Historical Context of the Kashmir Conflict
Following the First Kashmir War (1947–1948), India established control over approximately two-thirds of the Kashmir region, leaving Pakistan determined to reclaim the remaining territory. The geopolitical dynamics shifted significantly in the 1960s when Pakistan secured a substantial military aid package amounting to 700 million dollars from the United States. This assistance was the result of a defense agreement signed in 1954, which aimed to bolster Pakistan's military capabilities amid rising tensions in the region. Consequently, Pakistan made considerable advancements in modernizing its military equipment.
In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indian military underwent a profound transformation, necessitating changes in personnel and an upgrade of equipment. This period of reorganization provided Pakistan with a unique opportunity. Although Pakistan’s armed forces were smaller in size compared to their Indian counterparts, they possessed certain qualitative advantages, particularly in air power and armored units. This disparity was perceived as a critical factor that Pakistan could leverage before India completed its military build-up and restored its defensive posture.
The Rann of Kutch Conflict
In a bid to test its military advantages and assert its claim over disputed territories, Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk during the summer months of 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. This operation saw direct clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces and yielded some tactical successes for Pakistan. The skirmishes heightened tensions and served as a precursor to larger conflicts, shaping the strategic calculations of both nations in the lead-up to the Second Kashmir War.
Moreover, a domestic incident in 1963 catalyzed tensions within the Kashmir Valley. The disappearance of a revered holy relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar incited significant unrest among the Muslim population, fostering a heightened sense of religious identity and grievance. This event was viewed by Pakistan as a potential catalyst for insurrection, laying the groundwork for increased covert operations. The Pakistani military command began to believe that a combination of covert action, backed by the possibility of a full-scale war, might force India into negotiations regarding the Kashmir issue.
Strategic Calculations and the Covert Agenda
In this volatile environment, Pakistan made the audacious decision to deploy "mujahideen" fighters and regular army personnel into the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The objective was to incite rebellion and create a fertile ground for a larger military confrontation. The Pakistani leadership reasoned that an Indian military weakened by previous conflicts would be less inclined to respond robustly to such provocations. Thus, it adopted a strategy of utilizing irregular forces and the element of surprise as tools to achieve its longstanding ambitions in Kashmir, marking a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two nations. As the situation evolved, it became increasingly clear that the Kashmir dispute was set to intensify, with both countries entrenched in their positions and attitudes towards the region.
Planning for Infiltration Operations
The inception of Operation Gibraltar can be traced back to the 1950s, reflecting a long-standing strategic interest in addressing the Kashmir dispute. Originally conceived as a means to address the contentious situation, the plan gained momentum in the context of evolving geopolitical dynamics in South Asia. The backing from influential political figures, notably Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, provided the necessary political will to advance the operation during a time when tensions between Pakistan and India remained high. The operation was envisioned not merely as an act of military aggression, but rather as a calculated move to achieve specific political objectives without escalating into a wider conflict.
Central to the strategy was an envisioned force of approximately 40,000 irregular troops, who would be trained intensively for guerilla warfare and covert operations. This specialized group was assembled under the expectation that their motivation and advanced weaponry would provide them with a significant advantage in the rugged terrains of Kashmir. The operational goal was to confine hostilities within Kashmir itself, thereby avoiding a broader confrontation with India, which could have catastrophic consequences for both nations. Retired General Akhtar Hussain Malik articulated these aims by positing that the operation sought to "defreeze the Kashmir problem" and diminish Indian resilience, ultimately compelling India to engage in peace talks.
To set the stage for the operational plan, extensive groundwork was undertaken through Operation Nusrat. This preliminary phase involved intelligence gathering to identify vulnerabilities in the Cease Fire Line (CFL), which marked the boundary of control between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir. By pinpointing these gaps, planners aimed to establish viable entry points for the infiltrating mujahideen. Furthermore, the operation sought to assess the likely response from the Indian Army and gauge local sentiments among the Kashmiris, ensuring that the operation, if executed, would have the requisite support from the population while minimizing the chances of a swift and robust Indian military reaction. The carefully crafted elements of Operation Gibraltar reflected a methodical approach to conflict, aimed at achieving strategic goals through unconventional means while navigating the complexities of regional politics.
Execution of Operation Gibraltar
Despite initial misgivings expressed by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, Operation Gibraltar was set in motion in early August 1965, although some accounts suggest it began as early as July 24. The operation saw the infiltration of Pakistani troops, specifically from the Azad Kashmir Regular Force—now known as the Azad Kashmir Regiment—across the Cease Fire Line that demarcated the regions of Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir. The infiltrators primarily crossed the Pir Panjal Range into strategic locations like Gulmarg, Uri, and Baramulla. The objective was to capture essential heights around the Kashmir Valley and to incite a widespread revolt, with the expectation that this grassroots uprising would lead to direct involvement by Pakistani military forces.
The disparity between Indian and Pakistani accounts regarding the size of the infiltrating forces is striking. While Indian intelligence estimated that 30,000 to 40,000 troops participated, Pakistan claimed the number was limited to around 5,000 to 7,000. This contingent, known as the "Gibraltar Force," was organized under the command of Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 12th Division. The troops were divided into ten distinct forces, each comprising five companies, and assigned various code names primarily inspired by historically significant Muslim rulers. The name "Gibraltar" for the operation was specifically chosen due to its Islamic connotations, referencing the 8th-century Umayyad conquest of Hispania—mirroring Pakistan's intent to facilitate the conquest of Kashmir.
The operational plan was extensive and intricately designed, featuring multiple facets. Infiltrators were instructed to blend with the local population to incite a rebellion against Indian authorities. Simultaneously, guerrilla warfare tactics were employed, focusing on sabotaging vital infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels, and highways. Moreover, attacks were planned on enemy logistics, communications systems, and airfields, all aimed at fostering an environment conducive to an "armed insurrection" within Kashmir. The underlying assumption was that India would not react promptly, thereby allowing Pakistan to secure Kashmir quickly. However, out of the nine infiltrating forces deployed, only the Ghaznavi Force, commanded by Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan, managed to meet its objectives successfully in the Mehndar-Rajouri region. This limited success underscored the complexities and challenges associated with Operation Gibraltar, revealing the tenuous nature of military strategy amid regional instability.
Formation and Purpose of the Ghaznavi Force
The Ghaznavi Force, named in honor of the legendary Muslim conqueror Mahmud of Ghazni, was an elite auxiliary Special Operations unit established by the Pakistan Army during the tumultuous period of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. As part of a broader military initiative known as Operation Gibraltar, the primary objective of the Ghaznavi Force was to infiltrate the Jammu and Kashmir region. The strategic goal was to incite a local insurgency against the Indian governance, capitalizing on any existing discontent among the local population. This maneuver reflected Pakistan's longstanding interest in the region, which has been a point of contention since the partition of British India in 1947.
Composition and Leadership
With an operational strength nearing 200 personnel, the Ghaznavi Force was a blend of disciplined regular soldiers drawn from the Azad Kashmir Regular Force and specialized commandos from the Pakistani Special Service Group (SSG). This unique composition allowed the unit to combine conventional military training with specialized guerrilla warfare tactics, making it adept at conducting covert operations in hostile territories. The unit was commanded by Major Malik Munawar Khan Awan, a decorated officer whose leadership was instrumental in coordinating the complex logistics and operational strategies required for the infiltration mission.
Operational History
In July 1965, the Ghaznavi Force commenced its covert incursions into the Poonch and Rajouri districts of Jammu and Kashmir, aiming to establish a foothold that would facilitate wider unrest against Indian rule. The unit's operations were supported by the Pakistan Air Force, which conducted air drops of ammunition and supplies, ensuring that the infiltrators remained adequately equipped to carry out their missions. However, despite initial successes, the operation faced substantial setbacks as Indian forces quickly responded to the infiltration, deploying counter-insurgency measures that resulted in the capture or death of many members of the Ghaznavi Force by the end of August.
Withdrawal and Aftermath
As the situation deteriorated, with nearly all infiltrators compromised, the surviving members of the Ghaznavi Force received orders to pull back under escalating tensions, particularly when India launched offensive operations targeting Lahore. The operation is remembered for its implications on military strategy, enemy engagement, and the geopolitical landscape of the subcontinent. Though the immediate objectives of Operation Gibraltar and the Ghaznavi Force were not ultimately achieved, this initiative set a precedent for future conflicts in the region, highlighting the persistent volatility surrounding the Kashmir issue and confirming the importance each nation places on its military operations and insurgency strategies.
Reasons for Failure
The covert infiltration known as Operation Gibraltar has been widely regarded as a failure, ultimately leading to the broader Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Military analysts have engaged in considerable debate regarding the operational planning behind Gibraltar, with some asserting that the strategy was sound but hampered by execution failures. On the other hand, a significant number of both Pakistani and neutral analysts argue that the entire operation was inherently flawed, labeling it as "a clumsy attempt" from the outset, destined for failure. This perspective is grounded in the assumption held by the Pakistani Army, which believed that a discontented Kashmiri populace would rise against Indian authorities, thus ensuring a swift capitulation of the region to Pakistani control. Contrary to these expectations, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, leading to a fortuitous advantage for the Indian Army. Consequently, they became aware that they were engaging not with insurgent forces, as they initially thought, but with units of the Pakistani Army.
A significant factor contributing to the operation's failure was the lack of coordination between various branches of the Pakistani military. According to Air Marshal Nur Khan, the then Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, the necessary synchronization between the Army and the Air Force was alarmingly deficient. He accused the military leadership of misleading the nation regarding the instigation of conflict by claiming India provoked the war and subsequently declaring that Pakistan had achieved a "great victory." This narrative, which has been described as a "big lie," was never corrected, leading to an entrenched belief among the Pakistani military that they had been successful in their ventures. Notably, this misperception has contributed to the continuation of Pakistan's involvement in unwanted military conflicts.
Senior military officials like Musa Khan, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, displayed unwarranted confidence in the Gibraltar plan, believing it would be confined merely to the Kashmir region and thus felt no imperative to involve the Air Force in the operation. This led to a situation where many senior military officers and government leaders were oblivious to the impending crisis, which not only caught India off guard but also surprised the Pakistani leadership itself. There was also a significant degree of internal dissent regarding the operation; many officials feared that a failure could escalate into an all-out war with India, a possibility most were keen to avoid. The combination of these strategic miscalculations, poor inter-service coordination, and a misjudgment of the political landscape in Kashmir ultimately culminated in the operation's failure, precipitating an extended and intensified conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
The operation saw various military configurations, designated by names reflective of historical or cultural significance, deployed in specific areas across the disputed region. Forces such as Salahudin operated within the Srinagar Valley, while units like Ghaznavi were tasked with missions in Mendhar-Rajauri, and Tariq covered the area of Kargil-Drass. Additional groups included Babur in Nowshera-Sundarbani, Qasim at Bandipura-Sonarwain, and Khalid focusing on Qazinag-Naugam. The Nusrat unit was positioned in Tithwal-Tangdhar, with Sikandar allocated to Gurais, and Khilji overseeing operations in Kel-Minimarg. The diverse assignments for these force names indicate a broad scope of intended operations within Kashmir, where the hope for a decisive breakthrough ultimately shifted into a complex confrontation that ignited large-scale conflict.