Treaty Provisions
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, is a landmark agreement between India and Pakistan that governs the allocation and usage of the waters from the Indus River system. This system includes a total of six rivers, divided into three western rivers — the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab — and three eastern rivers — the Sutlej, the Beas, and the Ravi. According to Article I of the treaty, all rivers and tributaries, along with their catchment areas that do not comprise the eastern rivers, are classified as part of the Indus River system, inclusive of features such as creeks and delta channels. This delineation emphasizes that the eastern rivers are designated for exclusive use by India, while Pakistan holds similar rights over the western rivers, following permissible water uses by each country.
Significantly, the treaty established a transition period of ten years, during which India was obligated to provide water from its eastern rivers to support Pakistan’s canal systems until the latter could construct its infrastructure to utilize the resources from the western rivers. Remarkably, this commitment to provide water continued unfalteringly even during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, showcasing the treaty's critical role in mitigating resource-related tensions. Article 5.1 outlines that India had to contribute a substantial amount of money toward constructing new works and canal systems for irrigation in Pakistan, ensuring the equitable sharing of water resources amid geopolitical strife.
Furthermore, the treaty fosters cooperation between the two nations through the establishment of the Permanent Indus Commission. Each country appoints a commissioner, responsible for monitoring the treaty’s implementation, managing disputes, and fostering data exchange regarding water usage. This commission has proven resilient, surviving multiple wars between the nations while providing a central forum for consultation and conflict resolution. Annual reports by the commission are meant to reflect its operations, although these reports remain undisclosed, highlighting a gap in transparency regarding water-sharing issues. Despite ongoing tensions, the commission's provisions for consistent inspections and data sharing have helped mitigate potential conflicts arising from different engineering projects or water management strategies.
Both parties are mandated to inform each other of any engineering projects that may influence shared waters, facilitating a collaborative environment. Implementation of this stipulation was reflected in the mutual agreement on the construction of the Salal dam, demonstrating a willingness to work together. However, the Tulbul Project has faced prolonged suspension despite sustained discussions between the countries. In moments of dispute, mechanisms such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or neutral technical experts are engaged to provide resolutions. The rulings from both channels have set precedents for projects like the Baglihar power plant and Kishanganga Hydroelectric Plant, underlining the treaty's framework for legal recourse in managing disagreements.
Currently, tensions are resurfacing over projects such as the 850 MW Ratle Hydroelectric Plant, with Pakistan alleging violations of the IWT and seeking intervention from the PCA, while India has favored the appointment of a Neutral Expert. This diverging approach underscores the complexities inherent in navigating water rights under the treaty, especially as Pakistan’s groundwater usage and river training works may contravene specific provisions of the IWT. These ongoing disputes raise concerns regarding the future viability of the treaty, as interpretations by the PCA may challenge the original agreements laid out in the IWT, possibly leading to significant shifts in how water rights are enforced in the region. The relationship between the two nations continues to be tested, as water remains a critical and often contentious resource profoundly intertwined with both environmental sustainability and geopolitical stability.
Overview of the Indus River System
The Indus River System, a crucial waterway for the regions of South Asia, has its origins primarily in the Tibetan Plateau and the towering Himalayan mountains. This system meanders through key Indian states, including Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, before traversing into the plains of Punjab and Sindh in Pakistan. Ultimately, it discharges into the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi and near the Kori Creek in Gujarat. As of 2009, Pakistan had developed a massive irrigation infrastructure that utilized the Indus waters to support agriculture across more than 47 million acres (approximately 190,000 km²), making it one of the largest setups dependent on a single river system in the world. Additionally, the average annual water resource available in Pakistan from the Indus system stands at about 218 billion cubic meters, underscoring its importance for the agricultural economy of the country.
Consequences of Partition on Water Sharing
The partition of British India in 1947 set off a series of tensions over the apportionment of Indus waters, fundamentally rooted in the way the new boundaries were drawn primarily based on religious lines rather than geographical considerations. The division led to a complex conflict over the management of the Indus Basin's water resources, which had been effectively a unitary hydrological system prior to the partition. The geographical realities of partition meant that the source rivers of the Indus were situated in what became India, thereby placing Pakistan in a precarious position concerning its water security. India eyed the potential for harnessing the tributaries for its developmental ambitions, while Pakistan felt an existential threat, as control over these waters directly impacted its agrarian livelihoods.
Initial Efforts and Stalemate in Negotiations
In the immediate aftermath of partition, to address the urgent need for water distribution from the Indus, the Inter-Dominion Accord was enacted on May 4, 1948. This agreement mandated India to release adequate water through existing canals to the Pakistani territories of the basin, thus facilitating water access in exchange for annual financial payments from Pakistan. While this accord provided a temporary resolution to the pressing water needs, it was not designed as a long-term solution. Efforts to create a more sustainable agreement faced significant challenges, as both countries remained entrenched in their positions. India, asserting its control over water distribution, displayed a reluctance to meet Pakistan's demands, effectively presenting a roadblock to negotiations. Conversely, Pakistan sought elevation of the issue to the International Court of Justice, aiming for a legally binding resolution; Indian authorities, however, steadfastly maintained that dialogue must remain strictly bilateral, believing that the issues could best be resolved through direct negotiation rather than international adjudication.
World Bank's Role in the Indus Waters Treaty
The involvement of the World Bank in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) stems from the complexities surrounding water resource management between India and Pakistan. Originating from a critical 1951 trip by David Lilienthal, a prominent American engineer and former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bank's engagement was initiated by his observations on the geopolitical tensions in the region. While Lilienthal was sponsored by Collier's magazine for his journalistic pursuits, he was also briefed by various officials keen on alleviating tensions between the two countries. Lilienthal realized that given the volatile situation regarding Kashmir, a direct negotiation on this contentious issue seemed unlikely. Instead, he proposed joint efforts in developing the Indus Basin River system, which was crucial for both nations' agricultural needs. By fostering cooperation through infrastructural projects, he believed this would potentially cultivate a sense of community, making more complex negotiations like Kashmir easier in the long run.
This proposition found a receptive audience within the World Bank. Eugene R. Black, the then-president of the World Bank, acknowledged that the proposal was sensible and noted the economic importance of resolving the Indus dispute. Recognizing the historical reluctance of India towards third-party mediation, he assured the Indian government that the World Bank would focus on functional aspects of resource allocation, setting aside political differences. This approach was pivotal, aiming to separate technical negotiations from the entrenched political sentiments surrounding water rights. Black envisioned a collaborative Working Party formed by experts from both nations and the World Bank, all of whom would tackle the engineering and management of the basin's water resources.
Despite the initial optimism from the World Bank about achieving a swift resolution, actual negotiations were far more complicated than anticipated. Predictably, political stances overshadowed the functional discussions. Pakistan contended its historical right to the waters, while India sought a reimagined allocation framework that split resources based on geographical alignment, with the western rivers designated for Pakistan and eastern rivers for India. This clash was compounded by broader political contexts that made meaningful technical discussions challenging. As frustrations mounted, the World Bank's expectations for an immediately fruitful dialogue began to wane.
In a significant shift, after nearly two years of stalled negotiations, the World Bank proposed its own set of solutions which, although aimed at simplifying negotiations through concrete plans, ended up favoring India’s stance. A key aspect of the proposal allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to Pakistan, with construction plans for canals and storage dams to facilitate Pakistan's water needs. This controversial plan sparked outrage among Pakistani officials, who felt their position had been disregarded and threatened to withdraw from negotiations entirely. However, the desire for resolution ultimately led both sides to reconsider the impasse, recognizing the potential catastrophic consequences of failure, including heightened military conflict.
With both nations intent on avoiding further tensions, a renewed commitment to negotiating arose in December 1954. Over the next six years, discussions oscillated between progress and setbacks, with the World Bank facilitating deliberations centered on logistics and financing. One crucial element that remained unresolved was the financing of necessary infrastructural projects to support Pakistan amid their concession of rights to eastern rivers. Initially, the World Bank envisioned India covering these costs, but after India's refusal, a new external financing plan was established, leading to the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement in September 1960.
This agreement culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty on the same day, applicable retroactively from April 1, 1960. The financial provisions made through the Indus Basin Development Fund involved collaborations with several countries, including Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Pakistan benefiting from a combination of funds and loans. Furthermore, an additional agreement in 1964 extended these financial provisions, reinforcing the commitment of both nations to uphold the terms of the treaty while starkly illustrating the role of international mediation in resolving complex geopolitical disputes over natural resources.
Role of the World Bank in the Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan, aimed to manage the water resources of the Indus River system. While it established frameworks for the shared waters of the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers, the role of the World Bank predominantly focuses on facilitating and ensuring compliance with the treaty's provisions. Specifically, the World Bank acts as a neutral party to support the dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in the treaty. When one party is uncooperative or reluctant to adhere to the arbitration procedures, the World Bank intervenes to help mediate the situation, thereby contributing to water-sharing stability in the region.
Importance of Dispute Settlement
The dispute settlement process serves a critical function in the overall effectiveness of the Indus Waters Treaty. Given the strategic importance of water resources for both countries, any disagreement over water rights could escalate quickly into larger political tensions. The World Bank’s involvement is essential in maintaining a level of dialogue and cooperation, fostering a framework where disputes can be resolved without resorting to conflict. The arbitration procedure specified in the treaty is designed to ensure that decisions are based on technical assessments and objective criteria, paving the way for an amicable resolution. By providing a platform for negotiation and guidance, the World Bank supports both nations in prioritizing peaceful collaboration over potential confrontations.
Future Prospects
The challenges of water scarcity and climate change underline the necessity of effective governance and management of transboundary water resources, especially in South Asia. With increasing pressures on water supplies and agricultural demands, a strong framework for cooperation under the Indus Waters Treaty is imperative. In addition to the World Bank's role in dispute resolution, future agreements may involve enhanced financial instruments, including grants and loans aimed at developing sustainable water management practices in both India and Pakistan. Such initiatives could promote better water conservation techniques, infrastructure development, and technology sharing, contributing to the resilience of both countries in facing emerging water challenges.
In conclusion, while the World Bank's involvement in the Indus Waters Treaty primarily revolves around dispute resolution, the implications of this role extend far beyond arbitration. Its support can foster long-term cooperation, ensuring both nations manage shared water resources sustainably and equitably, ultimately promoting peace and stability in the region. The need for ongoing dialogue, coupled with strategic investments in water management, will remain essential as both countries navigate the complexities of shared water resources in an era marked by change and uncertainty.
Treaty Implications
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) delineates a complex water-sharing framework between India and Pakistan, rooted in the management of the rivers of the Indus system. Under this treaty, India is allocated roughly 41 billion cubic meters (m³) of water, which constitutes about 16% of the total flow, while Pakistan receives a significantly larger share of approximately 218 billion m³, equating to around 84%. This disparity in water allocation raises several implications regarding the agricultural and hydropower needs of both nations, particularly for regions such as Jammu and Kashmir in India.
India is permitted to utilize the western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) primarily for irrigation, with specified limitations on water storage. The treaty allows India to irrigate a maximum of 701,000 acres with a total new water storage capacity not exceeding 1.54 billion m³. Additionally, while India's capability to manage Run of River (RoR) projects is relatively unrestricted, the operating pool is limited, particularly during lean flow periods. The absence of significant storage west of the Indus, especially in Jammu and Kashmir, poses challenges for meeting irrigation demands, constraining agricultural productivity in a region reliant on these water resources. Conversely, Pakistan enjoys the benefits of a broader water allocation that supports the irrigation of approximately 80.52% of its cultivated lands within the Indus basin, highlighting the contrasts in resource availability between the two countries.
Pakistan's water management strategies further emphasize this disparity, as it plans to construct several multi-purpose water reservoirs. Projects like the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and Dasu Dam, among others, not only aim to harness water for irrigation but also focus on hydroelectric power generation. The cumulative storage capacity will help Pakistan manage fluctuating river flows and mitigate water scarcity challenges over the long term. However, this aggressive dam-building strategy comes with risks, particularly in seismic areas where dam failures can lead to catastrophic flooding in both Pakistani and Indian territories, such as the Kutch region.
From a geopolitical standpoint, India’s control over the IWT grants it certain military advantages within the framework of water resources management. The treaty primarily governs the sharing of river waters confined to regions under Indian jurisdiction, limiting Pakistan's ability to respond effectively to potential violations or disruptions by India. The IWT explicitly prohibits Pakistan from attacking hydraulic infrastructure on the Indian side, imposing constraints on military strategy and engagement related to water resources. This facet underscores the treaty's duality: a mechanism for water management that simultaneously serves as a strategic instrument within broader regional dynamics.
In conclusion, the Indus Waters Treaty serves as a crucial yet contentious framework for water sharing between India and Pakistan. While it seeks to promote cooperation and equitable usage of water resources, the inherent asymmetries in allocation and storage create challenges. The advancements in dam construction and the military implications of the treaty further complicate the relationship between the two nations, making the IWT an ongoing focal point of negotiation, conflict, and potential collaboration in managing shared water resources.
Pakistani Concerns Over India's Water Projects
In recent years, Pakistan has expressed significant concerns to the World Bank regarding India's development projects concerning the Chenab River. These concerns are primarily rooted in the belief that India's activities are not compliant with the stipulations of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), which governs the distribution of water from the Indus River system among India and Pakistan. Pakistani officials fear that India's new dam project could enable the manipulation of water flow, potentially leading to artificial water shortages or flooding in Pakistan. This situation raises alarm bells in Islamabad, as it highlights the delicate balance of water rights and the serious implications that any unilateral actions by India might have on Pakistan's water security.
The geopolitical tensions between the two nations were further exacerbated in 2019, following the Pulwama attack, which resulted in a major diplomatic fallout. Nitin Gadkari, India’s Union Minister for Water Resources and a prominent leader of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made provocative remarks about diverting all water flowing from India to its own states. Such statements were seen as retaliatory measures against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in the attack, a claim that the Pakistani government vehemently denied at first. However, a shift occurred when Fawad Chaudhry, the then Minister of Science and Technology in Pakistan, acknowledged the country's role in the event during a National Assembly session, complicating the matter further. This acknowledgment highlighted the intricate links between national security and water rights in the South Asian context.
In the wake of these developments, Indian officials, including Union Minister of State for Jal Shakti, Rattan Lal Kataria, underscored the government's commitment to preventing the downstream flow of water from the three rivers allocated to Pakistan under the IWT. Such statements have raised alarm among Pakistani officials, who view these remarks as an implicit threat to the water supply essential for its agricultural and drinking water needs. These tensions surrounding water resources pose a complex challenge for both nations, revealing the intricate intersection of politics, environment, and international relations in South Asia. The future of the Indus Waters Treaty and the cooperative management of transboundary waters will remain critical issues for maintaining stability and addressing the needs of both countries.
Kutch Region and Indus River Dynamics
The Indus River system plays a critical role in the hydrology of the Kutch region, particularly through its delta channels such as the Nara River, which flows into the Kori Creek in the Rann of Kutch, Gujarat, India. The Nara River, along with the Shakoor Lake, acts as a conduit that channels the Indus River's waters to the Arabian Sea. This region is significant not only for its ecological diversity but also for the agricultural practices that depend on the water resources from the Indus basin.
From 1987 to 1997, Pakistan undertook the construction of the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) project, an initiative designed to manage saline and polluted water from its territories. This project was facilitated by the support of the World Bank, yet it proceeded without the consent of the Indian government, raising substantial concerns regarding adherence to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Specifically, Article IV(10) of the treaty mandates communication and cooperation between India and Pakistan concerning infrastructure impacts on shared water resources. The LBOD was intended to divert effluent away from the Indus delta into the sea via the Kutch region; however, it inadvertently exacerbated flooding in Indian territories, causing significant environmental repercussions.
The ramifications of the LBOD extend beyond immediate flooding issues. The introduction of contaminated water into Indian water bodies has serious implications for the agricultural sector in Gujarat, where many salt farms rely on these water sources for sustenance. The water quality deterioration threatens livelihoods in a region already susceptible to the vagaries of both flood and drought. Additionally, the runoff from the LBOD traverses through the disputed Sir Creek area—a region claimed entirely by Pakistan but administered by India up to its centerline—resulting in further complexities in the already contentious relationship over water resources.
Given India's position as the lower riparian state within the Indus basin, the IWT places an obligation on Pakistan to provide detailed engineering plans for projects like the LBOD. According to Article IV of the treaty, such disclosures are necessary to ensure that India is not materially harmed by any modifications or diversions created by projects implemented upstream. Furthermore, the treaty stipulates that no major work can commence until disputes are resolved through arbitration. This provision highlights the importance of dialogue and cooperative management of the shared Indus river waters, which is essential for sustaining the ecological balance and meeting the water needs of both nations.
2016 Uri Attack and Its Aftermath
The September 2016 Uri attack, which resulted in the death of 19 Indian soldiers, marked a significant turning point in India-Pakistan relations and had a direct influence on the discourse surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). In the wake of this tragic event, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a notable declaration that "blood and water cannot flow together," signaling a potential shift in India's approach toward its shared water resources with Pakistan. This statement highlighted the urgency and sensitivity surrounding the management of water resources, raising concerns about the implications such a revocation might have on regional stability. Although the threats to revoke the treaty have yet to be actualized, the rhetoric surrounding the issue underscores the tensions that can arise from violence and its potential to affect longstanding agreements.
India's decision to revive the Tulbul Project on the Jhelum River is a critical development in the context of this treaty. This project, aimed at allowing navigation on the river, had previously been shelved due to objections raised by Pakistan regarding its impact on water flow. Political analysts, including Hasan Askari Rizvi, have pointed out that any alteration in Pakistan's water supply could lead to significant consequences for the country's agricultural and water management systems. This emphasis on the mutual dependencies created by the IWT illustrates the delicate balance between development and diplomatic relations, as changes in infrastructural projects can easily be perceived as provocations.
By February 2020, India asserted its commitment to adhering to the IWT "in letter and spirit," indicating a desire to navigate the complexities of water-sharing while maintaining an agrarian and hydrological equilibrium. Yet, the regular annual meetings of the IWT Commissioners have become irregular, particularly following the 2019 Pulwama attack, which claimed the lives of 40 Indian paramilitary personnel and reinvigorated hostilities between the two nations. The last meeting took place in May 2022, suggesting that discussions aimed at fostering mutual cooperation have increasingly faltered, leaving arbitration as the primary function of the treaty. This shift raises concerns about the future of the IWT and the possibility of escalating tensions over water resources, which continue to play a crucial role in geopolitics within the South Asian region. The interplay of water, politics, and conflict remains a pivotal factor influencing relations between India and Pakistan, suggesting that careful management of the IWT is essential for maintaining peace and stability.
India's utilization of the Indus river system is marked by significant hydrological potential, with an average annual flow of approximately 260 billion cubic meters. Out of this considerable volume, India is currently able to utilize around 38 billion cubic meters, which accounts for about 15% of the total capacity from the three Eastern Rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The water available above the rim stations—including 8.6 billion cubic meters at the Madhopur headworks in the Ravi basin, 16 billion cubic meters at Mandi Plain/Harike headworks in the Beas basin, and 17 billion cubic meters at Ropar headworks in the Sutlej basin—totals 42 billion cubic meters when excluding the downstream allocations. Notably, in an average year, an additional 5.611 billion cubic meters of water flows past these headworks into Pakistan due to circumstances regarding floodwater release, underscoring an underutilization of available resources by India.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), established between India and Pakistan, mandates that India refrain from using the vast majority of the water from the Western Rivers (Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus) while allowing for certain limited uses, particularly for agricultural purposes, as well as unlimited domestic, non-consumptive, and hydropower generation uses. As of 2019, nearly 9.3 billion cubic meters of India's unutilized share is found to be flowing into downstream Pakistan from the Ravi and Sutlej rivers, and it is critical to note that India maintains its rights to this water as stipulated in Articles II (1 and 4) of the IWT. This means Pakistan is not permitted to utilize this water for any purpose without India's consent.
There is a tangible opportunity for cooperation between India and Pakistan in managing these river systems. An ambitious proposition includes channeling water from these rivers to the Kutch region of India via the Sukkur Barrage pond and the Nara delta channel, ultimately reaching Shakoor Lake. By utilizing water from Shakoor Lake, India could significantly bolster irrigation efforts, aquaculture, and afforestation initiatives in the uplands. This would not only benefit India's agriculture but also mitigate the effects of flooding in Pakistan's Kutch region, fostering a sustainable approach to water management that helps both nations. Another potential solution involves diverting water from the Chenab River to the Eastern Rivers, akin to the Marhu Tunnel concept discussed during IWT negotiations. These diversion tunnels could not only facilitate the balanced flow of riverine resources but also enhance hydropower output from existing power stations on the Ravi and Beas rivers.
To further advance its utilization goals, India is implementing three major projects aimed at maximizing the use of its allocation from the Eastern Rivers. The completed Shahpurkandi dam project on the Ravi River, finalized in 2024, is expected to play a crucial role in regulating and optimizing water flow. Additionally, the Makaura Pattan Barrage across the Ravi River, part of the second Ravi-Beas link in Punjab, and the Ujh Dam project on the Ujh River in Jammu and Kashmir are poised to enhance water availability for the regions of Punjab and northern hill states. With these projects, India is strategically working towards fully harnessing the potential of its share of the water resources, establishing a pathway for sustainable development amidst the constraints of international agreements.
Demands for Renegotiation
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), established between India and Pakistan in 1960 to allocate water rights for the Indus River and its tributaries, has become a source of contention, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. In 2003, the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly passed a unanimous resolution calling for the abrogation of the treaty, and a similar demand was voiced in June 2016. Lawmakers in the region argue that the treaty imposes limitations that restrict the growth of irrigated land and hinder hydropower development, which are critical for the region's socio-economic advancement. They assert that the treaty undermines the rights of the local population and marginalizes Jammu and Kashmir as a non-entity in the broader discourse regarding water resources. Since 2016, a public interest petition has been pending in the Supreme Court of India, seeking to declare the treaty unconstitutional, reflecting the growing regional discontent.
In recent developments, India formally notified Pakistan in 2023 of its intention to renegotiate the treaty. India accused Pakistan of engaging in actions contrary to the spirit and objectives of the IWT. In response, Pakistan expressed its apprehensions about the risks involved in abrogating the treaty, as it is a lower riparian party. Pakistan emphasized its commitment to adhere to the procedural frameworks outlined in the treaty, indicating a desire for negotiation rather than confrontation. This exchange highlights the complexities and sensitivities that characterize the bilateral relationship between the two countries, particularly regarding shared water resources.
The ongoing tensions have also drawn attention to the role of the Court of Arbitration (CoA). India has refrained from appointing its two judges to the CoA, arguing that simultaneous proceedings with the court and a neutral expert would violate the IWT and customary international law. The CoA has indicated that it would first consider India's objections regarding its competence, with a preliminary decision expected by late June 2023. On July 6, 2023, the CoA delivered a partial verdict affirming the legitimacy of its constitution based on Pakistan's request and clarified that it would only handle disputes not addressed by the neutral expert, thereby minimizing the potential for conflicting rulings. The arbitrations are anticipated to lay the groundwork for a clearer understanding of each party's rights and responsibilities under the treaty, with the award from the ongoing Neutral Expert expected by the end of 2024.
Financial Contributions to the Treaty
The implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty has been underpinned by substantial financial assistance from various countries aimed at facilitating water management and infrastructure development in Pakistan. The original grant from India in 1960 amounted to approximately £62,060,000, supplemented by additional funds in 1964. Other contributing nations included Australia, with a total grant of AU$6,965,000, and Canada, which provided Can$22,100,000, along with supplementary assistance. Notably, West Germany contributed DM 126,000,000 and New Zealand added NZ£1,000,000 as part of their financial commitments under the treaty framework. The United States also played a significant role, with initial grants totaling US$177,000,000 in the 1960s, marking a considerable international investment in the region’s water management infrastructure. This financial backing illustrates the importance of collaborative international efforts in addressing shared challenges related to transboundary water resources, especially when historical and geopolitical tensions continue to complicate relations between India and Pakistan.