History of the Party
The party was founded in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 by two prominent figures, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah and Dr. Kolluri Chiranjeevi. Its origins can be traced back to a group of Naxalite activists who were particularly influential in the Telangana region. This development was closely related to the earlier Andhra Committee, which had separated from the Central Organising Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) in 1976. The foundations of the new party were further solidified through a merger with the Kothandaraman grouping, based in Tamil Nadu, underscoring a broader regional alliance aimed at advancing their ideological goals.
In its inception, the party committed itself to the ideology of continuing armed struggle alongside rallying mass movements. This decision indicated a strategic choice to stay away from conventional electoral politics, reflecting a deep-seated belief in direct action as a means of instigating change. The party openly acknowledged Charu Majumdar's legacy, a key figure in the Naxalite movement of the 1960s, which aimed to overhaul the socio-economic landscape of India. This ideological stance led the party to analyze Indian society through the lenses of both semi-feudal and semi-colonial exploitation, portraying a landscape ripe for revolutionary change.
Initially, the party's influence was mainly felt in the Telangana region, where support from local farmers and laborers was strong due to the prevailing socio-economic conditions. However, as time progressed, its reach expanded significantly into other parts of Andhra Pradesh and beyond, including states like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Odisha. This expansion was fueled by the desire to address the grievances of marginalized populations and to mobilize them against perceived injustices. Over the decades, the party faced various challenges but remained steadfast in its commitment to revolutionary principles and continues to play a significant role in the politics of the regions where it operates.
Recent Developments of CPI (ML)
In August 1998, a significant consolidation occurred in leftist politics in India when the CPI (ML) Party Unity, a faction with a strong base in Jahanabad, Bihar, merged with the CPI (ML) People's War (PW). This merger marked a pivotal moment for CPI (ML) PW as it allowed the organization to significantly broaden its geographic reach and operational presence. Notably, following the merger, CPI (ML) PW began establishing state committees in multiple states beyond Bihar, including Kerala, Haryana, and Punjab. This strategic expansion was indicative of the group's efforts to increase their influence and mobilize support in regions that had previously been less engaged with Maoist ideologies.
In a series of escalated actions aimed at instilling fear and attaining political leverage, CPI (ML) PW issued a controversial declaration in October 2002, which included explicit death threats against key political figures in India, such as Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh, and Babulal Marandi of Jharkhand. This declaration marked a significant turn in the group's tactics, which further escalated into direct violence when, in October 2003, they attempted an assassination against Naidu. These actions highlighted the increasingly militant approach of the group and their willingness to confront state power through armed struggle.
The pivotal moment in the evolution of CPI (ML) PW came on September 21, 2004, when it merged with the Maoist Communist Centre of India to form a new entity known as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). This merger solidified the unification of various Maoist factions in India, capitalizing on their shared ideological foundations and operational objectives. Shortly before this merger became public, in November 2004, a massive rally comprising approximately 150,000 people was organized in Hyderabad in support of CPI (ML) PW, demonstrating the significant public backing they had cultivated. This event not only illustrated the mobilization capabilities of the party but also indicated the rising tension in the socio-political landscape of India, as various factions began to challenge state authority with increased boldness.
Tactics
The armed squads of the party were comprised of ten members each, reflecting a structure that allowed for efficient mobilization and strategic planning in their operations. This relatively small unit size facilitated not only tactical coordination but also effective communication among squad members during high-stress situations. The composition of these squads was likely a critical factor in their operational effectiveness, as it allowed them to execute missions with agility and precision.
In their confrontations with security forces, these armed squads employed a range of tactics, notably including ambushes and the deployment of landmines. The use of landmines served as a significant force-multiplying strategy, enabling the squads to exert control over specific areas and deter security forces from pursuing them aggressively. Landmines could also create psychological barriers, instilling fear and uncertainty among enemy personnel while complicating logistics for advancing troops.
Moreover, the tactics utilized by the armed squads were not solely focused on direct engagement. Instead, they incorporated elements of guerrilla warfare, which emphasized mobility, surprise, and evasion. By using the terrain to their advantage, they were able to strike swiftly and then retreat into cover, reducing their vulnerability to counterattacks. This approach highlighted a broader strategic intent to wear down opposing forces through attrition, leveraging smaller-scale tactics to achieve larger political objectives.
Overall, the combination of small, agile units with a diverse array of confrontational tactics allowed the armed squads to be a persistent challenge to security forces. Their operations not only aimed to cause immediate disruptions but also sought to galvanize support for their cause and draw attention to their objectives. As conflicts evolve, the tactics employed by such groups often adapt in response to countermeasures, highlighting the dynamic nature of armed confrontations.
Bans and Political Activity
In May 1992, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, often referred to as CPI (ML) PW, was banned in Andhra Pradesh following the provisions outlined in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. Prior to this state ban, in February 1992, the national Home Ministry had urged several significant states—including Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa—to implement similar bans on the party. Despite these state-level prohibitions, CPI (ML) PW maintained its legal status at the national level, enabling it to continue rallying support in various Indian states.
In the year 2000, CPI (ML) PW marked a significant milestone with the launch of the People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA), which served to unify previously autonomous units into a cohesive fighting force. This movement allowed the party to effectively organize thousands of activists into 'dalams', which are small guerrilla units operating in various regions. The CPI (ML) PW and its newly formed PGA became particularly active in several key regions across India, including Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, and the Midnapore district in West Bengal. Here, they engaged in various activities intended to further their revolutionary aims.
The party's internal structure evolved, and in 2001, it convened its first congress, although the leadership considered this their second congress. This assertion stemmed from the party's claim to be a continuation of the original CPI (ML), which had held its first congress as far back as 1970. The historical perspective established a lineage that the party sought to uphold, highlighting its ideological commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles and its resistance against perceived injustices in society.
On September 23, 2004, the Andhra Pradesh state government announced its intention to enter into peace negotiations with CPI (ML) PW and its faction, CPI (ML) Janashakti. This indicated a potential shift in the state's approach towards dealing with armed rebel groups. However, just a few months later, in December 2004, the central government banned CPI (ML) PW along with all its associated front organizations, designating them as a 'terrorist organization' under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act of 2004. This ban underscored the ongoing tensions between state authorities and leftist revolutionary movements in India, illustrating the challenges faced by political groups operating outside mainstream political discourse.
Andhra Pradesh's Political Landscape
In the early years of its establishment, the state of Andhra Pradesh witnessed a fluctuating relationship between the government and the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) People's War (CPI (ML) PW). Over the first two decades, the state government oscillated between aggressive crackdowns on the party and periods of relative leniency, reflecting the complex political dynamics of the region. This inconsistency often created an unstable environment for parties like CPI (ML) PW, which strategically navigated these shifts to bolster its influence. The 1980s were particularly notable for the party, as it adeptly leveraged the political rivalry between the two dominant parties in Andhra Pradesh. As local elections approached, both major parties sought the CPI (ML) PW's support, recognizing its grassroots connections and the mobilization capabilities within local communities.
In exchange for its support, the CPI (ML) PW would negotiate for concessions such as the release of political prisoners and a reduction of oppressive measures from state security forces. This strategy not only enhanced the party’s position but also fostered a network of alliances that allowed it to remain relevant in the state’s political arena. Additionally, the party gained financial strength through its imposition of informal "taxes" on forest contractors, consolidating its economic base and ensuring resources for its operations. Such financing was crucial for sustaining the party's activities and furthering its revolutionary agenda.
The dynamics shifted in 2004 when the CPI (ML) PW engaged in peace talks with the state government. These negotiations indicated a significant moment in the political history of Andhra Pradesh, as they represented an acknowledgment from the state of the party’s influence and its grassroots support. These dialogues were crucial in re-evaluating the approach to insurgency and political dissent in the state. The move towards peace talks suggested a broader understanding of the socio-economic grievances that fueled support for the party, reflecting a shift from purely repressive measures towards dialogue and engagement. This period signified a complex interplay of politics, with the potential for long-term implications for governance, social stability, and the future of militant movements within the region.
Orissa's Political Landscape
In February 1998, a significant event marked the clash between state authorities and the Maoist insurgency in Orissa, when a police officer fell victim to an attack orchestrated by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) People's War (CPI (ML) PW) guerrillas. This incident not only highlighted the increasing tensions in southern Orissa but also marked the initial confrontation of the Orissa Police with the CPI (ML) PW fighters, who had crossed over from neighboring Andhra Pradesh. Such attacks underscored the growing reach of Maoist insurgents beyond their usual stronghold, suggesting a strategic expansion into Orissa's political and social fabric.
The period between 2000 and 2001 witnessed a surge in violence as various factions within the Maoist movement, particularly the CPI (ML) PW and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), engaged in fierce conflicts. The strife resulted in numerous casualties, and tensions escalated as these groups vied for control and territory within the state. However, in a notable twist, September 2002 proved to be a turning point when the CPI (ML) PW and the MCC agreed to coordinate their activities in Orissa. This coalition aimed to strengthen their operational efficiency and deter state forces, while Santosh, then the head of the CPI (ML) PW unit in Orissa, played a crucial role in consolidating their efforts.
As the April 2004 state assembly elections approached, the CPI (ML) PW initiated a boycott campaign to discourage participation in what they deemed a flawed electoral process. This campaign targeted key areas of influence such as Malkangiri and Rayagada, both known strongholds of the party. Despite their efforts, the elections witnessed a notable increase in voter turnout in these constituencies, raising questions about the party's declining influence in the region. Such developments indicated a potential shift in public sentiment and attitudes towards the Maoist insurgency, suggesting that traditional methods of intimidation and manipulation might be losing their efficacy. This evolving political landscape in Orissa highlights the complexities of insurgency, governance, and electoral politics in India, as local populations navigate the challenges posed by both state authorities and insurgent groups.