangong Lake area, which was viewed positively as a step toward de-escalation. However, Indian Army Chief Naravane stated on February 24 that despite these developments, a complete de-escalation remained "still a long way off," highlighting the precarious nature of the situation. March remained largely static, with no significant change in the posture of either the Indian Air Force or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force.
As April began, the eleventh round of corps-commanders talks took place on April 9, reflecting ongoing diplomatic dialogues amidst the military standoff. In May, however, the situation remained tense when the Indian Army denied a report suggesting a minor face-off occurred in Galwan in early May 2021. By July 13, the PLA troops employed "pin-prick tactics" in which they protested against a celebration for the Dalai Lama's birthday in the Demchok sector, further stressing the delicate balance of military and political maneuvers in the region.
On July 26, Chinese "civilians" crossed into Indian territory at Charding Nala in Demchok and set up tents, refusing to leave, which escalated tensions further. The twelfth round of corps-commanders talks was held on July 31, but the situation remained unsettled. August saw the establishment of a new military hotline between India and China on August 1, an initiative intended to enhance communication and prevent misunderstandings. On August 6, a press release from the Press Information Bureau of India stated that disengagement had occurred at Gogra; however, analysts cautioned that evidence of PLA structures was still visible through satellite imagery, raising questions about the sincerity of the disengagement efforts.
Eventually, by October 10, the thirteenth round of corps-commanders talks occurred, continuing the pattern of dialogue amid strained relations. By December, both nations were reported to be maintaining and even expanding their border infrastructure, indicating that while dialogues were ongoing, preparations for potential future confrontations had not ceased. This persistent duality of negotiating while preparing militarily underlines the complexities and challenges that define India-China relations in the context of border disputes.
January 2022 marked a significant period of ongoing tensions between China and India, particularly in terms of military infrastructure and diplomatic discussions. On the 4th of January, China commenced the construction of a bridge over Pangong Tso, a contentious area approximately 40 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This development is part of China's broader strategy to enhance its border infrastructure, which poses concerns for Indian officials regarding security and territorial integrity. In a response to these developments, India inaugurated the Umling La section of the Chisumle-Demchok road, demonstrating its commitment to improving connectivity and defense logistics in the region.
In a notable diplomatic move, the fourteenth round of corps-commanders talks took place on January 12. Unlike the previous encounter where independent statements were issued by each country, this time a joint statement was released. This shift could indicate potential efforts toward de-escalation and finding common ground amid ongoing skirmishes. The willingness to issue a joint statement suggests that both sides might be looking to stabilize the situation and manage further border disputes proactively.
On January 26, as part of the ongoing military dialogue, both nations participated in a border personnel meeting in Chushul-Moldo and the Daulat Beg Oldie-Trade and Transit (DBO-TWD) area, coinciding with India's Republic Day. This engagement underlines the importance of communication between the two militaries, even amidst heightened tensions, and indicates a desire to maintain operational protocols along the border.
In February, India continued its stance on cybersecurity and digital sovereignty by banning an additional 54 mobile applications that were identified as duplicates of previously restricted apps. This move reflects the ongoing conflict not only on the physical front but also in the cyber domain, as India seeks to protect its digital environment against Chinese influence.
As the year progressed, tensions remained high; on December 9, reports emerged from the Indian Army regarding a clash in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh state. The incident highlighted the volatility in the region and underscored the potential for confrontations arising from ambiguous border demarcations and territorial claims between the two nations. The conflicts in both technological and physical dimensions illustrate the multifaceted nature of the China-India relationship, marked by rivalry and the struggle for influence on the Himalayan frontier.