Historical Context
The Sri Lankan Civil War has its roots firmly embedded in the historical and political relations between the majority Sinhalese population and the minority Tamils. This conflict can be traced back to the colonial period of Ceylon, under British rule from 1815 to 1948. The British exploited the island’s natural resources—specifically tea, coffee, coconuts, and rubber—while colonial policies introduced significant demographic and social shifts. The importation of Indian Tamils to address labor shortages on tea plantations heightened fears among Sinhalese of losing their cultural identity. Moreover, English-language education promoted by the American Ceylon Mission enabled Tamils to secure positions within the civil service, further intensifying animosities.
The political landscape began to shift in the early 20th century. The Ceylon National Congress was formed in 1919, representing a coalition of various ethnic groups, though tensions simmered as the British implemented systems of communal representation. The rise of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party in 1936 and subsequent legislative measures to prioritize Sinhala over English reflected growing nationalist sentiments. However, the aftermath of independence in 1948 saw the introduction of discriminatory laws like the Ceylon Citizenship Act. This act rendered approximately 700,000 Indian Tamils stateless and laid the groundwork for increasing ethnic divisions in the country.
Escalation of Ethnic Tensions
The socio-political environment in Sri Lanka worsened significantly in the years following independence. In particular, the Sinhala Only Act of 1956 fostered resentment among Tamils by enforcing Sinhala as the sole official language, effectively sidelining Tamil speakers in civil service, administration, and education. Tensions erupted into violent confrontations during the 1956 and 1958 anti-Tamil pogroms, which marked a turning point in the conflict. Sinhalese mobs targeted Tamil communities in Sinhalese-majority areas, while retaliatory actions also occurred against Sinhalese in Tamil-majority regions. The ensuing chaos exacerbated ethnic divisions and solidified the narrative of victimhood in both communities.
By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, this animosity gave rise to more organized militancy within the Tamil population. Figures like Velupillai Prabhakaran emerged as key leaders who would later found the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As official policies, such as university admission standards, increasingly discriminated against Tamils, many educated young people began to view militancy as a viable means of addressing their grievances. The 1970s saw the re-establishment of linguistic and educational policies that restricted access to resources for Tamils, culminating in a climate that urged many youth towards violent resistance rather than engagement in democratic processes.
Organizations and Political Dynamics
During this period, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) emerged, advocating for Tamil self-determination through the Vaddukkodei resolution of 1976. The TULF's central tenet demanded recognition of the rights of Tamils, reflecting a shift from political representation to assertions of sovereignty. As the TULF aligned with militant factions, the political landscape shifted further. The young Tamil militants were disillusioned with traditional politics, seeing the TULF's strategies as insufficient in addressing their plight.
The political dynamics changed again following the electoral victory of the United National Party in 1977. While the TULF regained some influence, the group's inability to effectively rally support for Tamil issues led to a decreased trust among Tamil youth. Their calls for secession from Sri Lanka seemed increasingly distant from reality, and militants, believing that the political avenue had been exhausted, intensified their violent actions against the government. The relationship between political parties and militant groups further deteriorated, particularly as the LTTE began to impose its own authority over Tamil political representation, leading to a broader fracturing of the Tamil political space.
Conclusion
The multifaceted origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War are deeply interwoven with the colonial history, socio-political dynamics, and systemic discrimination faced by Tamils. Ethnic tensions escalated with policies and incidents that marginalized Tamil voices, ultimately culminating in violent conflict. As young Tamils gravitated towards more radical solutions, the established political framework struggled to adapt, leading to a complete breakdown in dialogue and, ultimately, the protracted war that followed. The complex interplay of history, politics, and social identity continues to shape contemporary Sri Lankan society and its ongoing quest for reconciliation.
Rise of Militant Groups
The genesis of the Eelam War I (1983–1987) in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the politicization of Tamil youth in the north and east of the country. This surge of political consciousness and unrest gave rise to a myriad of militant groups, predominantly operating outside the purview of established Tamil leadership in Colombo. Among these, the most notable was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which evolved from the earlier group known as TNT in 1976. The LTTE's early years were marked by focused violent campaigns, targeting not only state actors such as policemen but also moderate Tamil politicians who sought to negotiate with the government. A significant incident during this time was the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the mayor of Jaffna, in 1975—an act orchestrated by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran that set a precedent for the group's aggressive posture.
The LTTE's methodology in this phase relied primarily on targeted assassinations and high-profile attacks. In stark contrast, the Sri Lankan government's approach consisted of increased militarization, including setting up extensive checkpoints throughout urban areas to curb LTTE activities. The attempted assassination of M. Canagaratnam, a Tamil Member of Parliament, in 1978, was a direct manifestation of the LTTE’s aggressiveness, with Prabhakaran personally involved in the attempt.
Escalation of Ethnic Tensions
A pivotal event occurred in May 1981 when the Jaffna Library was set ablaze, with reports suggesting participation by police and Sinhalese mobs. This tragic loss of over 90,000 books, including historically significant palm scrolls, served as a grim reminder to the Tamil community of the government's inability to safeguard their cultural heritage. Such events hardened Tamil sentiments and reinforced the notion that a separate state was necessary for their survival. The escalation of violence reached a new chapter in July 1983 when the LTTE executed a deadly ambush against a Sri Lankan army patrol in Thirunelveli, marking the unofficial beginning of the civil war. The retaliatory measures taken by the government, particularly during the incident known as Black July, led to significant human rights abuses, with thousands of Tamils killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.
The state-sponsored violence during Black July galvanized Tamil opposition, many of whom sought refuge in Tamil-majority areas or fled the country altogether. Throughout this tumultuous period, multiple Tamil militant groups emerged, but the LTTE, under Prabhakaran's guidance, aimed to consolidate power by eliminating rivals and asserting its dominance.
Occupation and Violence
By late 1984, the government's policies included the establishment of Sinhala settlements in areas previously occupied by Tamils, using state-sponsored convicts to harass the local population. These actions included abductions and other brutalities against Tamil civilians, further exacerbating tensions. The LTTE, capitalizing on the resentment towards governmental actions, garnered significant support following horrific events such as the Kent and Dollar Farm massacres, where entire families were slaughtered in cold blood. Retaliatory violence perpetuated cycles of death and destruction, deeply entrenching communities in a web of animosity and revenge.
Peace talks initiated in Thimphu in 1985 briefly raised hopes for a resolution, but they quickly broke down, with violence surging into 1986 and beyond. The Sri Lankan military found itself launching extensive operations, notably "Operation Liberation" in mid-1987, intended to reclaim territory lost to the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula. This marked a shift to conventional warfare, with significant military casualties being recorded.
The Era of Suicide Attacks
As the war escalated, the LTTE devised increasingly desperate strategies, which culminated in the tragic introduction of suicide attacks—a tactic that would become synonymous with the group. In July 1987, the LTTE executed its first suicide bombing, aimed at a fortified Sri Lankan army camp, killing dozens. With over 378 such attacks carried out throughout the conflict, the LTTE established itself as a pioneer of the suicide bombing phenomenon, leaving an indelible mark on the landscape of asymmetric warfare. This grim chapter in Sri Lankan history not only solidified the LTTE's position as a formidable force but also took the notion of conflict to new and devastating heights, shaping the contours of the civil war that would continue for several more decades.
Indian Involvement in the Sri Lankan Conflict
The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War, particularly from 1987 to 1990, was deeply influenced by ethnic ties, especially in Tamil Nadu, where there was strong solidarity for the Sri Lankan Tamil independence struggle. The Indian government, through various means, provided support to different factions engaged in the conflict. Initially, from August 1983 until May 1987, the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), extended military aid, training, and funding to several militant organizations, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and others. This strategy of backing multiple groups was seen as an effort to prevent any one faction from gaining dominance over the Tamil independence movement, thereby providing India with a measure of control over the situation.
As hostilities escalated, India's direct involvement became more pronounced, most notably marked by the airdrop of humanitarian supplies to Jaffna on June 5, 1987, amidst a siege conducted by Sri Lankan forces. This act was both a display of support for the LTTE and a direct challenge to the Sri Lankan government's claims of impending victory over the militants. Following this, the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, which promised significant concessions to Tamil aspirations, including the devolution of power, the potential merger of the northern and eastern provinces, and the official recognition of the Tamil language. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was tasked with maintaining order in the conflict-affected regions, while India vowed to cease assistance to Tamil militant groups.
Despite initial disarmament agreements with several militant factions, the LTTE's refusal to surrender its arms set the stage for conflict with the IPKF. The tensions led to severe confrontations, aggravated by the LTTE's retaliatory violence following the suicide of imprisoned LTTE members, resulting in a pogrom against the Sinhalese in the Eastern Province. This violence claimed the lives of approximately 150 Sinhalese and displaced tens of thousands. The backlash against India's presence fueled nationalistic sentiments among Sinhalese, leading to widespread protests and conflict with the Sri Lankan government's military efforts to suppress dissent.
While some Tamil groups sought reconciliation and peaceful avenues for resolution, the LTTE remained obstinate, leading to escalated hostilities with the IPKF. The IPKF faced serious challenges, confronting both the LTTE and growing opposition from local Tamils while also facing national backlash from Sinhalese factions opposed to foreign intervention. The Sri Lankan government’s alleged complicity in secretly supplying arms to the LTTE against the IPKF further complicated the dynamics, leading to intensified combat and increased casualties.
As the situation deteriorated and mounting casualties plagued both sides, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi maintained the IPKF's presence, though public sentiment grew increasingly against this decision. Following Gandhi's electoral defeat in December 1989, the newly appointed Prime Minister V.P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF, culminating in their exit by March 24, 1990. The intervention resulted in the deaths of around 1,200 Indian soldiers and over 5,000 Sri Lankans, with an enormous financial cost for India, estimated at over ₹10.3 billion. The implications of this intervention continue to echo in Sri Lanka's socio-political landscape, influencing relations among its ethnic groups and shaping the regional dynamics in South Asia.
Impact of Rajiv Gandhi's Assassination
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 marked a significant turning point in the relationship between India and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Gandhi was killed by Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, a female suicide bomber, during an election campaign rally in Tamil Nadu. This incident profoundly affected the perception of the LTTE in India, leading to a significant decline in support for the organization among the Indian populace. The assassination was a calculated move by the LTTE's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, who viewed Gandhi as a threat to the Tamil liberation movement. Prabhakaran feared that if Gandhi were to win the 1991 elections, he would likely reinstate the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, which Prabhakaran referred to as a "satanic force" due to their involvement in battling the LTTE during their earlier deployment in the island nation.
A subsequent investigation into Gandhi's assassination culminated in a court finding in 1998, which held the LTTE and its leader Prabhakaran responsible for the act. Special Judge V. Navaneetham ruled that the LTTE had orchestrated the assassination as part of a broader strategy to eliminate perceived enemies of the Tamil people. Over the years, various members of the LTTE leadership have expressed varying degrees of regret or justification concerning the assassination. In a 2006 interview, Anton Balasingham, a prominent ideologue within the LTTE, conveyed some remorse but declined to fully accept accountability.
Further complicating the narrative, in 2011, Kumaran Pathmanathan, who held significant leadership roles within the LTTE, openly apologized to the Indian nation for the organization's actions, describing the assassination as a "mistake" that was meticulously planned with Prabhakaran and the LTTE's intelligence chief, Pottu Amman. Pathmanathan stated that it was common knowledge among the LTTE leadership about the orchestration of the assassination, indicating a deep-seated sense of regret among certain factions of the organization.
Following Gandhi's assassination, India adopted a more distanced and cautious stance regarding the conflict in Sri Lanka, refraining from direct involvement in the ongoing civil unrest. The influence of the LPTE diminished significantly, as public sentiment shifted against them, and the Indian government subsequently increased its focus on ensuring regional stability without any direct military engagement. This incident highlighted the complexities of geopolitical relationships intertwined with ethnic conflicts and the dire consequences that can arise from such adversarial actions.
Context of Eelam War II
Eelam War II, stretching from 1990 to 1995, marked a significant escalation in the already volatile conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Despite attempts to address the grievances of the Tamil population, such as the implementation of the 13th Amendment in November 1987, violence persisted. Vartharaja Perumal, the Chief Minister of the North and East Provincial Council, articulated a 19-point demand aimed at resolving the ethnic crisis. His threats of a unilateral declaration of independence for the northern and eastern provinces prompted President Premadasa to dissolve the council in March 1990. Concurrently, the LTTE utilized terror to displace Sinhalese and Muslim farmers, asserting control over large territories in the north and east, particularly after the withdrawal of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force.
As the LTTE consolidated its power, it assumed governmental functions in the territories it controlled. The fragile cease-fire initiated in 1990 allowed the LTTE to focus on eliminating rival Tamil groups, while the Sri Lankan government targeted the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurgency through Operation Combine. However, once the cease-fire disintegrated, both factions clashed intensely, and government efforts to reclaim Jaffna met with failure. The brutality of this phase of the conflict soon became infamous, with numerous human rights abuses reported.
Escalation of Violence
The conflict saw some of its most horrific incidents during Eelam War II. On June 11, 1990, the LTTE committed a massacre of 600 policemen in the Eastern Province after they had surrendered under the pretext of safe passage. In retaliation, the government enforced an embargo on essential supplies to the Jaffna peninsula and conducted relentless airstrikes in the northern regions. Security forces were implicated in the deaths and disappearances of 4,500 Tamils in Batticaloa and Amparai districts in the latter half of 1990 alone, highlighting the grim reality for civilians caught in the crossfire. An atrocity noted during this time was the LTTE's massacre of 166 Muslim civilians in Palliyagodella, prompting security strategies that included arming Home Guard units among the Muslim population.
International and local human rights observers faced challenges in investigating these events due to government-imposed emergency regulations, creating a culture of impunity where human rights violations could occur unchecked. The brutal realities of the war were stark, with burning bodies frequently reported along roadsides, and government death squads actively targeting individuals believed to have ties to either the JVP or LTTE. October 1990 saw the LTTE forcibly expel approximately 72,000 Muslims from the Northern province, stripping them of their possessions and lives as they knew them.
Major Conflicts and Key Developments
A pivotal moment in Eelam War II was the intense Battle of Elephant Pass in July 1991, where 5,000 LTTE fighters besieged the Sri Lankan military base that governed access to Jaffna. This battle resulted in over 2,000 casualties on both sides during a month-long siege, underscoring the war's high human cost. Subsequent efforts by the government to recapture Jaffna were met with further resistance and failure, exemplified by a series of offensives in February 1992. The deaths of high-ranking military officials like Lt. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa in a landmine blast severely impacted troop morale.
The conflict reached a tragic crescendo with political assassinations and military defeats. On May 1, 1993, the LTTE successfully carried out a suicide bombing that took the life of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, altering the political landscape of Sri Lanka and fueling further violence. The LTTE's victory in November 1993 at the Battle of Pooneryn resulted in significant losses for the Sri Lankan forces, with 532 soldiers and 135 sailors either killed or unaccounted for. The relentless cycle of violence and retaliations during Eelam War II solidified the schisms between ethnic communities, setting a bleak tone for Sri Lanka's future.
Political Landscape and Initial Conflict
The Sri Lankan Civil War saw a significant shift in political power following the 1994 parliamentary elections when the United National Party (UNP) faced defeat, paving the way for the People's Alliance led by Chandrika Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga's election campaign heavily emphasized the need for peace, yet a devastating LTTE car bomb attack during a rally in Thotalanga, Grandpass, claimed the lives of the entire UNP leadership, including their presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake. This attack not only solidified Kumaratunga's position, winning her a commanding 62% majority, but also underscored the escalating violence that would mark the subsequent years.
In January 1995, a cease-fire was reached, yet negotiations faltered. Subsequent actions by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), specifically the bombing of two Sri Lankan Navy gunboats on April 19, reignited hostilities, leading to the commencement of Eelam War III. The government adopted a "war for peace" strategy, seeking to reclaim strategic locations such as Jaffna, which was held by approximately 2,000 LTTE fighters. The military engagement intensified with the launching of Operation Riviresa, aimed at recapturing the peninsula, which culminated in a fierce campaign characterized by heavy casualties on both sides and tragic civilian consequences.
Escalation of Military Operations
The Jaffna Peninsula became a focal point of intense conflict, with government forces executing operations that initially aimed to isolate the region from the rest of the country. Despite the significant military engagements, including the bombing of a church in Navali that resulted in the deaths of over 65 refugees, the Sri Lankan military ultimately regained control of Jaffna by December 5, 1995, a historical moment marked by the flag-raising ceremony conducted by Defense Minister Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte. However, the human cost was staggering, with estimates suggesting approximately 2,500 soldiers and rebels lost their lives during this offensive, alongside an alarming number of civilian casualties.
As the war progressed into 1996, the LTTE retaliated with Operation Unceasing Waves, achieving a decisive victory at the Battle of Mullaitivu. This engagement resulted in severe losses for the Sri Lanka Army, with 1,173 troops killed, raising alarms about the military's capability to manage the extensive conflict. Subsequent military initiatives saw further intense fighting, notably with the extensive loss of civilian life prompting mass evacuations. During this turbulent phase, bombings orchestrated by the LTTE in southern Sri Lanka struck both civilian and economic targets, including a devastating assault on the Central Bank in January 1996 that left at least 90 dead and thousands injured.
Continued Violence and Counter-offensives
The continued onslaught culminated in heavy fighting around key locations, with significant operations like the LTTE's Operation Unceasing Waves II in September 1998, where they captured Kilinochchi after a protracted engagement. The toll on Sri Lankan forces was substantial, with clashes claiming the lives of hundreds, heightening the sense of urgency for the government to reclaim strategic territories. Despite attempts through Operation Rana Gosa to penetrate LTTE-occupied areas in the Vanni in early 1999, success eluded the military as they faced fierce resistance and mounting casualties.
The LTTE's strategic comeback, marked by Operation Unceasing Waves III in November 1999, saw them regain territories in the Vanni, culminating in the obliteration of essential military positions and significant casualties among government troops. Around this time, the LTTE's operational range extended, leading to their infamous assassination attempt on President Kumaratunga in December 1999, which resulted in severe injuries but did not prevent her from securing re-election. However, the fall of the Elephant Pass military complex in April 2000 marked a critical turning point as the LTTE managed to dismantle a crucial barrier that had segregated the Jaffna Peninsula from the mainland.
The phase of Eelam War III is characterized by a relentless cycle of strikes, counter-attacks, civilian displacements, and significant human tragedies as both the government and LTTE engaged in brutal conflict that left deep scars on the fabric of Sri Lankan society. Facing immense military and geopolitical pressures, the conflict would continue to evolve, leading to further humanitarian crises and diplomatic complexities in the years that followed.
Growing Calls for Peace
As the Sri Lankan Civil War dragged on, the mounting casualties precipitated a wave of exhaustion among the populace, intensifying calls for peace. By the middle of 2000, human rights organizations estimated that over one million individuals were internally displaced, living in precarious conditions within camps, battling homelessness, and facing dire struggles for basic survival. The humanitarian crisis became increasingly alarming, mobilizing various grassroots movements that advocated for peace. These efforts coalesced into a robust peace movement throughout the late 1990s, with numerous organizations conducting peace camps, conferences, training sessions, and meditation practices aimed at fostering dialogue between the warring factions.
Recognizing the urgent need for resolution, both the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned to Norway for assistance in early 2000. This marked the beginning of significant international diplomacy aimed at negotiating a settlement to the protracted conflict. Initial discussions raised hopes for a lasting cessation of hostilities, and these aspirations were briefly bolstered when the LTTE proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire in December 2000. Yet, this optimism was short-lived, as the cease-fire was rescinded in April 2001, leading to renewed offensives by the LTTE.
Escalating Violence and Economic Consequences
The LTTE’s resurgence came with substantial territorial gains, as they expanded into regions previously held by government forces, notably threatening the strategically crucial Elephant Pass military complex, which housed 17,000 troops. The military complexities and heightened tensions resulted in an increasingly precarious security landscape. In July 2001, the conflict escalated dramatically with a brazen suicide attack on Bandaranaike International Airport. This assault, executed by the LTTE, resulted in significant destruction, including the obliteration of eight aircraft from the Sri Lanka Air Force and several commercial planes owned by Sri Lankan Airlines.
The ramifications of this attack rippled throughout the nation, significantly impacting the economy. As the country depended heavily on tourism as a vital source of foreign exchange, the destruction at the airport dealt a severe blow to this sector, leading to a notable drop in tourist arrivals. These economic challenges culminated in an alarming development: for the first time since gaining independence in 1948, Sri Lanka recorded negative economic growth in 2001. The combination of war-induced displacements and this economic downturn deepened the challenges faced by ordinary Sri Lankans, further complicating the already intricate quest for peace and stability.
Shift Towards Peace
By the end of 2001, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) expressed a newfound willingness to engage in peaceful negotiations to resolve the long-standing conflict in Sri Lanka. One contributing factor may have been the mounting international pressure, particularly due to the United States' direct support for the Sri Lankan government amidst the broader global "War on Terror". The LTTE's leadership was also significantly affected by the strategic military operations conducted by the Sri Lankan army’s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), which successfully targeted and eliminated high-ranking LTTE officials, including Vaithilingam Sornalingam, alias Shankar, who was one of the closest aides to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. This loss weakened the rebel group’s command structure and may have incentivized the LTTE to reconsider its approach.
In the southern part of the country, public dissatisfaction was growing regarding the government's "war for peace" strategy, particularly as the economy faltered and tangible progress toward peace appeared elusive. President Chandrika Kumaratunga faced increased scrutiny, leading to the loss of a no-confidence motion, which compelled her to dissolve parliament and call for fresh elections. The subsequent elections held on December 5, 2001, resulted in a notable victory for the United National Front (UNF), led by Ranil Wickremesinghe, who promoted a pro-peace agenda. Wickremesinghe emphasized the necessity of engaging in negotiated dialogue to resolve the conflict with the LTTE.
Amidst these political changes and under Norway's facilitation, driven by a desire to broker peace, the LTTE declared a 30-day cease-fire on December 19. This announcement included a commitment to halt all military actions against Sri Lankan government forces, marking a significant moment of potential reconciliation. The new UNF government positively responded by reciprocating the cease-fire two days later, imposing a month-long cessation of hostilities and agreeing to lift a prolonged economic embargo that had affected areas under LTTE control.
However, the cease-fire was contentious and controversial among various segments of Sri Lankan society. Many groups, particularly among the Buddhist clergy, vocally opposed the cease-fire and its perceived concessions to the LTTE. These dissenters engaged in protests, including burning Norwegian flags, symbolizing their frustrations. Their agitation eventually culminated in the formation of a politically motivated party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya, which held extreme views against the peace negotiations, thereby contributing to the polarized political landscape in the country at that time. This emergence of hardline nationalist sentiments foreshadowed the complexities and challenges that would plague future peace efforts in Sri Lanka.
== Memorandum of Understanding and Ceasefire Agreement ==
On 22 February 2002, a significant milestone in the Sri Lankan Civil War was reached with the formalization of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which included the signing of a permanent cease-fire agreement (CFA). The Norwegian government was appointed as the mediator in the peace process, a role that involved coordinating discussions between the two parties and facilitating dialogue. Together with other Nordic nations, they established the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, a committee of experts tasked with overseeing compliance with the cease-fire, a crucial step towards lay the groundwork for lasting peace.
In an encouraging move towards reconciliation, the Sri Lankan government lifted the ban on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), thereby ensuring a pathway for direct negotiations with the organization. This thaw in relations led to progressive developments, including the resumption of commercial air travel to Jaffna — a region heavily affected by the conflict — and the reopening of the vital A9 highway. This vital roadway not only connected government-controlled areas in the southern part of the country with Jaffna, but also re-established a crucial logistical route through LTTE-held territories. While the passage of civilians through the Vanni region was a welcome respite, it was accompanied by the imposition of a tax by the LTTE, reflecting the complexities of governance in contested regions.
Global interest in achieving peace in Sri Lanka rapidly grew, with several foreign nations pledging substantial financial support contingent upon the successful resolution of the conflict. This external backing, coupled with a renewed sense of optimism, fueled hopes that an end to the protracted war was indeed attainable. The much-anticipated peace negotiations commenced in Phuket, Thailand, representing a series of talks that extended to various international venues, including Norway, Germany, and Japan.
During these discussions, both parties demonstrated unprecedented willingness to compromise. Notably, the LTTE indicated a shift in its political objectives by agreeing to the principle of a federal solution and conceding their long-standing aspiration for a separate Tamil Eelam state. This was a substantial pivot from previous positions, as the LTTE had historically demanded total independence. In parallel, the Sri Lankan government also showed flexibility, moving away from its prior stance that often limited negotiations to minimal devolution of power. Furthermore, for the first time in years, both factions engaged in the exchange of prisoners of war, showcasing a tangible step towards building trust and commitment to the peace process. The momentum built during these negotiations underscored the potential for a transformative resolution to a conflict that had spanned over two decades and claimed countless lives.
Political Turmoil in the South
The political landscape in Sri Lanka experienced significant upheaval following the elections of 2001, marking an unprecedented moment in the nation's governance. For the first time, the President and Prime Minister emerged from opposing political parties, leading to a fraught cohabitation. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, aligned with the United National Party (UNP), endorsed a federal solution to the persistent ethnic conflict, a stance that clashed sharply with those of hard-line factions within President Chandrika Kumaratunga's party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). These Sinhala nationalist groups expressed deep skepticism towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), particularly in light of the group's continued militarization activities. The LTTE not only maintained a tax system but also engaged in arms smuggling, the recruitment of child soldiers, and assassination of rival Tamil leaders and government agents, following events such as the Millennium City incident. During this tumultuous period, the LTTE expanded its influence by establishing strategic bases, notably around Trincomalee Harbour and throughout the Eastern Province.
The peace negotiations reached a critical juncture on April 21, 2003, when the LTTE announced a suspension of talks due to dissatisfaction with how certain "critical issues" were being addressed. The LTTE's grievances included their exclusion from crucial reconstruction discussions in Washington, DC, and concerns regarding the disparity between the promised benefits of peace and the reality on the ground. They highlighted a perceived imbalance in the relative tranquility of government-held areas versus the ongoing violence plaguing regions under LTTE control. Despite these setbacks, the LTTE professed a commitment to resolving the two-decade-long conflict, calling for tangible progress in security measures before a settlement could advance.
In response to the political tensions and pressures from within her party, President Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and asserted control over three pivotal ministries: Mass Media, Interior, and Defense. This move aimed to counteract the rising tensions surrounding the LTTE's peace proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA), which granted extensive powers to the group over the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. Critics, particularly from the nationalist factions, accused Prime Minister Wickremasinghe of effectively surrendering the north and east to the LTTE. As public discontent grew, Kumaratunga sought to solidify her position by forming a new alliance with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) under the banner of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). This coalition advocated for a firmer stance against the LTTE and eventually led to calls for fresh elections. The elections, held on April 8, 2004, culminated in a victory for the UPFA, leading to Mahinda Rajapakse's appointment as Prime Minister, thus heralding a new phase in Sri Lankan politics amidst a backdrop of ongoing conflict.
== Split of the LTTE ==
In March 2004, a significant schism emerged within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), marking a pivotal moment in the organization’s history. This rift predominantly involved the northern and eastern factions of the LTTE, and was spearheaded by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, more commonly known as Col. Karuna. As the Eastern commander and a trusted ally of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, Karuna led a group of approximately 5,000 eastern cadres in a revolt against the central command. He cited a lack of resources and inadequate representation for Tamils in the eastern region of Sri Lanka as primary causes for his actions. This rebellion not only showcased the internal divisions within the LTTE but also suggested a growing unrest regarding the leadership’s strategic priorities, especially regarding the allocation of resources.
Following the parliamentary elections, clashes between Karuna's faction and loyal LTTE forces erupted in Southern Trincomalee. These skirmishes resulted in a swift defeat for Karuna's group, forcing its leaders, including Karuna himself, to flee and find refuge in hiding. Notably, he received assistance from Seyed Ali Zahir Moulana, a politician affiliated with the ruling party, indicating a complex intermingling of politics and military conflicts in the region. Despite this setback, the so-called "Karuna faction" continued to engage in hostilities against the LTTE, maintaining significant influence in the eastern provinces. They eventually capitalized on their newfound autonomy by forming a political party, the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), signaling their intention to participate in Sri Lankan elections in the future.
The backdrop of these events was a fragile cease-fire that, despite numerous violations, managed to hold through the escalating internal conflict. By 2005, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) reported over 3,000 cease-fire violations attributed to the LTTE and around 300 by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLA). Allegations swirled around both parties engaging in covert operations aimed at undermining one another. The government accused the LTTE of various acts, including the assassination of political opponents, recruitment of child soldiers, arms smuggling, and targeting government forces and intelligence agents. Conversely, the LTTE leveled accusations against the government for allegedly supporting paramilitary factions, especially the emergent Karuna group, thus intensifying the cycle of violence and mistrust. This period highlighted not only the fracturing of the LTTE but also the complexities of the broader conflict in Sri Lanka, revealing the interwoven nature of military and political struggles within the island's tumultuous landscape.
Tsunami and Its Consequences
On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami devastated Sri Lanka, claiming over 35,000 lives and displacing countless others. The natural disaster prompted an outpouring of international aid aimed at relief efforts, but it also highlighted significant tensions regarding aid distribution, particularly in Tamil-dominated regions under the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In an attempt to address these challenges, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE reached an agreement on the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) by June 24. However, this agreement was met with fierce criticism from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a leftist political party, leading them to withdraw from the coalition government. The P-TOMS also faced legal challenges, ultimately culminating in its dissolution by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The cancellation raised concerns about the inadequacy of aid reaching the northern and eastern provinces, despite an initial decrease in violence immediately following the tsunami.
The assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on August 12, 2005, marked a critical turning point in the conflict and international perception of the LTTE. Kadirgamar, a Tamil and a respected figure among international diplomats for his forthright stance against the LTTE, was believed to have been targeted by a sniper associated with the group. His death alienated the LTTE from the global community, significantly diminishing the sympathy they previously enjoyed. Moreover, the international silence that followed during the Sri Lankan government's military operations against the LTTE in 2006 underscored this change. The tensions escalated further when the LTTE closed the Mavil aru sluice, a strategic move that heightened hostilities.
Political shifts within Sri Lanka also had important ramifications for the conflict. In a ruling by the Supreme Court, President Kumaratunga's second term was declared invalid, which mandated fresh presidential elections. The November elections saw former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe of the United National Front (UNF) campaigning for renewed dialogue with the LTTE, while the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) backed Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, who advocated a more aggressive approach. The LTTE urged Tamil voters to boycott the elections, a move that ultimately contributed to Wickremasinghe's loss, as Rajapaksa narrowly claimed victory. In response to the election results, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran warned in his annual address that the organization would intensify its struggle in 2006 if the government did not initiate genuine efforts for peace, setting the stage for further escalation of the conflict.
Eelam War IV (2006–2009)
The Eelam War IV marked a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), beginning in December 2005. During this period, the northeast of the country witnessed a surge in guerrilla warfare tactics employed by the LTTE, including notorious Claymore mine attacks that resulted in the deaths of approximately 150 government troops. This increase in violence signified a turning point in the conflict, shifting from large-scale battles to more targeted and irregular forms of warfare. The Sea Tigers, the naval wing of the LTTE, engaged in numerous skirmishes with the Sri Lankan navy during this time, exacerbating tensions and fueling the cycle of violence. The assassinations of individuals such as Taraki Sivaram, a journalist known for his pro-LTTE stance, and Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE Member of Parliament, further underscored the lethal political atmosphere, with both deaths attributed to alleged state actors.
As the war progressed into 2006, the nature of the conflict transformed, with a troubling focus on civilian targets emerging. The LTTE escalated its campaign against the Sri Lankan state by launching a series of bombings on commuter buses and trains across various parts of the country, particularly around the capital, Colombo. These attacks instilled fear among the civilian population and disrupted daily life, leading to increased casualties among innocent bystanders. The deliberate targeting of civilians by the LTTE highlighted the ruthless tactics employed by the group and their commitment to instilling terror as a method of warfare. In retaliation, the Sri Lankan government intensified its military operations, aiming to reclaim territory controlled by the LTTE and restore order.
The ramifications of these attacks during Eelam War IV were profound and far-reaching. They galvanized an already-divided society and fueled animosity between ethnic communities. Amidst the chaos, humanitarian concerns rose to the forefront, as thousands of civilians found themselves caught in the crossfire, forced to flee their homes and seek refuge from the violence. Humanitarian organizations found it increasingly difficult to operate in such conditions, raising alarms over displacement, food shortages, and attacks on aid workers. Observers noted that the deteriorating security situation demanded urgent international attention and intervention to address the looming humanitarian crisis and seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Background to the Negotiations
In the wake of escalating violence during the Sri Lankan Civil War, the need for renewed dialogue between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became imperative. The co-chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference urged both sides to resume negotiations, emphasizing the potential for worsening conflict. US State Department officials warned the LTTE that any resurgence of hostilities would face a significantly more adept and resolute Sri Lankan military, setting a tense backdrop for the peace discussions. Unfortunately, despite formal attempts to engage in talks, violence against civilians, including the tragic murders of five Tamil students on 2 January 2006, underscored the fragility of the situation.
Efforts for Peace
In a last-minute attempt to salvage the chances for an agreement, Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim and LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham intervened on the island. Initial disagreements between the parties over the location of talks delayed progress; however, a breakthrough was achieved when both sides agreed to a new round of negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, scheduled for 22 and 23 February 2006. The ensuing weeks saw a notable decrease in violent encounters, fostering a glimmer of hope. However, this calm was short-lived, as the LTTE reignited military attacks against Sri Lankan forces by April.
Renewed Tensions and Canceled Talks
Amidst rising violence, the LTTE requested a delay of the Geneva talks to 24–25 April, a request the government initially acquiesced to. Following some negotiations, both parties arranged for a civilian vessel to transport regional LTTE leaders under international truce monitors, which necessitated crossing through government-controlled areas. Tensions escalated again when the LTTE withdrew from the arranged meeting, citing disputes over naval escort agreements, despite previous agreements on this matter. This cancellation led to a premature cessation of peace talks on 20 April 2006 as the LTTE officially announced an indefinite withdrawal, citing logistical issues while many analysts viewed this as a pretext to evade negotiations.
Escalating Violence and International Response
The conflict sharply escalated following the LTTE's withdrawal. On 23 April 2006, a horrific attack saw six Sinhalese rice farmers murdered in their fields, with additional civilian casualties following on 13 May. The violence reached a critical point when a female LTTE suicide bomber, pretending to be pregnant, attempted the assassination of the Sri Lanka Army commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, detonating explosives at army headquarters in Colombo. In retaliation, the Sri Lanka Air Force conducted aerial assaults on LTTE positions in the northeast for the first time since the 2001 cease-fire, demonstrating a significant shift in military strategy.
International Condemnation and Consequences
The dynamics of international involvement shifted dramatically after the assault on the army commander, alongside previous high-profile attacks, such as the assassination of influential Tamil politician Lakshman Kadirgamar. On 19 May 2006, the European Union proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organization, freezing its assets across the 27 member nations. The European Parliament articulated a call for political representation in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces, acknowledging that the LTTE did not epitomize all Tamils. In response to these developments, new talks were set for June in Oslo, Norway. However, these negotiations collapsed when the LTTE refused to meet the government delegation, exacerbating tensions and cutting off a potential avenue for peace.
Continued Violence and Uncertainty
The cycle of violence escalated further with notable incidents such as the Vankalai massacre, where blame was squarely placed on both the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil Tigers. The Kebithigollewa massacre resulted in the deaths of at least 64 Sinhalese civilians, provoking renewed Sri Lankan air strikes. The assassination of General Parami Kulatunga, one of the country’s highest-ranking military officials, by an LTTE suicide bomber, signaled a critical juncture where questions arose about the feasibility and existence of a cease-fire. The actions of both parties led to a crisis of credibility and raised doubts about the possibility of restoring peace amid entrenched hostilities. The situation remained volatile as both sides continued their military engagements, undermining any hopes for a lasting resolution to the conflict.
Background of the Mavil Aru Water Dispute
The Mavil Aru water dispute emerged as a significant flashpoint in the Sri Lankan Civil War, leading to the first large-scale hostilities following the ceasefire agreement in 2002. This conflict ignited on July 21, 2006, when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unilaterally closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru reservoir. Located in eastern Sri Lanka, this reservoir served a vital role in supplying water to areas including Trincomalee, which was crucial for agricultural and domestic needs for approximately 15,000 families in government-controlled areas. The closure not only exacerbated tensions between the government and LTTE but also highlighted the area's complex ethnic demographics, where Sinhala, Muslim, and Tamil communities coexist.
Geopolitical Significance
The Mavil Aru region, with its strategic location, plays a critical role in Sri Lanka’s security dynamics. This area acts as a gateway to Koddiyar Bay and is closely linked to the Trincomalee port, one of the nation’s key naval bases. The presence of the LTTE here posed a significant threat to the Sri Lankan armed forces, triggering fears of a larger confrontation. As the situation on the ground grew increasingly tenuous, the international community watched closely, mindful of the potential implications for regional stability and humanitarian conditions for the affected populations.
Military Operations and Humanitarian Crisis
After failing to resolve the water crisis through diplomatic channels facilitated by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the Sri Lankan military commenced operations aimed at reopening the sluice gates. President Mahinda Rajapaksa emphasized that access to water constitutes a fundamental human right and notably remarked that utilities like water should not be exploited as leverage in conflicts. Consequently, military operations escalated, with air and ground forces targeting LTTE positions not only in Mavil Aru but also in nearby regions such as Batticaloa and Vavuniya.
Air strikes were initiated on July 26, paving the way for a concerted ground offensive. The sluice gates were finally reopened on August 8, following intense military engagements. Conflicting narratives emerged regarding the circumstances of this reopening. While the SLMM claimed they influenced the LTTE to lift the blockade, the LTTE stated they acted on humanitarian grounds. In stark contrast, military analysts suggested that the reopening resulted from targeted military strikes that decimated LTTE positions.
Aftermath and Consequences
The military operation, dubbed "Operation Watershed," resulted in tragic consequences, with reports indicating around 150 civilian casualties and over 50,000 people displaced from Mutur and surrounding villages. This humanitarian crisis underscored the severe toll of military conflict on innocent populations, setting a grim precedent for future engagements. Ultimately, the Mavil Aru water dispute galvanized further military action, foreshadowing the onset of Eelam War IV, which would engulf the nation in further violence and suffering in the following years. As the smoke of battle settled, the situation served as a stark reminder of the pervasive challenges faced by various ethnic communities in seeking peace amidst ongoing conflict.
LTTE's Escalation of Hostilities
In early August 2006, the situation in Sri Lanka dramatically worsened as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) intensified its military operations. The local conflict, which had simmered for years, erupted into fierce fighting in several key areas, most notably in Trincomalee and Muttur. On August 2, a coordinated artillery assault by the LTTE struck Muttur, a strategically significant coastal town held by the government. This offensive resulted in the deaths of at least 30 civilians and forced approximately 25,000 residents to flee their homes. The initial advantage gained by the LTTE was met with a swift military response; by August 5, the Sri Lankan military had regained control of Muttur, inflicting significant casualties on the LTTE with estimates of over 150 fighters killed during the confrontations.
The violence not only highlighted the contested nature of the region but also raised serious concerns regarding humanitarian safety. Shortly after the clashes in Muttur, a tragic incident unfolded involving 17 humanitarian workers from Action Against Hunger (ACF). These individuals, identifiable by their charitable work attire, were brutally murdered in their office, found lying face down with gunshot wounds. The brutality of this act sparked widespread international condemnation, illustrating the peril faced by those dedicated to humanitarian efforts in conflict zones. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) attributed blame for the massacre to government forces, a claim that was vehemently denied by the Sri Lankan authorities, who labeled it a "pathetic and biased" assertion.
Simultaneously, the conflict escalated further north as the LTTE launched massive offensives against Sri Lankan Army positions on the Jaffna peninsula starting August 11. Approximately 400 to 500 LTTE fighters executed land and amphibious assaults, launching a heavy barrage of artillery at key military installations, including the critically located Palaly airbase. The resulting clashes marked one of the bloodiest confrontations since the beginning of the ceasefire in 2002, with the LTTE reportedly suffering over 200 fatalities while Sri Lankan armed forces experienced losses of around 90 soldiers and sailors.
As engagements continued in the northern and eastern regions, air operations by the Sri Lanka Air Force targeted the LTTE's stronghold in Mullaitivu, leading to a controversial airstrike that resulted in significant civilian casualties. While the LTTE accused the military of deliberately attacking a gathering of schoolgirls, claiming 61 fatalities, the SLMM could only verify 19 casualties. The government defended its actions, positing that the strike targeted an LTTE training facility that utilized underage recruits. Such incidents underscore the increasingly fraught and chaotic nature of the conflict, blurring the lines between combatants and non-combatants.
On the same day as the airstrike in Mullaitivu, a separate incident involved an assassination attempt on Pakistan's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Bashir Wali Mohamed. His convoy fell victim to a claymore mine explosion, resulting in seven fatalities including civilians and injuries to 17 others. Following the attack, the High Commissioner insinuated that India could be involved, suggesting it might be a tactic to intimidate Pakistan, which was a significant supplier of military equipment to the Sri Lankan government. As the conflict continued to spiral, the international community was left grappling with the implications of sustained violence and the complicated geopolitical dynamics at play in the region.
Strategic Importance of Sampur
The fall of Sampur during the Sri Lankan Civil War highlighted the intense strategic importance of this region in relation to the ongoing conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The area, situated close to the Koddiyar Bay across from the Trincomalee naval base, posed a significant threat to the security of the proactive military presence and naval operations essential for the government. Sri Lanka’s navy base in Trincomalee was not only a critical military installation but also served as a pivotal supply route for operations in the northern Jaffna Peninsula.
The presence of LTTE artillery in and around Sampur created a precarious situation whereby the naval base was subjected to continuous potential attacks, which could have effectively paralyzed the military's operations in the region. This concern was echoed by a US military advisory team in 2005, indicating international awareness of the threat posed by the LTTE’s positioning. The strategic significance of controlling Sampur became crucial as the LTTE escalated its military campaigns, notably following confrontations in Mavil Aru and Muttur, which further destabilized the cease-fire agreement established in 2002.
The Military Offensive
On August 21, 2006, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse announced a decisive government strategy aimed at neutralizing the LTTE presence in Sampur, marking a shift towards a more aggressive military posture. As hostilities escalated, the government ordered an offensive on August 28 to recapture control of Sampur as well as the surrounding Kaddaiparichchan and Thoppur areas. The LTTE, recognizing the scale of the military response, warned that continued offensive actions would result in the collapse of the cease-fire, an indication of the high stakes involved.
The ensuing military operation, led by Brigade Commander Sarath Wijesinghe, culminated in the successful recapture of Sampur by September 4, 2006. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the conflict, being the first significant territorial gain for the Sri Lankan armed forces in years and illustrating the shifting dynamics of power on the battlefield. With LTTE fighters acknowledging their withdrawal from the town, the military sought to establish firm control and set up new bases to bolster their strategic foothold in the region.
Casualties and Aftermath
In the aftermath of the military operation, the loss of life on both sides was considerable. The Sri Lankan military reported that 33 personnel had died during the assault, while estimates suggested over 200 LTTE fighters were killed. These casualties underscored the brutal nature of the conflict and the high human cost associated with such territorial engagements.
The fall of Sampur signified not only a change in territorial control but also an intensification of hostilities within the civil war that had plagued Sri Lanka since 1983. As the government sought to assert its influence over former LTTE strongholds, the conflict entered a phase of increased violence, foreshadowing subsequent military campaigns aimed at securing more territories held by the LTTE. This notable event in the Sri Lankan Civil War underscored the persistent volatility of the situation and the ongoing challenges faced in achieving a lasting peace.
LTTE Retaliation and Escalation of Conflict
In October, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) executed a series of coordinated attacks that marked a significant escalation in hostilities during the protracted Sri Lankan Civil War. The conflict's intensity reached a peak when LTTE forces ambushed a large contingent of government troops in Muhamalai, resulting in approximately 130 soldiers' deaths. This strategic crossing point became a focal point of violence, exemplifying the ongoing struggle for territorial control between government forces and the LTTE.
Tragically, the LTTE's tactics included advancing their capability for deadly suicide bombings. Soon after the incident at Muhamalai, a notable attack occurred in Habarana, where a suspected LTTE suicide bomber targeted a naval convoy and killed around 100 sailors who were returning home on leave. This incident marked the deadliest suicide attack within the context of the ongoing conflict and highlighted the LTTE's willingness to execute such devastating strikes against military personnel.
In addition to these assaults, the LTTE Sea Tiger naval unit launched an unprecedented attack on the Dakshina naval base in Galle, located in the southern part of the country. This attack represented the furthest south the LTTE had ever operated in such a significant capacity, utilizing five suicide boats manned by a total of 15 LTTE fighters. The government's naval forces, however, successfully repelled this attack, sustaining minimal damage and resulting in the loss of all 15 LTTE fighters, alongside one Navy sailor.
Despite the violence surrounding these events, both parties—the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government—agreed to attend peace talks in Geneva on 28–29 October. However, the discussions quickly collapsed when disagreements arose over the crucial A9 highway. This highway serves as the primary link between Jaffna, a region held by the LTTE, and the government-controlled territories in the south. The LTTE advocated for its reopening, which had been closed after intense fighting earlier in August. The government, on the other hand, expressed concerns that the LTTE would exploit the route to levy taxes on civilians and facilitate further military operations against government forces, underlining the complexity of negotiating peace.
As the conflict continued into the new year, the LTTE's violent strategies persisted. Reports surfaced of two bus bombings executed by suspected LTTE members in southern Sri Lanka, resulting in the deaths of 21 civilians. The nature of these attacks bore a distinct similarity to previous LTTE operations, prompting the Sri Lankan government to condemn the acts and place the blame squarely on the LTTE. Despite this attribution of guilt, the LTTE denied its involvement, showcasing the ongoing propaganda battle and the validity of claims amidst a cycle of violence that was entrenched within the broader conflict.
The situation remained fluid, with both sides locked in a struggle that was underpinned by deep-seated grievances, competing territorial claims, and a pervasive cycle of violence.
Government Offensive in the East
In December 2006, Sri Lankan government officials announced an extensive military campaign aimed at expelling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from the Eastern Province. The government’s strategy involved first securing the east and then deploying the full military might to confront the LTTE in the north. This decision was sparked by allegations that the LTTE was shelling civilian areas and systematically using approximately 35,000 individuals as human shields. Reports from civilians corroborated these claims, indicating they were forcibly held by the Tamil Tigers. A tragic incident occurred on November 7, 2006, when over 45 Tamil civilians lost their lives in what became known as the Vaharai bombing, reflecting the tense and violent conditions prevailing at that time.
The military campaign officially commenced on December 8, 2006, in the Batticaloa District, with an immediate objective to seize Vakarai, a critical stronghold of the LTTE in the east. However, after a week of intense fighting, the operation was suspended due to the large civilian population in the area and complications posed by monsoon rains that hampered combat operations. In this period of conflict, an estimated 20,000 civilians fled towards government-controlled regions out of fear for their safety. On January 19, 2007, after regrouping and launching a renewed assault in mid-January, government forces captured Vakarai. This strategic victory was anticipated to disrupt the supply lines between northern LTTE operatives and those in the east, thereby further undermining the organization’s influence in the region. Meanwhile, the LTTE accused the government of civilian casualties, notably claiming that air strikes conducted by the military resulted in the deaths of 15 civilians following the Padahuthurai bombing on January 2.
As the government intensified its military offensive, the LTTE remained active in conducting attacks against civilian targets in territory held by the government. For instance, on April 1, 2007, the Sri Lankan military accused the LTTE of murdering six Sinhalese aid workers in the Batticaloa district who were there to assist with tsunami recovery efforts. The following day, a bomb detonated on a civilian bus in Ampara, resulting in 17 fatalities, including three children, highlighting the ongoing cycle of violence engulfing both military and civilian populations.
In February 2007, following assessments of the battlefield dynamics, troops—primarily comprised of Special Forces and Commando units—embarked on a focused operation to eradicate any remaining LTTE fighters in the Eastern Province. This operation saw significant victories, such as the capture of the LTTE's vital base in Kokkadicholai on March 28 and the key A5 highway on April 12, which marked a pivotal moment as it restored governmental control over a major transportation route for the first time in 15 years. By this stage, the LTTE was confined to a mere 140-square-kilometre patch of jungle in the Thoppigala region northwest of Batticaloa. The culminating engagement, known as the Battle of Thoppigala, concluded on July 11, 2007, with the army seizing the Thoppigala peak, which effectively obliterated the LTTE's military capabilities in the Eastern Province and marked the end of Eelam War IV in that theater.
Government Offensive in the North
The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northern regions of the country had entered a critical phase by late 2007. Sporadic fighting had characterized the early part of that year; however, from September onwards, the scale and intensity of clashes underwent a significant escalation. The Forward Defence Lines, which marked the boundary separating the government forces from LTTE-controlled territory, became the focal point of intense military confrontations. Heavy exchanges of artillery fire were commonplace, leading to direct military incursions by the Sri Lankan Army into LTTE-held areas. By December 2007, the Sri Lankan military had successfully breached major LTTE defences in strategic locations such as Uyilankulama, Parappakandal, and Thampanai, marking a crucial shift in the balance of power on the battlefield.
In an interview published in the Sunday Observer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka expressed cautious optimism regarding the military's advances. He announced that the Sri Lankan Army had effectively occupied the LTTE's Forward Defence Lines and had encircled the Wanni area, which was a significant stronghold for the LTTE. His estimates suggested that only around 3,000 LTTE fighters remained. The Army’s strategy was to eliminate this remaining cadre within the first half of 2008. However, the subsequent day brought a more sobering assessment from various military commanders, indicating that the LTTE’s numbers could be closer to 5,000, prompting concerns about the challenges still ahead for the Sri Lankan military.
The campaign against the LTTE leadership intensified following targeted air strikes. On November 26, 2007, the Sri Lanka Air Force claimed to have injured Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, during an air assault on a bunker complex. This strike was part of a broader strategy aimed at dismantling the organization’s command structure. The killing of key LTTE figures, such as S. P. Thamilselvan on November 2, and Colonel Charles on January 5, 2008, demonstrated the government’s commitment to undermining LTTE capabilities. These operations were part of a concerted effort to weaken the rebel group’s political and military strategies, showcasing the government’s intent to decisively bring an end to the long-standing conflict in Sri Lanka.
Overall, the events of late 2007 and early 2008 represented a turning point in the Sri Lankan Civil War, with military leaders on both sides aware that the coming months would be critical in determining the future of the conflict. The government forces, emboldened by recent successes and aiming to leverage momentum, planned to escalate their operations further into LTTE territory, signaling a possible shift toward a more aggressive military posture designed to bring about a swift conclusion to the hostilities.
Ceasefire Agreement Abrogation
In December 2007, the political landscape of the Sri Lankan Civil War took a significant turn when Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa urged the government to abandon the longstanding ceasefire agreement that had been in place since February 2002. This ceasefire, established largely to facilitate peace talks and reduce hostilities between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), had been marred by numerous violations. On 2 January 2008, the Sri Lankan government officially declared the abrogation of the ceasefire agreement. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had documented a staggering 3,830 ceasefire violations attributed to the LTTE, contrasted with just 351 by the Sri Lankan security forces from February 2002 to May 2007. Following a halt in SLMM determinations on ceasefire violations in May 2007, the government posited that the circumstances no longer merited a ceasefire.
The withdrawal from the ceasefire drew significant international concern and disappointment from various donor nations that had facilitated the peace process. In a response to the government's move, the LTTE asserted that they were still committed to the ceasefire and criticized the unilateral withdrawal as unjustified. The LTTE urged the international community to reconsider the bans imposed on them, arguing that their adherence to the agreement warranted reconsideration of their status.
In parallel to these developments, the government's military strategy shifted to expand its operational fronts. The intention was to secure key strategic territories, and on 23 April, the Sri Lankan Army initiated an offensive along the Muhamalai Forward Defence Line but encountered initial setbacks. However, this was soon followed by a series of rapid military advances; by 9 May, the government forces captured the strategically significant town of Adampan. This momentum continued with the acquisition of the Mannar, known as the "Rice Bowl" due to its fertile paddy fields, on 30 June, followed by Vidattaltivu on 16 July, and Iluppaikkadavai on 20 July.
Amid this intensifying military conflict, the LTTE announced a unilateral ceasefire effective from 28 July to 4 August 2008, intending to coincide with the 15th SAARC summit of heads of state taking place in Colombo. This move was perceived by the Sri Lankan government as insincere and propagandistic, leading them to dismiss the LTTE's offer as unnecessary and treacherous. The situation depicted a complex dynamic where military strategies and political maneuvering were intertwined, resulting in an escalation of hostilities that would have lasting implications on the conflict's trajectory.
Government Military Advancements
On 2 August 2008, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) achieved a crucial milestone by capturing Vellankulam, the last bastion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Mannar District. This victory marked the culmination of an extensive eight-month campaign aimed at reclaiming the area from LTTE control. The SLA continued its momentum and seized Mallavi by 2 September, a strategic location that following weeks of intense clashes underscored the government's determination to debilitate LTTE capabilities. In response, the LTTE launched a surprising counter-offensive on 9 September, targeting the Vavuniya air base. The aftermath of this engagement resulted in each side claiming a form of victory, highlighting the complexities of battlefield narratives during the civil war.
Having secured Mannar, SLA forces proceeded into Kilinochchi District, the final stronghold of the LTTE, with ambitions of capturing Kilinochchi town by the year's end. By 3 October 2008, an aid convoy from the United Nations successfully delivered supplies to Kilinochchi, although reports indicated that the town was largely deserted, symbolizing the receding grip of the LTTE. However, on 6 October, the ongoing conflict claimed the life of retired Major General Janaka Perera, alongside 26 others, in a suicide bombing orchestrated by the LTTE, demonstrating the ongoing risk and violence that punctuated this period.
A significant tactical advance occurred on 17 October 2008 when SLA troops successfully severed the Mannar-Poonaryn A32 highway near Nachchikuda, an essential route and a remaining stronghold for the LTTE's Sea Tigers. The SLA initiated a comprehensive assault shortly thereafter, capturing the stronghold by 29 October. Following this achievement, Army Task Force 1 continued its relentless offensive advancing toward Pooneryn and subsequently capturing key locations including Kiranchchi, Palavi, Veravil, Valaipadu, and finally Devil's Point. On 15 November, troops from Army Task Force 1 entered Pooneryn, which was a strategically pivotal stronghold for the LTTE. Concurrently, the establishment of Army Task Force 3 aimed to open a new front in Mankulam, where SLA troops were successful in securing the area around Mankulam by 17 November 2008.
Throughout this military escalation, the humanitarian situation for the more than 200,000 civilians displaced by the conflict deteriorated alarmingly. Reports suggested a looming humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the ongoing hostilities, creating a pressing need for international intervention. However, skepticism regarding the LTTE's willingness to engage in genuine negotiations led to a lack of intervention from Western powers and India, highlighting the geopolitical complexities that often characterize civil conflicts. This combination of military offensives and the declining humanitarian situation created a critical juncture in the Sri Lankan Civil War, raising questions about the immediate and long-term ramifications for all parties involved.
Offensive on Kilinochchi
The offensive on Kilinochchi marked a significant chapter in the Sri Lankan Civil War, commencing on 23 November 2008. The Sri Lankan Army (SLA) initiated a carefully coordinated attack on the LTTE rebel defenses from three strategic directions. Despite the army's organized efforts, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) proved to be formidable opponents, demonstrating their capability to inflict substantial damage on the advancing forces. The battles that unfolded were characterized by intense combat, leading to significant casualties for both the SLA and LTTE.
After weeks of fighting, by 1 January 2009, SLA troops finally took control of Paranthan, a key location situated to the north of Kilinochchi along the crucial A-9 highway. This victory effectively severed the southern flank of the LTTE's Elephant Pass stronghold and unveiled Kilinochchi’s vulnerabilities. It was here that the LTTE had established its de facto administrative capital for over a decade, using the area as a command center for their operations. Just a day later, on 2 January 2009, the Sri Lankan Army successfully seized Kilinochchi. This decisive victory not only undermined the LTTE's strategic capabilities but also tarnished their reputation as an invincible militant organization. Analysts began predicting the impending collapse of the LTTE in light of the growing military pressures from the Sri Lankan forces on multiple fronts.
Retreat to Mullaitivu
Following the fall of Kilinochchi, the LTTE was compelled to retreat from the Jaffna Peninsula, consolidating its forces in the jungles of Mullaitivu. The SLA's rapid advance led to the complete capture of the Jaffna Peninsula by 14 January 2009. However, internal disarray and diminishing resources hindered the LTTE’s ability to maintain a viable defense. On 25 January, the SLA seized Mullaitivu, further diminishing the territorial control of the LTTE. The fall of Chalai on 5 February marked the last significant Sea Tiger base being dismantled. With less than 200 square kilometers remaining under their control, the LTTE was reduced to a shadow of its former stature.
Amid the military offensives, this phase of the war was marred by escalating violence against civilians. Reports emerged detailing a grave humanitarian crisis, with Human Rights Watch issuing stark accusations against the SLA for indiscriminately shelling civilian areas, including hospitals, leading to what they described as "slaughtering" innocent lives. Additionally, the plight of approximately 200,000 internally displaced persons crowded into a mere 14 square kilometers of land in Vanni continued to attract international condemnation. The government had designated this area as a 'no-fire zone,' yet the civilians within faced significant threats and dire conditions.
Air Strikes and Shifting Control
In a desperate act on 20 February 2009, the LTTE employed aerial tactics by dispatching two planes on a suicide mission targeting strategic sites in Colombo. Although the intent was to inflict significant damage on military headquarters and the air force base, both aircraft were intercepted and shot down, resulting in minimal impact but showcasing the LTTE's dwindling operational capabilities. By late March, the extent of LTTE-controlled territory had shrunk dramatically to just one square kilometer, illustrating the army's remarkable advances over the preceding three years.
Political tensions were also rising as President Mahinda Rajapaksa faced mounting pressure to address the humanitarian crisis. In a bid for resolution, he attempted to engage with the Tamil National Alliance; however, the alliance maintained their stance, refusing dialogue until the government adequately addressed the concerns regarding the displaced civilians caught in the conflict zone.
The Battle of Aanandapuram
The conflict reached a pivotal moment with the Battle of Aanandapuram on 5 April 2009, which was heralded as the defining moment of the nearly three-decade-long war. More than 50,000 SLA soldiers, comprising five divisions, encircled LTTE forces in a narrow strip of land bordered by vital waterways and the Indian Ocean. The battle resulted in heavy casualties for the rebels, with around 625 LTTE fighters killed, marking a substantial loss of experienced commanders, including Velayuthapillai Baheerathakumar, alias Theepan, the overall commander of the LTTE's northern front. This battle characterized the relentless drive of the SLA aimed at eradicating the LTTE and restoring governmental control over the region.
== Fighting in the 'No-Fire Zone' ==
During the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) managed to push the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into a designated no-fire zone, which was intended for the protection of civilians. Within this no-fire zone, the LTTE constructed a 3-kilometre bund, effectively trapping over 30,000 civilians. The Sri Lankan Army succeeded in dismantling this structure, which was crucial in the subsequent military operations aimed at liberating the trapped civilians.
On April 21, 2009, a significant assault by Sri Lankan troops was launched, with a primary focus on capturing LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Concurrently, many Tamil civilians were fleeing the no-fire zone to escape the intensifying conflict. The following day saw a dramatic turn of events when two high-ranking LTTE members, media coordinator Velayuthan Thayanithi (alias Daya Master) and top interpreter Kumar Pancharathnam (alias George), surrendered to the advancing forces. This event was perceived as a substantial blow to the LTTE leadership. During debriefing, both men revealed the harrowing reality within the no-fire zone: LTTE militants were reportedly shooting at civilians attempting to escape, and the group was continuing the abduction and conscription of children as young as fourteen years old. This testimony underscored the desperate humanitarian situation that was unfolding.
By April 25, the territorial control of the LTTE had drastically dwindled, reduced to a mere 10 square kilometers. The ongoing mass exodus of Tamils from the no-fire zone prompted the United Nations to estimate that around 6,500 civilians had lost their lives, with an additional 14,000 wounded in the conflict between January and April of that year. Reports from the BBC indicated that the land reclaimed by the army had become a wasteland, largely depopulated and devastated by the ravages of war.
As the fighting persisted, a cohort of independent UN experts vocally urged the Human Rights Council to initiate an urgent international inquiry into the escalating humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), approximately 196,000 individuals had fled the conflict zone, while around 50,000 civilians remained trapped within it. A UN spokesperson, Gordon Weiss, highlighted the dire circumstances, noting that more than 100 children had perished amid what he characterized as "large-scale killing of civilians." He condemned the situation in northern Sri Lanka as a "bloodbath." UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his horror at the indiscriminate killings of civilians caught in the crossfire, emphasizing the heavy toll that continued military engagement was inflicting on non-combatants. While he recognized the urgent need for the government to protect its citizens, he also condemned the LTTE for their blatant disregard for civilian safety in the conflict.
On May 13, the UN Security Council released a statement condemning the LTTE for its history of terrorism and particularly for using civilians as human shields. The Council affirmed the Sri Lankan Government's right to combat terrorism and called for the LTTE to cease its hostilities, thereby allowing trapped civilians to flee. The members expressed grave concerns regarding the use of heavy weaponry in densely populated areas and urged the government to adhere to its commitment to safeguarding civilians.
On May 16, 2009, the Sri Lankan military achieved a pivotal victory by breaching the LTTE's defensive perimeters and seizing control of the last segment of the coastline previously held by the rebels. The military's operations were intensifying, and they claimed that intercepted LTTE communications indicated that the militants were preparing for mass suicide in light of being encircled. Some LTTE fighters resorted to self-detonation as a desperate measure, marking a tragic end to the fierce resistance they had mounted throughout the conflict.
Sri Lanka Declares Victory Over the LTTE
On 16 May 2009, Sri Lanka officially announced a significant military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant organization that had been engaged in a protracted civil war since the early 1980s. President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressed leaders at the G11 summit in Jordan, declaring that "my government, with the total commitment of our armed forces, has in an unprecedented humanitarian operation finally defeated the LTTE militarily." This statement marked a pivotal moment in Sri Lanka's history and underscored the conclusion of a brutal conflict marked by severe human rights violations and devastating impacts on both sides.
Furthermore, the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, echoed the president's sentiments, confirming the defeat of the LTTE as Sri Lankan troops intensified their operations to clear the remaining pockets of insurgents in the northeastern region of the country. In these final stages, the military engaged in fierce encounters, where it was reported that 70 LTTE fighters were killed while attempting to escape by boat. These developments symbolized the collapse of an organization that had once exerted significant influence and control over parts of Sri Lanka, leading to a bitter struggle for autonomy for the Tamil ethnic community.
As the military operation unfolded, uncertainty loomed over the fate of key LTTE leaders, particularly Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the organization's longstanding chief. His whereabouts, along with those of other senior officials, remained unknown, contributing to growing speculation and tension regarding the aftermath of the conflict. The government's claim of victory ultimately raised significant questions about the post-war reconciliation process and the future of ethnic relations in Sri Lanka, as many Tamils faced significant hardship and displacement during the war's final phases. The international community closely monitored the situation, urging accountability and the establishment of a framework for lasting peace in a country so deeply scarred by decades of violence.
Defeat of the LTTE
On 17 May 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formally acknowledged their defeat in the Sri Lankan Civil War, marking a major turning point in the long-standing conflict. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, who served as the chief of international relations for the LTTE, made the announcement, stating, "This battle has reached its bitter end … We have decided to silence our guns." This statement signified not only the cessation of hostilities but also the culmination of nearly three decades of intense warfare that had claimed thousands of lives and led to widespread suffering on both sides.
The LTTE's admission of defeat highlighted the overwhelming military success of the Sri Lankan government, which had launched a decisive offensive in the final stages of the war. Throughout the conflict, the LTTE had been known for its innovative guerrilla tactics and its controversial use of suicide bombings. Despite having once been seen as a formidable force fighting for the rights of the Tamil population, the organization ultimately could not withstand the concentrated efforts of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. The government's military strategy included a blockade of LTTE-held territories and significant ground assaults, leading to the dispersion and fragmentation of LTTE military capabilities.
In his statement, Pathmanathan expressed remorse for the countless lives lost during the conflict, reflecting the deep scars left on communities and families, especially among the Tamil population in the North and East of the island. The war had caused immense human suffering, triggering a humanitarian crisis that saw civilians caught in the crossfire, displacement of populations, and severe economic disruption in affected regions. The acknowledgment of defeat also brought to light the need for healing and reconciliation within the war-torn country, as it began to grapple with the aftermath of the conflict and sought a path toward sustainable peace.
As Sri Lanka began to transition into a post-war era, the focus shifted to addressing the root causes of the conflict, including ethnic tensions and the demand for autonomy among Tamils. The end of the LTTE marked not just a military victory for the government but also presented an opportunity for the nation to heal and foster dialogue. The international community monitored these developments with hope, seeking to ensure that the lessons of the past would guide Sri Lanka toward a more inclusive and harmonious future.
Claim of Prabhakaran's Death
On May 18, 2009, a pivotal moment in the Sri Lankan Civil War culminated with the military claiming the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to the Sri Lankan armed forces, Prabhakaran was killed early in the morning while allegedly attempting to escape the conflict zone inside an ambulance. The announcement of his death was made via state television shortly after the military stated that it had effectively cornered him in a confined area of jungle in the northeastern part of the country. Reports from the media, including The Daily Telegraph, indicated a violent confrontation, with statements suggesting that Prabhakaran perished in a rocket-propelled grenade attack as he tried to flee alongside key members of his inner circle.
The aftermath of Prabhakaran's alleged death marked a significant turning point in the long-standing conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, which had been characterized by prolonged violence and claims for a separate Tamil Eelam state. General Sarath Fonseka, the commander of the Sri Lankan Army, proclaimed a decisive victory, declaring that the military had successfully defeated the insurgents and "liberated the entire country”. This statement epitomized the government's narrative of reclaiming territorial control and restoring peace after decades of ethnic strife.
In addition to the reported death of Prabhakaran, the military spokesperson Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara announced the heavy losses sustained by the LTTE, claiming that approximately 250 Tamil Tigers had been killed overnight while they were engaged in combat from within a designated no-fire zone. This intense military action underscored the brutal final phase of the war, during which the government forces engaged in aggressive tactics aimed at dismantling the remnants of the LTTE's military infrastructure. The death of Prabhakaran, along with the loss of other high-ranking LTTE officials such as Colonel Soosai and intelligence chief Pottu Amman in the same strike, signified a collapse of command within the organization and contributed to the eventual downfall of the insurgent group.
Prabhakaran’s death was subsequently met with differing reactions; while it was celebrated by many within Sri Lanka as a sign of hope for peace and national unity, it also sparked debates regarding the legitimacy and ethics of the military's approach to ending the conflict. The continued scrutiny over the treatment of civilians caught in the crossfire and the questionable tactics employed by both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE further highlighted the complexities of the civil war's conclusion and the challenges that lay ahead for post-war reconciliation and rebuilding efforts in the region.
The Final Day of Conflict
On May 19, 2009, the long-standing conflict in Sri Lanka reached a climactic resolution marked by intense fighting in the early hours of the day. The battle persisted until approximately 9:30 AM, at which point all members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had been eliminated. The troops from the Sri Lankan Army began the solemn task of recovering the bodies of those who had fallen in the skirmish. A member of the Army Task Force VIII, Sergeant Muthu Banda, reported discovering a body resembling that of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran amid the mangrove vegetation surrounding the Nandikadal lagoon.
At around 9:00 AM, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressed the Parliament, proclaiming a historic victory for the nation and asserting that it had been liberated from the grips of terrorism. His speech was a significant moment, symbolizing not merely a military victory but also a turning point in the country’s turbulent history. Shortly afterward, Task Force VIII communicated to Commander Colonel G.V. Ravipriya that they had potentially found Prabhakaran's corpse. By 12:15 PM, Army Commander Sarath Fonseka made the monumental announcement of Prabhakaran's death, which was broadcasted via the state television network, ITN.
The first visual evidence of Prabhakaran’s body aired on Swarnavahini around 1:00 PM, further cementing the announcement of his demise. The identification was subsequently confirmed by Karuna Amman, a former close associate of Prabhakaran, who provided firsthand verification. Additionally, DNA testing linked the recovered remains to Prabhakaran’s deceased son, who had been killed by the Sri Lankan military in earlier confrontations. Despite this, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE's chief of international relations, issued a counterclaim on the same day, asserting that “Our beloved leader is alive and safe.” However, a few days later, on May 24, he acknowledged Prabhakaran’s death, retracting his earlier denial.
The conclusion of hostilities was declared by the Sri Lankan Government on May 19, 2009, ending a protracted civil war that had lasted for nearly three decades. This victory not only altered the political landscape of Sri Lanka but also set the stage for a complex post-war reconciliation process, aimed at healing the deep-rooted ethnic divisions and addressing the grievances of the Tamil population. The conflict's end marked a significant chapter in Sri Lanka's history, with implications that would resonate for years to come.
Combat Activities Post-Conflict
Following the conclusion of the Sri Lankan Civil War in May 2009, sporadic clashes between the Sri Lankan Army and remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were reported across various regions. On 19 May 2009, the Sri Lankan Army engaged LTTE cadres in Kachikudichchiaru, resulting in the deaths of three insurgents. The series of confrontations continued in the days that followed, with notable engagements occurring in a variety of locations including Periyapillumalai and the Kadawana jungle. By 21 May 2009, the Sri Lankan Army reported the elimination of ten LTTE members in their operations aimed at dismantling the remaining capabilities of the group.
The military's efforts to eradicate LTTE remnants were highlighted by significant recoveries made during these operations. On 27 May 2009, in the Kalavanchchikudi region of Batticaloa, troops reported not only the death of eleven LTTE cadre but also the seizure of substantial military assets. These included five T-56 assault rifles, twenty claymore mines, and multiple anti-personnel mines, pointing to the threat posed by the remnants of the LTTE and underscoring the ongoing security challenges faced by the Sri Lankan government.
In early June 2009, the Special Task Force (STF), a specialized division of the Sri Lankan military, confronted LTTE cadre during a search operation in the Darampalawa area of Ampara. This encounter resulted in the recovery of two bodies and a cache of military supplies, further emphasizing the persistence of armed resistance despite the war's official cessation. This tension was compounded by incidents such as the clash on 4 July 2009 at Kiraankulam, which resulted in casualties among both Sri Lankan forces and LTTE members.
The aftermath of the conflict also saw key figures from the LTTE being targeted. On 5 August 2009, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the newly appointed leader of the LTTE, was apprehended in Malaysia by Sri Lankan military intelligence. His capture represented a significant blow to the organization's leadership and operational structure, as he was subsequently returned to Sri Lanka for further proceedings. Additional confrontations in August resulted in the deaths of five LTTE cadres in Batticaloa, highlighting that the threat from LTTE operatives persisted in the region.
These events characterize a turbulent period following the end of the major hostilities in Sri Lanka, illustrating both the military's ongoing commitment to neutralizing remaining LTTE elements and the complexities involved in achieving lasting peace and security in the nation. The continued engagement between Sri Lankan forces and LTTE remnants indicates that while the organized structure of the LTTE may have been dismantled, the potential for sporadic violence and challenges to national security remained present in the post-war landscape.
Celebration and Relief
Following the conclusion of the Sri Lankan Civil War in May 2009, the reaction among the general populace was overwhelming and largely positive. The streets burst into celebration as the non-Tamil public of Sri Lanka expressed their relief and joy over the end of decades-long conflict. Colorful displays of jubilant gatherings painted a picture of hope for a future free from violence. Crowds gathered, waving flags and chanting messages of peace, symbolizing a collective desire for unity and national healing.
Political leaders and figures expressed their sentiments during this pivotal moment. Opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe, recognizing the significance of the victory, took a moment to commend President Rajapaksa and the state security forces for their efforts in defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). His congratulatory message underscored a rare moment of solidarity within the otherwise polarized political landscape of Sri Lanka. Religious leaders from various faiths also joined in the chorus of appreciation, acknowledging the end of the prolonged bloodshed and urging the populace to focus on rebuilding their nation.
Global reactions to the end of the fighting were mixed. While many international leaders welcomed the cessation of hostilities, viewing it as an opportunity for peace and recovery, some expressed concern regarding the humanitarian crises stemming from the conflict. The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted these concerns meticulously. He expressed relief over the operational conclusion but was "deeply troubled" by the civilian casualties that marked the conflict's end. Ki-moon's call to action emphasized the importance of nation-wide healing and reconciliation, indicating that the end of the war was merely the beginning of a long and challenging journey toward rebuilding trust and fostering a harmonious society.
Media outlets also took note of this pivotal historical moment, with Time magazine ranking the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War among the top ten news stories of 2009. This recognition not only highlighted the conflict's significance but also set the stage for global awareness of the ongoing challenges faced by Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the war. As the nation looked to the future, the priorities shifted towards addressing the residual impacts of war, including the need for justice, reconciliation efforts, and the resettlement of displaced communities, all of which would be crucial for sustainable peace in the region.
Protests
The Sri Lankan Civil War, which lasted from 1983 to 2009, resulted in significant civilian casualties, particularly in the Northern Province, where the fighting was most intense. As the conflict unfolded, the Tamil diaspora, which consists of Sri Lankan Tamils living abroad, began to raise their voices against the atrocities occurring in their homeland. These communities, deeply affected by the war and the suffering of their relatives still in Sri Lanka, mobilized to bring attention to the plight of those caught in the crossfire of the conflict.
Protests were organized in major cities across the globe, reflecting the widespread concern about the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka. Prominent locations included the capitals and major metropolitan areas in countries with significant Tamil populations, such as India, where many Tamils sought to connect cultural and geographical ties to their homeland; the United Kingdom, where a robust Tamil community has long advocated for their rights; and Canada, which has one of the largest diasporas outside of Sri Lanka. Other notable countries that witnessed demonstrations included Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, and the United States.
These protests were not just a form of expression but also aimed at influencing policymakers and raising awareness among the general public about the ongoing struggles faced by the Tamil people. Activists highlighted the need for accountability regarding human rights violations and pushed for international intervention to protect civilians. The demonstrations often included speeches, rallies, and marches, with activists calling for an end to the hostilities and a peaceful resolution to the conflict, emphasizing the importance of recognizing the Tamil identity and securing their political rights within Sri Lanka.
Overview of Casualties in the Sri Lankan Civil War
The Sri Lankan Civil War, which spanned nearly three decades from 1983 to 2009, resulted in a staggering loss of life, with estimates suggesting over 100,000 civilian casualties and more than 50,000 combatant fatalities on both sides. Specific reports indicate that approximately 27,000 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 28,708 personnel from the Sri Lankan Army, over 1,000 Sri Lankan police officers, and around 1,500 Indian soldiers were killed during the conflict. Detailed disclosures in 2008 by the LTTE noted that by that time, 22,390 of its fighters had lost their lives since the conflict's inception in 1982. However, the organization ceased maintaining official records in 2009, complicating subsequent estimates.
The ongoing debate about casualty figures adds another layer to the already complex narrative surrounding the war. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which is regarded as a reliable source of information on global armed conflicts, categorized the violence in Sri Lanka into three types: "State-based" conflicts between the government and rebel groups, "Non-state" conflicts not involving the government, and "One-sided" violence targeting civilians. Between 1990 and 2009, estimates of fatalities due to this organized violence ranged from 59,193 to 75,601.
Civilians Caught in the Crossfire
Civilian deaths accounted for a significant portion of the casualties, particularly within the Tamil minority. According to the Tamil Centre for Human Rights, from 1983 to 2004, around 54,053 Tamil civilians were killed at the hands of both the Sri Lankan government and Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). Another organization, the National External Secretariat for Human Rights (NESOHR), reported a grim toll of 4,000 to 5,000 Tamil civilian deaths resulting from large-scale massacres, contributing to an overall estimate of around 40,000 civilian casualties by the time of the 2002 ceasefire.
The final months of the civil war are marred by disputes over casualty counts. The Sri Lankan government reported 9,000 deaths within this timeframe but did not specify the breakdown between LTTE fighters and civilians. Meanwhile, the United Nations provided a contrasting estimate of 6,500 civilian deaths based on witness testimonies and information collected during the conflict. Further troubling estimates suggest that overall casualties could reach between 15,000 and 20,000 during the concluding phases of the war. Some reports, including those from a former UN official, hinted that actual civilian fatalities may have been as high as 40,000.
Controversies Surrounding Casualty Reports
Discrepancies in these casualty figures reveal the difficulty in obtaining accurate data during a period marked by chaos and misinformation. A notorious instance involved four doctors who worked in a no-fire zone and initially reported high casualty numbers. During a press conference, they later retracted those claims, alleging coercion by the LTTE. However, following their release, some of these doctors asserted that they had been pressured into recanting their statements and stood by their original figures, compounding the uncertainty surrounding the death toll.
The varying accounts of casualties led to speculation that the real death toll might surpass even the higher estimates provided by international bodies. Some human rights organizations posited that as many as 70,000 civilians might have perished in the final phase of the civil war. The Sri Lankan government, however, maintained that it took significant precautions to minimize civilian harm and accused the LTTE of utilizing civilians as human shields during operations.
Broader Implications and Responsibility
Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have faced accusations from the United Nations and various human rights groups for their roles in perpetrating war crimes during the conflict. While the Tamil civilian population suffered disproportionately, the war also inflicted casualties on Sinhalese and Moor civilians. Estimates suggest that the LTTE was responsible for the deaths of approximately 3,700 to 4,100 civilians, which were claimed to be a response to pivotal incidents of violence against Tamil communities.
The claims and counterclaims surrounding these figures highlight the continuing struggle for accountability and recognition of the war's toll on civilian lives. The unresolved legacy of the Sri Lankan Civil War casts a long shadow over the region, illustrating the nuanced and often painful realities of conflict, where truths remain contested and the memory of the dead calls for acknowledgment and justice.
Economic Repercussions of the Civil War
The Sri Lankan Civil War, spanning a violent 25 years, inflicted a staggering economic toll on the nation, with total costs estimated at a monumental US$200 billion. This economic burden is roughly equivalent to five times the country's GDP in 2009, illustrating the profound impact that prolonged conflict can have on a nation's economic fabric. The funds expended were not solely for military endeavors; for example, US$5.5 billion was allocated specifically to Eelam War IV, the final phase of combat against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), culminating in their defeat.
Post-conflict, the Sri Lankan government aimed to rehabilitate and develop the Northern Province, devastated by years of warfare, through the "Uthuru Wasanthaya" program. A substantial investment of US$2.25 billion was directed toward this initiative to foster recovery and reintegration of displaced populations. This effort underscores the complexity of rebuilding a war-torn society while attempting to revitalize the economy and restore public services, which had suffered immensely during the conflict.
Furthermore, the opportunity cost of the civil war paints a stark picture of its effect on economic growth. According to a report by Strategic Foresight Group, during periods of intense civil unrest, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) levels remained stagnant. In contrast, periods of ceasefire were marked by increased net FDI, indicating that stability is a crucial factor for attracting international investment. The civil war not only obstructed economic development but also deterred investors, leading to a vicious cycle of stagnation and conflict that hampered Sri Lanka's economic prospects for decades. The long-term implications of such a sustained conflict highlight the importance of peace for economic revitalization and growth.
Political solution
Following the decisive military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, Sri Lanka confronted a pivotal moment in its history. President Mahinda Rajapaksa made a strong commitment to finding a political resolution to the longstanding ethnic conflict that had ravaged the nation for decades. He emphasized the importance of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which was intended to provide a framework for power-sharing between the central government and provincial authorities, particularly in regions predominantly inhabited by the Tamil population. This amendment allows for the establishment of provincial councils, aimed at enhancing local governance and addressing the aspirations of minority communities.
In a significant shift, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which emerged as the leading political representative of the Sri Lankan Tamil community, moved away from its previous demand for an independent state. Instead, it adopted a stance favoring a federal solution to ensure greater autonomy and self-governance for Tamil areas. The TNA's willingness to engage in dialogue with the government marked a crucial step toward reconciliation, as both parties entered into bilateral talks to explore feasible political solutions and the potential for devolving power. This dialogue was seen as an essential component in bridging the deep-rooted mistrust between the Tamil population and the Sinhalese-majority government.
Despite these developments, skepticism about the effectiveness of the political solution persisted, particularly within the government. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, then Defence Secretary and brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, expressed his views in an interview with the Indian television channel Headlines Today. He dismissed discussions surrounding a political solution, stating that they were "simply irrelevant" in the aftermath of what he termed the successful eradication of terrorism in Sri Lanka. His comments reflected a prevailing attitude within parts of the government, where the focus remained on consolidating military victories rather than fostering a genuine political dialogue that could lead to long-term peace and stability.
This divergence in perspectives highlighted the complex dynamics at play within Sri Lanka's post-war landscape. While the government sought to maintain order and national unity, many Tamils continued to seek recognition of their rights and grievances arising from the civil conflict. The challenge for the government lay in balancing the needs of national security with the aspirations of minority communities, as failure to address these issues could potentially reignite tensions and undermine the fragile peace achieved after years of conflict. The commitment to seeking a political solution remained vital for fostering trust and ensuring a more inclusive future for all Sri Lankans.
== LLRC: An Overview ==
In the aftermath of the Sri Lankan Civil War, which officially ended in May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa faced increasing global calls for accountability regarding the conduct of the war. In response, he established the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) with the objective of examining the events of the conflict and providing recommendations aimed at fostering reconciliation among the diverse ethnic groups within the country. The LLRC was tasked to document the experiences of the war, assess the failures of governance, and propose a framework for healing the nation.
== Findings and Conclusions ==
Ultimately, the LLRC concluded that the Sri Lankan military did not, in its view, deliberately target civilians within designated No Fire Zones. Nonetheless, the commission did identify that there had been shelling of hospitals, which led to a significant number of civilian casualties. Despite acknowledging these grave incidents, the commission refrained from assigning specific accountability for these actions. Furthermore, the LLRC's findings suggested that the long-standing ethnic tensions were exacerbated by failures among both Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders. According to the commission, Sinhalese politicians had not provided an acceptable political solution to address the grievances of the Tamil community, while Tamil leaders contributed to the conflict by promoting extremist separatist agendas.
== Criticism and Controversy ==
Despite the LLRC's intentions, it faced substantial criticism from various sectors, including human rights organizations and international bodies. The UN Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability specifically pointed out the LLRC's constrained mandate, asserting that it lacked the independence required to carry out a thorough investigation. Critics highlighted that the commission did not meet minimum international standards for accountability and justice, particularly as it offered inadequate protections for witnesses and victims of the war. Many argued that without a more robust framework, the LLRC's conclusions and recommendations would unlikely lead to meaningful reconciliation or healing among the affected communities.
== The Path Forward ==
The LLRC's establishment marked an essential step in Sri Lanka's journey towards acknowledging the past. However, the mixed reception of its findings underscores the complexities surrounding justice and reconciliation in post-war societies. To achieve lasting peace, it is critical for the Sri Lankan government to pursue an inclusive dialogue that genuinely addresses the root causes of the conflict, honors the rights of victims, and establishes mechanisms for accountability that are acceptable to all parties. Without such efforts, the risk of repeating historical grievances remains, and true reconciliation may remain an elusive goal for the diverse ethnic groups within Sri Lanka.
Transitional Justice Efforts
In 2015, in a bid to address the long-standing grievances stemming from the Sri Lankan Civil War, the government initiated the establishment of a truth commission modeled after South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This step was aimed at rigorously investigating the numerous allegations of human rights violations and wartime atrocities that occurred during the conflict, which spanned over three decades. The war, primarily between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), resulted in immense suffering and trauma for many communities, necessitating a comprehensive approach to healing and reconciliation.
To underpin these efforts, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera articulated a vision for a new constitution intended to address the structural issues that fueled ethnic tensions and conflict, which he believes are pivotal for achieving lasting peace and preventing any future recurrence of violence. The proposed constitutional reforms aim to create a more inclusive political framework that respects the rights and aspirations of all ethnic communities, particularly the Tamils who had long felt marginalized in the post-colonial Sri Lankan state.
However, the journey towards achieving transitional justice has not been without its challenges. The government has faced considerable pushback from both Sinhala and Tamil extremist factions. Sinhala nationalists, who often view calls for reconciliation and accountability as threats to their ethnic dominance, have been vocally critical of the government's initiatives. On the other hand, some Tamil factions remain skeptical, fearing that the truth commission may be used as a tool for political gain rather than a genuine effort towards reckoning with past injustices. This dichotomy reflects the complexities of Sri Lanka’s ethnic landscape, where efforts towards reconciliation must navigate deeply entrenched historical grievances and varying expectations from different communities. Addressing these challenges remains essential for the success of transitional justice and the creation of a sustainable and equitable peace in Sri Lanka.
Internally Displaced People during the Civil War
As the Sri Lankan Civil War reached its climax, significant international concern mounted regarding the welfare of approximately 350,000 civilians trapped in areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In a bid to provide safety, on January 21, 2009, the Sri Lankan military established a 32 square kilometre Safe Zone near Puthukkudiviruppu, designed to protect these vulnerable populations. The government sought to reassure civilians by dropping leaflets via Sri Lankan Air Force aircraft, urging them to relocate to this designated Safe Zone and promising military non-engagement in the area. Despite these efforts, the response from civilians was minimal as many remained hesitant to leave, while accusations emerged against the LTTE for obstructing the movement of civilians to safer areas.
As conflict intensified, civilians were forced into increasingly precarious conditions, ultimately fleeing into a narrow strip of land flanked by the Indian Ocean and Nanthi Kadal. The military expanded their Safe Zone on February 12, 2009, to a smaller 10-square-kilometre area northwest of Mullaitivu, which unfortunately became a target for repeated military assaults. Over the course of three months, the Sri Lankan military conducted operations aimed at dismantling the LTTE’s last strongholds, with the government asserting the strikes were directed solely at combatants. However, the reality on the ground was devastating; these attacks resulted in significant civilian casualties and injuries, with reports indicating that LTTE militants exploited the situation by using civilians as human shields.
The end of the conflict ushered in a humanitarian crisis, creating approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were subsequently relocated to camps within the Vavuniya District. These camps, surrounded by barbed wire and subject to criticism for their harsh conditions, became a symbol of the war's aftermath. Despite assurances from President Mahinda Rajapaksa to foreign diplomats regarding the planned resettlement of the IDPs in accordance with a 180-day plan post-war, the reality was slower than anticipated. By January 2012, while most IDPs had been returned to their homes, over 6,500 individuals from the Mullaitivu district remained unresettled, awaiting the completion of essential de-mining operations in their former regions.
The civil war, which had spanned from 1983 to 2009, led to significant population displacement, with many Tamil civilians seeking refuge in South India. Even after the war's conclusion, the expatriation continued, with approximately 5,000 individuals opting to return to Sri Lanka by mid-2012. However, as of July 2012, around 68,152 Sri Lankans were still residing in South India as refugees, illustrating the lasting impact of decades of conflict on the civilian population. The complexities surrounding resettlement and rehabilitation continue to resonate, emphasizing the long-term challenges faced by those affected by the war.
Detainees
The Sri Lankan Civil War resulted in a significant number of detainees as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) faced overwhelming defeats, prompting many of its members to abandon the organization. As hostilities came to a close, a staggering total of 11,664 LTTE personnel, including over 500 child soldiers, surrendered to the Sri Lankan military. Among these surrendered individuals were 1,601 females, highlighting the complex demographics within the ranks of the LTTE. The government recognized the urgent need for a structured process to rehabilitate these ex-combatants, subsequently launching a "National Action Plan for the Re-integration of Ex-combatants."
The rehabilitation initiative categorized the surrendered personnel into three distinct groups: hardcore militants, non-combatants, and individuals who were forcibly conscripted, which notably included many child soldiers. To facilitate this rehabilitation, 24 dedicated centers were established across various regions, particularly in Jaffna, Batticaloa, and Vavuniya. These centers aimed not only to rehabilitate and reintegrate the combatants into society but also to address the psychological trauma many had experienced during the conflict. The government recognized about 700 members as hardcore militants, necessitating a tailored approach to their rehabilitation and reintegration. Some of these hardcore cadres were even absorbed into the State Intelligence Services, empowered to leverage their insider knowledge in dismantling the LTTE's internal and external networks.
By January 2012, significant progress was made with the government's rehabilitation efforts, as over 11,000 ex-combatants were released from rehabilitation centers. Only four centers remained operational with approximately 550 detainees still undergoing rehabilitation. The exit of so many former LTTE members raised hopes for peace and stability within the country, although it also presented challenges in addressing the lingering tensions between different ethnic communities. The success of the reintegration program not only represented a critical step toward national healing but also underscored the complexities of rebuilding a war-torn society in the aftermath of prolonged conflict.
Land Mines and Aftermath
The conclusion of the Sri Lankan Civil War left a profound legacy of destruction in the form of land mines, which have significantly impacted the lives of those residing in previously conflict-ridden areas. Approximately 1,304 square kilometers (503 square miles) of land remain heavily contaminated with an estimated 1.6 million land mines. This persistent hazard not only poses a severe risk to local communities but also hampers economic recovery and environmental rehabilitation in these regions. As efforts to address this critical issue continue, as of September 2023, dedicated demining teams consisting of personnel from the Sri Lankan army and eight foreign-funded agencies have made substantial progress, clearing an impressive 1,287 square kilometers (497 square miles). However, approximately 17 square kilometers (6.6 square miles) of dangerous terrain still await clearance, highlighting the ongoing challenges faced in achieving a mine-free environment.
In the wake of the war, significant socio-economic initiatives have emerged, tailored to foster stability and security in the northern regions of Sri Lanka. A notable development is the influx of over 5,000 Tamil youths who have expressed their eagerness to serve in the national police force, responding to the government’s call for recruitment. This initiative was aimed primarily at filling 2,000 vacancies in the police department, with a special focus on enhancing security and law enforcement services in the northern and eastern provinces, areas that have borne the brunt of the conflict. The recruitment drive represents a critical step toward promoting inclusivity and empowerment within the Tamil community, as these young individuals seek to actively contribute to the rebuilding of their homeland.
The collaboration between local officers and young recruits is vital in reinstating public trust in law enforcement, rebuilding communities, and facilitating a sense of normalcy in a region that has endured decades of turmoil. This shift towards a new generation of police officers, reflective of the diverse demographic fabric of Sri Lanka, suggests a broader recognition of the need for reconciliation, sustained peace-building, and addressing the grievances of various ethnic groups that were historically marginalized during the war.
War Crimes Investigations
The Sri Lankan Civil War, which lasted from 1983 until 2009, left a deep and enduring mark on the country's history, marred by allegations of war crimes and human rights abuses committed by both state and non-state actors. In March 2014, responding to these allegations, the United Nations Human Rights Commission drafted a crucial resolution aimed at promoting reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka. This resolution led to the appointment of Ms. Navi Pillay as the High Commissioner, who was tasked with initiating a comprehensive investigation into the serious violations and abuses reported during the armed conflict.
In response to the proposed investigations, the Sri Lankan government, implicated in a multitude of war crimes, demonstrated a pattern of non-cooperation. Reports indicate that the state has resisted various efforts directed at accountability and has firmly maintained a stance against international scrutiny of its actions during the war. Notably, in August 2014, the government outright refused entry visas to U.N. officials assigned to investigate, signaling its intention to obstruct the inquiry process. Furthermore, in October 2014, the Sri Lankan authorities escalated their refusal to cooperate by imposing a blanket ban on foreign visitors to the areas previously affected by the conflict, effectively isolating what many consider crucial sites of potential war crimes.
This lack of cooperation has raised concerns within the international community regarding the sincerity of the Sri Lankan government in addressing historical grievances and pursuing justice for victims of the civil war. The OHCHR Investigation in Sri Lanka (OISL) sought to evaluate evidence, collect testimonies, and provide a thorough account of the events that transpired during the conflict, culminating in a report. Notably, such reports have documented numerous incidents of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other serious human rights violations. The challenge remains for international bodies to hold accountable those responsible for such grievous acts, particularly in light of the government’s resistance to external oversight.
War Crimes During the Sri Lankan Civil War
The Sri Lankan Civil War, particularly its concluding phase known as Eelam War IV in 2009, was marked by extensive war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both the Sri Lankan military and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These atrocities included deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, extrajudicial executions of combatants and prisoners, enforced disappearances carried out by the Sri Lankan military alongside paramilitary groups, and severe humanitarian crises characterized by acute shortages of food, medical supplies, and clean water for civilians trapped in conflict zones. Both factions were also involved in child recruitment and targeted violence, including suicide bombings against civilians.
A pivotal moment in the discourse on war crimes emerged in August 2009, when UK’s Channel 4 aired a documentary titled "Sri Lanka's Killing Fields," showcasing video evidence of uniformed men summarily executing eight bound and blindfolded individuals. This footage was authenticated by United Nations experts, though skepticism lingered regarding certain aspects of the video, including the apparent movements of victims and the date embedded in the footage. The video raised significant concerns about the conduct of the Sri Lankan military during the conflict. However, the Sri Lankan government has staunchly refuted these claims, asserting that the UN’s findings were biased and labeling the documentary as fabricated.
In response to mounting allegations, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a panel of experts to conduct an inquiry into potential violations of international law during the conflict’s final stages. Their report identified credible allegations of war crimes committed by both factions and called for an independent international investigation. However, the Sri Lankan government vehemently rejected the UN report, claiming it was fundamentally flawed and lacked diligent verification processes. Subsequently, the Sri Lankan government formed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) to investigate the war from 1983 to 2009, though its efficacy and transparency were questioned.
Despite the implementation of domestic investigative measures, including a roadmap introduced in July 2012 to address war crimes, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights remarked in September 2013 that the efforts were insufficient and lacked credibility. By March 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted in favor of establishing a resolution aimed at investigating rights abuses committed during the civil war, supported by countries including the United States and the United Kingdom.
As new political leadership emerged under President Maithripala Sirisena, there was a request for international support for domestic investigations into war crimes. While some factions within the Tamil National Alliance noted the potential for a hybrid court to facilitate such inquiries, the party remained divided on the need for an international investigation. Key figures within the TNA praised new governmental initiatives, while others, like Ananthi Sasitharan, expressed skepticism about the willingness to address the demands for accountability.
During the continuing discourse surrounding war crimes, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa's administration faced criticism in January 2020, when he stated that many of the individuals who had disappeared during the war likely died in combat. His assertion, which suggested that about 4,000 military personnel were also missing, drew backlash from human rights organizations concerned about the implications of such comments on the unresolved cases of over 20,000 disappearances throughout the conflict.
International scrutiny intensified, with the U.S. State Department in February 2020 imposing entry bans on prominent Sri Lankan military figures for their involvement in war crimes, establishing a precedent for international accountability. By January 2023, Canada joined the fray, setting sanctions against former presidents Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa alongside members of the Sri Lankan military for systematic human rights abuses—a move underscoring the ongoing global concern over the actions taken during the Sri Lankan Civil War and the need for justice and accountability in the region.
Allegations of Genocide
The allegations of genocide against the Government of Sri Lanka emerged prominently in December 2009, when Human Rights Watch became one of the first international organizations to call attention to these claims under international law. Leading expert in international law, Professor Francis A. Boyle, took decisive action by convening an emergency meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, where he presented substantial evidence pointing to crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated against the Tamil population. Both domestic and international observers noted the appalling lack of intervention from the global community in preventing the slaughter of Tamil civilians during the protracted civil conflict in Sri Lanka.
In January 2010, the Permanent People's Tribunal held a session in Dublin, Ireland, showcasing its commitment to human rights. The proceedings culminated in four pivotal findings: the Sri Lankan government and military were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, while the specific charge of genocide was deemed to require further investigation. Furthermore, the Tribunal pointed fingers at the international community, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, for their roles in the deterioration of the peace process in Sri Lanka. It highlighted that member states of the United Nations had failed to uphold their moral obligation to seek justice for the numerous violations of human rights that occurred during the conflict.
On 22 September 2010, the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic began advocating on behalf of victims of the Sri Lankan armed conflict. This clinic stressed the urgent need for a new international tribunal aimed at prosecuting those responsible for the egregious crimes committed during the war. Their contributions included providing detailed evidence of human rights violations to the UN Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka, which was also appointed by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2010 for the examination of these claims.
The quest for justice saw substantial developments over the years. A panel of 11 international experts, including seasoned genocide scholars and former UN officials, was appointed in November 2012 by the Permanent People's Tribunal to delve into the allegations of genocide against the Sri Lankan government. Furthering this pursuit, the Tamil Nadu State Assembly passed a resolution in March 2013, urging the Indian government to reconsider its relationship with Sri Lanka and calling for an international inquiry into the alleged genocide and war crimes against the Tamil people.
In a critical ruling on 10 December 2013, the Permanent People's Tribunal unanimously found the Sri Lankan government guilty of genocide against the Tamil minority, while implicating the United States and the United Kingdom in complicity with these crimes. As the evidence continued to build, the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic produced a comprehensive report in January 2015 outlining "The Legal Case of the Tamil Genocide." This report called for an independent international investigation into the actions of the Sri Lankan government during the civil war.
However, obstacles remained in the pathway towards justice. In April 2015, the Northern Provincial Council of Sri Lanka adopted a resolution demanding that the UN investigate the genocide and urging appropriate measures at the International Court of Justice, expressing the community's lack of faith in domestic inquiries. Despite these calls for accountability, President Maithripala Sirisena's refusal in September 2017 to permit prosecutorial actions against military officials like Jagath Jayasuriya underscored the ongoing challenges faced. His remarks indicated a reluctance to hold the military accountable, reflecting the prevailing sentiment among the majority ethnic Sinhalese population who largely opposed legal actions against individuals implicated in wartime atrocities.
Throughout this intricate web of allegations, inquiries, and political resistance, the calls for justice and accountability for the Tamil population have persisted, highlighting the enduring impact of the Sri Lankan Civil War on international human rights discourse.