Origins of Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) traces its origins to a collaboration between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and a network of Deobandi Islamic jihadis closely associated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Throughout the late 1990s, the Pakistani military began to frame jihad in Kashmir as an integral component of its foreign policy objectives, thereby legitimizing militant activities under the guise of religious warfare. The formation of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen during the mid-1990s was also in part facilitated by ISI support, aimed at executing high-profile terrorist undertakings that would garner international attention. In 1998, the United States formally designated Harkat as an Islamic jihadist organization, leading to airstrikes targeting its training camps located in Afghanistan.
A pivotal moment that underscored the militant group's capabilities occurred in December 1999 when Harkat operatives executed the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814. The aircraft was en route from Kathmandu to Delhi when it was diverted to Kandahar. There, the hijackers received assistance from the Afghan Taliban and local Pakistani officials. Following a violent incident involving the execution of a passenger, the Indian government capitulated to the hijackers' demands, resulting in the release of several imprisoned Harkat operatives, including Maulana Masood Azhar. Once released, these individuals were escorted back to Pakistan by the ISI. Subsequently, Azhar was positioned at the helm of the newly formed Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was strategically developed by the ISI in part to counterbalance the rising influence of another militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
The operational leadership of JeM under Masood Azhar is often described as nominal, with the organization exhibiting a largely decentralized structure. Members of JeM have historical ties to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, maintaining strong affiliations with both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Many individuals involved in JeM received military training at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, nurturing a shared loyalty to the latter. The exodus of many Harkat members to JeM significantly depleted Harkat's resources, ultimately compromising its operational capabilities. While the Pakistani government officially banned Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2002, the group remains active and continues to maintain several operational facilities within the country, raising questions about the broader implications for regional security and Pakistan's commitment to combating extremism.
Kashmir Conflict Escalation (2000-2001)
In the year 2000, the rise of militant groups in Kashmir became alarmingly evident when Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) orchestrated its first suicide bombing on April 20, targeting an Indian army barracks. This attack resulted in the deaths of five Indian soldiers, marking a significant escalation in the violent conflict that had plagued the region for decades. The emergence of such tactics highlighted the shift in the operational strategies of militant organizations in Kashmir, which began increasingly resorting to suicide attacks as a method of warfare.
The geopolitical landscape of South Asia shifted dramatically following the September 11 attacks in the United States, as Pakistan's then President Pervez Musharraf aligned with the U.S. in the War on Terror. This alliance was perceived by many, including various analysts, as a tactical move for Pakistan to gain leverage in its long-standing support for militant activities in Kashmir. In October 2001, JeM executed a devastating bombing near the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly, which resulted in the loss of 38 lives. The group's audacity only deepened with the December 2001 assault on the Indian Parliament, a bold fidayeen attack that saw militants engage with security personnel for several hours. Although the assault was thwarted, it claimed the lives of eight security officers and a civilian gardener, cementing the incident as one of the most audacious acts of terrorism in India’s history. JeM's claim of responsibility was swiftly retracted under pressure from Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which often played a dual role in supporting and controlling militant operations.
The attack on the Indian Parliament sent shockwaves throughout the nation, prompting Indian authorities to accuse both JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) of orchestrating the violence. After thorough investigations, four members of JeM were apprehended and subsequently tried for their roles in the attack; among them was Afzal Guru, who was given the death penalty. Security expert Bruce Riedel articulated the gravity of the situation, noting that had a prominent Indian leader been killed, it could have triggered a military response from India. This scenario fueled tensions between India and Pakistan, leading to a large-scale mobilization of troops along the border, marking one of the biggest military exercises in fifteen years.
Reacting to the escalated risk of conflict and U.S. unease regarding the maintenance of a coherent War on Terror, Musharraf was under immense pressure to publicly denounce terrorism emanating from Pakistan. On January 12, 2002, he declared a crackdown on terrorist organizations, including a ban on JeM and four other extremist groups. In a sweeping operation, hundreds of militants were detained, inciting backlash from them, as noted by analyst Ahmed Rashid. Yet, despite these measures, by March 2002, many of those arrested were released, and restrictions on their activities were quietly lifted. The cycle of arrests and releases underscored the complexities of Pakistan's internal policies regarding militancy, as financial and intelligence support to JeM resumed, and Masood Azhar, the group's founder, was released following a court verdict. This contentious interplay between counterterrorism rhetoric and the reality of militant resurgence in the region continued to shape the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan's political landscape.
Evolution and Rebranding
In the early months of 2001, as tensions escalated globally and specifically with the United States, a strategic shift took place within the militant group known as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Anticipating a designation as a foreign Islamic jihadist organization by the US State Department, JeM preemptively rebranded itself as Tehrik-ul-Furqan, and began to transfer its assets to low-profile supporters in a bid to obfuscate its financial footprint. The group's efforts to evade scrutiny were ultimately in vain, as both the United Nations and the US officially labeled it a foreign Islamic jihadist organization by the end of 2001. In a further attempt to distance itself from its controversial activities, JeM changed its name to Khuddam ul-Islam following a ban imposed by the Pakistani government in January 2002. This rebranding met a similar fate when it too was banned in 2003, leading the group to establish a facade of a charitable organization known as Al-Rehmat Trust, alleged to be a front for raising funds for militant operations.
During this tumultuous period, internal dissent began to fracture the group. Notable commanders from JeM, including Abdul Jabbar, Maulana Umar Farooq, and Abdullah Shah Mazhar, broke away to form a new faction, Jamaat ul-Furqan, amidst rising tensions. The remaining members, loyal to Masood Azhar, retained the Khuddam ul-Islam name. Meanwhile, discontent simmered within JeM, primarily due to the leadership's perceived betrayal of their jihadist ideals, particularly after President Pervez Musharraf aligned Pakistan with US efforts in the War on Terror. Masood Azhar's support of the state during this geopolitical shift resulted in a loss of credibility and authority within the ranks, culminating in demands for his resignation. This atmosphere of dissent was exacerbated by influential figures such as Maulana Abdul Jabbar, who vehemently opposed Musharraf's regime and rallied for a jihad against what they dubbed the "slave" government of Pakistan under US influence.
Escalating Violence and Internal Turmoil
From March to September 2002, the splinter factions, empowered and spurred on by their grievances and external backing from Al Qaeda and other militant groups, executed a series of violent attacks targeting Pakistani officials across major cities including Islamabad, Karachi, and Bahawalpur. Furthermore, following the ousting of the Taliban regime, returning JeM militants launched targeted assaults against churches, Shia mosques, and foreign diplomatic missions, exacerbating sectarian tensions within Pakistan. Despite the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) urging Masood Azhar to contain the insurgency, he was losing control over the increasingly militant and disenchanted elements within JeM. Azhar's claims of expelling the rebellious factions were undermined by the reality that many remained embedded in JeM’s structure, thereby vying for influence, resources, and relevance.
The situation deteriorated further when both Khuddam ul-Islam and Jamaat-ul-Furqan faced a ban from Musharraf's government in November 2003. In a dramatic escalation, rebellious elements conspiratorially mounted assassination attempts against President Musharraf in December 2003, with evidence suggesting complicity from elements within the Pakistani military. The explosives used in these attacks traced back to Al Qaeda-linked facilities in South Waziristan. Masood Azhar's public statements calling for Musharraf's assassination further fueled suspicions of his complicity or, at the very least, tacit support for the aggressive actions taken by the splinter factions.
As the Pakistani government cracked down on these rogue elements within the military and intelligence services, a substantial number of individuals were apprehended and dismissed, with significant legal repercussions faced by several members. Despite this crackdown, the militant infrastructure largely remained intact, laying the groundwork for resurgence. By 2004, Azhar's faction operated from a diminished but resilient state, allowing for its rejuvenation, while rebellious factions gradually reestablished connections with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007, indicating a shift in alliance among Pakistan's complex network of militant groups. This evolution illustrated the volatility and adaptability of extremist factions in Pakistan's shifting political and social landscape.
Revival of Masood Azhar and JeM
Masood Azhar has remained a steadfast ally of the Pakistani state since 2004, navigating the complex landscape of militant organizations and state policies. Despite the Pakistani government's efforts to impose official bans on his group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the state apparatus has continued to offer a protective umbrella, allowing the group to flourish in regions like Bahawalpur. This apparent paradox of fostering militancy while maintaining a façade of control reflects the intricate balance that Pakistan aims to achieve in its foreign policy, especially concerning India. Reports from 2009 indicate that JeM constructed an extensive 6.5-acre walled complex in Bahawalpur, featuring facilities that could be utilized for training militants, such as a swimming pool and a stable for horses. This complex, which has been identified as 'Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah,' is located only 8 kilometers from a key military installation, the headquarters of the Pakistan Army's 31 Corps. Such proximity raises serious questions about the degree of oversight exercised by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies over extremist organizations operating within their borders.
In addition, the presence of an imposing madrassa run by JeM at the heart of Bahawalpur demonstrates the organization’s deep-rooted influence in the region, reportedly attracting hundreds of young children annually. The unwavering support from the local population, alongside the group’s ability to mobilize resources, was starkly highlighted during a massive three-day rally organized by the organization in 2008. Notably, armed security personnel were stationed at key city entry points, while law enforcement officers appeared to be conspicuously absent, underscoring the implications of state complicity in allowing such activities to transpire unchecked.
Azhar maintained a cautious low profile for several years until his reappearance in 2014, during which he delivered impassioned speeches advocating for increased militant operations against India and the United States. His declarations included claims of having a substantial reserve of 300 suicide attackers at his disposal and direct threats against then-Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This resurgence coincided with significant political shifts in Pakistan, particularly the return of Nawaz Sharif to the premiership. Sharif's approach to diplomacy, marked by a push for 'détente' with India, appeared to aggravate factions within JeM that thrived on anti-Indian sentiment. Tensions escalated following Modi’s unexpected visit to Lahore on Christmas Day in 2015, which was perceived as a betrayal of Islamist hardliners like Azhar, exacerbating existing rifts and leading to further calls for violent action against India.
This dynamic between JeM and the shifting political landscape of Pakistan reflects a broader narrative of state-sponsored militancy and terrorism in South Asia. The Pakistani state’s strategy has often involved leveraging extremist groups as proxies for its geopolitical ambitions, particularly against India. However, as the political climate evolves, the potential for internal conflicts between state objectives and the ambitions of militant leaders like Azhar becomes a critical factor for regional stability.
Timeline of Events in 2016
In January 2016, a significant and alarming series of events unfolded shortly after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Lahore. The terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) launched an audacious attack on the Pathankot air base, resulting in the tragic deaths of seven security personnel. This attack was part of a broader trend of escalating violence, as it was soon followed by an assault on the Indian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan publicly condemned the attacks, striving to maintain a fragile peace process that had seen various ups and downs over the years. In a proactive measure, Pakistan announced it had formed a joint investigation team with India to probe the Pathankot attack, hinting at a collaborative effort to address the complex issue of terrorism.
Despite Pakistan's assurances, the dynamics remained murky. Although authorities claimed to have taken JeM's founder, Masood Azhar, into "protective custody," the organization quickly denied any arrests had occurred. By April 2016, reports indicated that Azhar was free, albeit "within reach, if needed," calling into question the seriousness of Pakistan's actions against such groups. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, a National Assembly member, asserted that the conditions fostering extremism, including madrassas receiving funding, persisted unabated. The situation grew increasingly convoluted as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif found himself pressured by army chief General Raheel Sharif during a high-level meeting, ultimately resulting in a transfer of authority regarding counterterrorism efforts to the military. Reports suggested that once civilian authorities intervened against these groups, unseen forces within Pakistan's security establishment acted to ensure their release, although the government dismissed these claims as exaggerated.
As 2016 progressed, the unrest in Jammu and Kashmir emerged as a pivotal factor, prompting various jihadi groups in Pakistan to rally in support of the situation in Kashmir. Notably, JeM openly engaged in fundraising efforts for jihad, signaling a troubling endorsement of violence under the guise of religious and political support. This period reached a critical point in September 2016, when a coordinated attack on an Indian Army base in Uri near the Line of Control resulted in the deaths of 19 soldiers, marking it as one of the deadliest events in the two decades preceding it. Indian authorities placed blame squarely on JeM for the attack and engaged in heavy rhetoric, labeling Pakistan as a "terrorist state" and characterizing the attackers as "highly trained" and "heavily armed."
In response to the Uri attack, India embarked on a diplomatic offensive aimed at isolating Pakistan on the global stage. On September 28, Indian officials claimed to have conducted "surgical strikes" targeting alleged JeM camps in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, a statement met with vehement denial from Pakistani authorities. This series of events not only underscored the fraught India-Pakistan relationship but also highlighted the ongoing challenges in combating terrorism, revealing how deeply entrenched elements within society continue to foster such violent ideologies despite governmental efforts to suppress them. The environment in both countries indicated that, while formal channels of diplomacy remained open, the cycle of violence continued to eclipse peace efforts, contributing to an atmosphere laden with mistrust and hostility.
Kashmir Conflict Escalation in 2019
The year 2019 marked a significant and deadly escalation in the ongoing conflict in Kashmir, particularly exemplified by the tragic suicide attack on 14 February. Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based militant group, orchestrated this horrific act in Lathpora, targeting a convoy of security forces. This brutal attack resulted in the loss of at least 40 Indian personnel, further intensifying the already fraught atmosphere in the region. The assault involved a vehicle laden with approximately 350 kilograms of explosives, which rammed into a bus carrying 39 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) members, highlighting the scale and planning that the attackers employed.
In response to the attack, India escalated military action on 26 February 2019 by conducting airstrikes in Balakot, Pakistan, utilizing 12 Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 jets. The strikes were aimed at a site believed to be a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp and formed part of India's broader counter-terrorism strategy. In the aftermath, while Indian authorities claimed significant damage to the militant group's infrastructure, the Pakistani government refuted these claims, stating that the strikes did not cause any significant destruction. This military engagement led to heightened tensions and a significant incident on the following day, when Pakistan shot down an Indian aircraft, capturing its pilot. The pilot was later released as a gesture of peace, although the episode deepened the sense of animosity between the two nations over the Kashmir dispute.
The violence that marred 2019 did not stop with the February airstrikes. On 27 August, tragedy struck again when two members of a nomadic community were brutally killed by militants, believed to be associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed, in the Tral area of south Kashmir. These individuals had been abducted from their temporary shelter in the region, illustrating the continued threat posed by such militant groups and the volatile environment faced by local communities. The rise in targeted violence against civilians, particularly marginalized groups, underscored the increasing severity of the conflict and the challenges to security and peace within the Kashmir Valley. The incidents of 2019 serve as a stark reminder of the complexities surrounding the Kashmir issue and the urgent need for dialogue and resolution.
Impact of the Taliban Seizure on JeM Activities
The Taliban's swift takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 had significant ramifications not only within the country but also across regional terrorist networks, particularly the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). The power shift provided an opportunity for various militant groups to re-establish connections and collaborate more closely. Reports indicate that following the Taliban's ascension, several JeM operatives were released, further bolstering the group's ranks. This development raised concerns among security analysts and governments, particularly in India, which has been a longstanding target of JeM's militant activities.
Meetings between JeM leaders and Taliban officials signal a strategic alliance, with both parties seemingly seeking mutual benefits through cooperation. In a notable event, JeM founder Masood Azhar reportedly held a meeting with prominent Taliban figures, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Kandahar shortly after the Taliban regained control. The discussions centered around bolstering efforts in the Kashmir region, which remains a contentious point of conflict between India and Pakistan. The Taliban's support for JeM in this context highlights the potential for increased militant activity in Kashmir, as the group seeks to leverage its newfound access to resources and logistical support from the Taliban.
The implications of this collaboration extend beyond mere operational synergy. The Taliban's regime, now emboldened by international recognition movements and potential political leverage, may be inclined to utilize groups like JeM to exert influence and challenge Indian authority in Kashmir. This assertion is compounded by reports indicating that the Taliban has assured JeM of comprehensive support for its agenda in India, further fueling fears of escalated violence in the region. The evolving dynamics in Afghanistan following the Taliban's takeover could thus reshape the security landscape in South Asia and necessitate heightened vigilance from Indian authorities and neighboring countries.
Ideology and Goals of Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is an armed militant organization that operates primarily in Pakistan and has been involved in various jihadist activities aimed at what it sees as liberating Kashmir and incorporating it into Pakistan. The group's ideological framework positions Kashmir not merely as a territorial dispute but as a pivotal starting point for broader jihadist aspirations across India. JeM propagates the belief that Muslims in India are under oppression and positions itself as a vanguard for their liberation. This ambition extends beyond Kashmir, with an alarming intention to push non-Muslim populations, particularly Hindus, out of the entire Indian subcontinent. This goal reflects a deeply entrenched sectarian worldview, aiming to reshape the demographic landscape of the region through violence and coercion.
The founder and leader of JeM, Masood Azhar, has been vocal about the group’s aspirations, not only targeting Jammu and Kashmir but also seeking to influence other regions of India. His rhetoric underscores a relentless commitment to jihad, where he has urged followers to prioritize their lives for the cause by marrying and procreating solely for the sake of furthering jihadist objectives. This relentless focus on jihad raises concerns about radicalization and the normalization of violence among followers, which could lead to a cycle of extremist actions and counter-reactions, destabilizing the region even further.
In addition to its operations in India, JeM has shown an intent to target international forces in Afghanistan, particularly the United States and its allies. This positioning aligns with broader jihadist narratives that portray Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a form of oppression that needs to be resisted. JeM’s activities are not limited to external engagement; it has also been involved in domestic unrest within Pakistan. The organization has a history of targeting Christians and other minority groups, reflecting its extremist ideology in violent actions. Notably, its operatives have been implicated in various attacks against the Pakistani state and its security forces, showcasing a complex relationship with the very government it sometimes seeks to manipulate or co-opt.
One of the notorious incidents linked to JeM is the abduction and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl by Ahmed Omar Sheikh, underscoring the group's commitment to violence and its willingness to target foreign nationals. Such acts contribute to the international perception of JeM as a terrorist organization, and they complicate Pakistan's fight against extremism. The wider implications of JeM's ideology and actions pose significant challenges for regional stability, counter-terrorism efforts, and the broader international community's approach to dealing with militancy in South Asia. The continued activities of JeM serve as a stark reminder of the intricate web of geopolitical tensions that define the conflict in Kashmir and the ongoing fight against extremist ideologies.
Leadership Structure
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is led by its founder and emir, Maulana Masood Azhar, who has a storied history of militancy. Before establishing JeM, Azhar was affiliated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a group that operates within the same ideological spectrum. His training at the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia seminary in Karachi not only connected him to the Taliban founder Mullah Omar but also facilitated his long-standing ties with Al Qaeda. Azhar's military involvement includes significant participation in the Soviet-Afghan War, where he not only fought but also played a role in forming militant factions across regions including Chechnya, Central Asia, and Somalia. Notably, his expertise reportedly extended to training Somalian militants in countering American airpower, specifically instructing them on how to shoot down Black Hawk helicopters.
Masood Azhar's prominence grew markedly after being arrested in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1994 during a "mission." His arrest drew the attention of Osama bin Laden, who allegedly orchestrated a hijacking to secure Azhar's release. Following this incident, Azhar became a celebrated figure in Pakistan, receiving considerable support from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which positioned him as a leading figure of JeM. His recognition extended to international levels when, in 2010, the United States Treasury Department designated him as a "global Islamic terrorist." This formal designation underscores the significant threat posed by Azhar and his organization within broader global counterterrorism efforts.
Family Dynamics and Operations
JeM operates similarly to a family-run business, where family ties play a crucial role in coordinating its activities. Several members of Masood Azhar's family hold pivotal positions within the organization. His brother, Abdul Rauf Asghar, is a prominent leader and serves as the group's intelligence coordinator. Asghar’s involvement in terrorism is compounded by his history as one of the hijackers during the notorious IC 814 incident, and he has stepped in as the "acting leader" of JeM during Azhar's absence, particularly noted in 2007. His operational command includes orchestrating major attacks within India, including the infamous 2016 Pathankot attack, during which evidence indicated that he directed militants via telecommunications.
The influence of Abdul Rauf Asghar in JeM is further solidified by his designation as a "global terrorist" by the US Treasury Department, highlighting the international ramifications of his militant activities. Furthermore, the group has faced internal strife, as evidenced by the mysterious assassination of one of its commanders, Shahid Latif, in Daska town, Sialkot district in 2023. Latif's killing raises questions about potential power struggles within JeM and reflects the increasingly volatile environment in which these militant organizations operate. JeM's leadership structure, characterized by familial ties and strategic ruthlessness, continues to pose significant challenges to regional and global security dynamics.
Membership Dynamics of JeM
The establishment of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Karachi in the year 2000 marked a significant turning point in the landscape of militant organizations in Pakistan. At the time of its launch, an impressive assembly of approximately 10,000 armed supporters gathered, showcasing the immediate appeal of the group. The initial membership primarily emerged from Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a group that had previously engaged in combat in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This shared history fostered a deep-seated loyalty towards these organizations while simultaneously cultivating animosity towards the United States, particularly in the wake of post-9/11 geopolitics.
JeM's membership predominantly draws from the Punjab province in Pakistan, specifically the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Rahim Yar Khan. These areas are not only populous but also serve as significant ethnic hubs for the Pakistani military's composition. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency perceived this shared ethnicity as a potential alignment with the military's broader strategic objectives, thereby facilitating recruitment efforts. Additionally, the organization has attracted a diverse array of fighters, including a considerable number of Afghan and Arab militants, which enhances its operational capabilities and international connections. The inclusion of Western militants of Pakistani descent, such as Rashid Rauf, Shehzad Tanweer, and Ahmed Omar Sheikh, further underscores this diversity, demonstrating JeM's ability to attract various factions into its fold.
The dynamics of JeM's membership were not static; a notable split occurred in 2002, resulting in a significant exodus of original fighters who departed to join splinter groups. Nevertheless, JeM witnessed a resurgence by 2009 and was estimated to have between one and two thousand fighters along with a substantial support network consisting of several thousand individuals engaged in auxiliary roles. The charismatic leadership of Masood Azhar, who claimed to command an impressive contingent of 300 suicide attackers, played a crucial role in revitalizing the organization's presence. This ability to mobilize and retain fighters highlights JeM's resilience in the face of external pressures and its continued relevance within the regional conflict paradigm.
JeM and Its Infrastructure
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has a significant and complex infrastructure that supports its operations and objectives. Originally, JeM operated training facilities in Afghanistan, where it collaborated with various militant groups. However, following the fall of the Taliban government, the organization relocated its training camps to different regions in Pakistan. Notable locations include Balakot and Peshawar in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This strategic shift allowed JeM to maintain its training operations while escaping the direct conflicts that arose in Afghanistan.
By 2009, JeM had established a well-fortified headquarters in Bahawalpur, located in Pakistani Punjab, approximately 420 miles south of Islamabad. This site features a madrassa at its center, serving as a focal point for indoctrination and recruitment. The headquarters encompasses a 6.5-acre walled complex that functions as a comprehensive training facility. The amenities at Bahawalpur include specialized training areas for water exercises and horseback riding, which are essential for preparing operatives for diverse forms of combat and insurgency.
In addition to its training programs, Bahawalpur acts as a rest and recuperation center for jihadists who have engaged in combat in Afghanistan. The geographical location of Bahawalpur is strategically advantageous, as it is situated away from the high-risk areas targeted by US drone strikes. Furthermore, the city is in proximity to other militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which operates out of Muridke, and Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, both of which are based in Punjab. These operational ties suggest a collaborative network among various militant factions, facilitating shared resources and strategic planning.
Within Bahawalpur, there are an estimated 500 to 1,000 madrassas that propagate a violent interpretation of Islam, catering primarily to children. These institutions play a critical role in radicalizing the youth and sustaining the militant ideology essential for the recruitment process. The pervasive presence of such madrassas within Bahawalpur not only aids in the proliferation of extremist beliefs but also ensures a continuous supply of potential operatives for organizations like JeM. The combination of these elements positions Bahawalpur as a pivotal hub for militant activity in the region, shaping the landscape of religious extremism and insurgency in South Asia.
Publications of JeM
Jamaat-ul-Dawa (JeM), akin to various other jihadi organizations operating in the region, has effectively utilized a sophisticated media strategy to propagate its ideology and recruit followers. Print media remains a fundamental element in this strategy, with a range of publications tailored to different demographics. Among these, "Al-Qalam" serves as a weekly publication available in both Urdu and English, which serves to articulate the group's ideological stance and religious perspectives to a broader audience. This bilingual approach facilitates worldwide outreach, allowing non-Urdu speakers to engage with the core beliefs of JeM.
In addition to "Al-Qalam," JeM produces the monthly "Ayeshatul Binat," specifically aimed at women, which seeks to address their unique perspectives and promote the organization's views on gender roles within an Islamic framework. Furthermore, the group publishes "Musalman Bachy," a weekly magazine intended for children, reflecting an effort to indoctrinate younger generations into their belief system from an early age. These publications play a crucial role in shaping perceptions and encouraging adherence to extremist ideologies among different age groups.
Beyond traditional print media, JeM has embraced digital platforms to enhance its outreach. The organization actively maintains several Telegram channels as part of its e-publications strategy. These channels are pivotal in disseminating real-time information about alleged successes in operations against the Indian armed forces, thus portraying the group as a formidable and resilient entity. They also serve as a platform for the leadership to release statements, propagandist materials, and motivational content aimed at inspiring loyalty among potential supporters. This combination of print and digital media showcases JeM's multifaceted approach to recruitment and ideological dissemination, highlighting the ongoing challenge posed by such groups in the region.
Links to Other Organizations
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has a complex history of affiliations and alliances with various militant groups, especially in the context of the broader geopolitical landscape in South Asia. When JeM was established, it forged strong connections with both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, utilizing shared training camps in Afghanistan to facilitate operational cooperation. This relationship included the exchange of intelligence and coordination of attacks, underscoring a significant level of collaboration among these groups. Security expert Bruce Riedel posits that the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 may have been a retaliatory act or "payback" to Al-Qaeda, particularly due to their earlier assistance in securing the release of JeM leader Masood Azhar from Indian captivity. The repercussions of this attack led Pakistan to reposition its military assets from the Afghan border to the Indian frontier, inadvertently alleviating pressure on Al-Qaeda's operations.
The dynamic within JeM saw a shift in 2002 when many members with strong loyalty to the Taliban defected to join more radical factions. However, Masood Azhar's faction re-emerged in 2008 by actively recruiting fighters for the Afghan jihad, indicating a resurgence in their operational capabilities. By 2010, notable Pakistani officials, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik, acknowledged the connections between JeM, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, indicating a united front akin to a singular entity focusing on varied activities within militancy. This camaraderie is especially strong in South Punjab, where these groups collaborate closely to pursue common objectives against Indian interests.
JeM’s links do not end with these groups; it also maintains ties with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, its precursor organization, which enhances its ideological continuity. Furthermore, JeM has operational relationships with Lashkar-e-Taiba, specifically noted for its role in orchestrating the 2001 Indian Parliament attack. To expand its reach and operational capabilities in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir, JeM became a participant in the United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization comprising 13 to 16 militant factions dedicated to combating Indian administration in Kashmir.
Additionally, a notable faction within JeM is Khuddam ul-Islam, a militant splinter group that operates under the designation of a Proscribed Organisation in the United Kingdom, as per the Terrorism Act of 2000. This group is reported to have political ties with Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. Some analysts suggest that Khuddam ul-Islam represents a restructured version of JeM, with leadership potentially directed by Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar, who is the younger brother of Masood Azhar. This connection signifies a continual evolution within JeM's operational structure and its capacity to adapt in response to both regional and international pressures.
Notable Attacks
The militant group, in association with Lashkar-e-Taiba, has been linked to several significant terror attacks in India, most notably the 2001 Indian Parliament attack in New Delhi, which aimed to destabilize the Indian government. This coordinated assault drew widespread condemnation and heightened security concerns, prompting a review of India's counter-terrorism strategies. The incident not only led to the loss of lives but also put a spotlight on the contentious issues of domestic and international terrorism faced by India.
In addition to the Parliament attack, the group has been implicated in the tragic murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002. Pearl was a Wall Street Journal reporter whose abduction and subsequent killing shocked the world and highlighted the dangers faced by journalists in conflict zones. His death raised awareness of the broader implications of terrorism for press freedom and the safety of media personnel around the globe, leading to increased discussions about the ethical responsibilities and protections necessary for journalists in perilous environments.
An alarming plot to kidnap Rahul Gandhi, an influential Indian political leader and descendant of the renowned Nehru-Gandhi political family, has been attributed to this militant faction. This failed endeavor aimed to exchange Gandhi for 42 imprisoned militants in India, indicating the group’s willingness to exploit political figures to further its agenda. The arrest of three Pakistani nationals—Mohammed Abid alias Fateh, Yusuf alias Faisal, and Mirza Rashid Beg alias Raja Kajafi—revealed the operational connections and networks often utilized by such groups.
Internationally, the group's reach became more prevalent when an undercover informant, posing as a member of Jaish-e-Mohammed, assisted law enforcement in apprehending four individuals plotting to bomb a New York City synagogue and target military aircraft with Stinger missiles. This operation in May 2009 underscored the global threat posed by such groups and the need for vigilant international cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. One of the detained, James Cromitie, had expressed a desire to affiliate with Jaish-e-Mohammed, highlighting the recruitment strategies employed by militant organizations to expand their influence.
In recent years, the group has also been associated with high-profile attacks in India, such as the Pathankot attack in January 2016, which targeted an airbase, and a subsequent attack in September 2016 at an army camp in Uri, Kashmir. These incidents reflect a persistent trend of militant activities in volatile regions and have prompted robust military and security responses from the Indian government. The culmination of these attacks reached a tragic peak on February 14, 2019, when a suicide bomber named Adil Ahmad Dar executed a suicide bombing against a convoy of CRPF security personnel near Pulwama in Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of at least 40 officers. This devastating event not only shocked the nation but also reignited fervent debates over security, insurgency, and the overarching challenges of terrorism that India continues to confront.