34 State Legislatures Composition, Powers and Procedures

State Legislature: Organization and Powers

In the political framework of a state, the legislature assumes a pivotal and central role, serving as the primary law-making body and a cornerstone of governance.

Part VI of the Constitution, through Articles 168 to 212, meticulously addresses every key aspect of the state legislature—from its organization and composition to its duration, officers, procedures, privileges, and powers. These provisions closely parallel those governing Parliament, yet they incorporate distinct variations tailored to the federal structure.

Organisation of State Legislatures

India's state legislatures exhibit considerable variation in structure, reflecting the Constitution's flexibility. While most states operate under a unicameral system, a few maintain a bicameral setup. As of 2019, only six states—Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, and Karnataka—have two houses. Notable changes include the abolition of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Council through the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, and the non-implementation of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council Act, 2010. In contrast, Andhra Pradesh revived its council via the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council Act, 2005, while Madhya Pradesh, despite provisions under the Seventh Amendment Act of 1956, remains unicameral due to the absence of a presidential notification.

In the 22 unicameral states, the legislature comprises the governor and the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha), the popularly elected lower house. Bicameral states, however, include the governor, the Legislative Assembly, and the Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad), which serves as the upper house or "house of elders." This design allows for a second chamber to review legislation, though its role remains advisory and subordinate to the assembly.

The Constitution empowers Parliament to create or abolish a legislative council based on a state's preferences. This requires the concerned state's legislative assembly to pass a resolution by a special majority—defined as a majority of its total membership and at least two-thirds of members present and voting. Parliament then enacts the change through ordinary legislation, requiring only a simple majority, without invoking the amendment process under Article 368.

This provision stemmed from debates in the Constituent Assembly, where critics argued that a second chamber was unrepresentative, slowed down lawmaking, and imposed heavy costs. To address these concerns, the framers made councils optional, allowing states to adopt or discard them according to their political needs and financial capacity. Historical examples abound: Andhra Pradesh established its council in 1957, abolished it in 1985, and revived it in 2007. Tamil Nadu's council was scrapped in 1986, as were those of Punjab and West Bengal in 1969. More recently, Tamil Nadu's assembly resolved in 2010 to revive its council, leading to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council Act, 2010. Yet, in 2011, it reversed course with another resolution seeking abolition, leaving the act unenforced. Such flexibility underscores the dynamic nature of India's federal structure.

Strength of the Legislative Assembly

The Legislative Assembly, or Vidhan Sabha, forms the lower house of a state's bicameral or unicameral legislature, comprising members directly elected by the people through universal adult franchise. This democratic foundation ensures broad representation, with the assembly's size calibrated to reflect each state's population. In general, the maximum strength is capped at 500 members, while the minimum stands at 60, allowing flexibility so that larger states can accommodate more representatives without exceeding the limit.

Smaller states, however, enjoy tailored exceptions to this rule. Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Goa have a reduced minimum of 30 members, Mizoram 40, and Nagaland 46. These adjustments recognize their unique demographic realities while upholding the principle of effective governance. Notably, Sikkim and Nagaland also incorporate a distinctive feature: certain seats in their assemblies are filled not by direct public vote, but through indirect elections, blending direct democracy with specialized representation.

Governors Power to Nominate Anglo-Indians

The Governor of a state possesses the power to nominate one member from the Anglo-Indian community to the Legislative Assembly, but only if that community lacks adequate representation among elected members. This constitutional provision, designed to ensure fair inclusion, was originally meant to last just ten years—until 1960. Parliament, however, has repeatedly extended it in ten-year increments to address ongoing needs. The latest such extension came via the 95th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2009, prolonging the provision until 2020.

Territorial Constituencies

To facilitate direct elections to the state legislative assembly, each state in India is divided into territorial constituencies. This division ensures equal representation by maintaining a uniform ratio between the population of each constituency and the seats allotted to it across the entire state. In essence, the Constitution mandates parity in representation, preventing any disparity among constituencies within a state.

The term "population" here refers specifically to the figures from the most recent census preceding the delimitation, provided those figures have been officially published. This approach anchors the process in reliable, verifiable data, promoting fairness and consistency in electoral boundaries.

Readjustment of Constituencies After Each Census

The Constitution mandates a readjustment after every census, both in the total number of seats in each state legislative assembly and in the division of the state into territorial constituencies. Parliament holds the authority to decide the body responsible for this process and the manner in which it is carried out. To implement this, it has enacted the Delimitation Commission Acts in 1952, 1962, 1972, and 2002.

However, the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 introduced a freeze on these readjustments, holding the total number of seats in each state assembly and the allocation of territorial constituencies fixed at 1971 levels until the year 2000. This moratorium aimed to incentivize states to adopt population control measures, rewarding those with slower growth by protecting their seat shares. The 84th Amendment Act of 2001 extended this freeze further—up to 2026—with the same objective in mind.

Even during this period, the 84th Amendment Act of 2001 permitted the government to readjust and rationalize territorial constituencies within states, using the 1991 census figures as the basis, provided the total number of assembly seats remained unchanged. Subsequently, the 87th Amendment Act of 2003 refined this by shifting the basis to the 2001 census instead of 1991, while maintaining the prohibition on altering overall seat totals. These measures balanced the need for fair representation with efforts to promote demographic stability.

Reservation of Seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

The Indian Constitution ensures representation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) by reserving seats in the legislative assemblies of every state, strictly in proportion to their share of the population. This provision aims to address historical underrepresentation and promote inclusive democracy at the state level.

Originally framed as a temporary safeguard, the reservation was scheduled to last just ten years, until 1960. Yet, Parliament has repeatedly recognized its ongoing relevance, extending the duration in ten-year blocks through successive constitutional amendments. The latest such extension came via the 95th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2009, pushing the deadline to 2020.

Strength of the Legislative Council

In a key distinction from the directly elected members of the Legislative Assembly, those of the Legislative Council are chosen indirectly through an electoral college. The Constitution caps the Council's maximum strength at one-third of the Assembly's total membership while setting a minimum of 40 members. As a result, the Council's size in any state scales directly with that of its Assembly, ensuring the directly elected lower house maintains clear predominance in state legislative matters.

While these constitutional limits provide the framework, Parliament determines the exact strength of each Council through specific legislation.

Manner of Election to the Legislative Council

The composition of a state's Legislative Council follows a carefully structured formula, ensuring representation from diverse sectors of society. Of the total membership, one-third are elected by members of local bodies, such as municipalities and district boards. Another one-twelfth come from graduates who have resided in the state for at least three years. An equal one-twelfth are chosen by teachers with at least three years of experience, employed at institutions no lower than the secondary school level. One-third are selected by the state's Legislative Assembly from among individuals who are not already its members. The remaining one-sixth are nominated by the Governor, drawn from people with special knowledge or practical expertise in fields like literature, science, art, the cooperative movement, and social service.

In total, five-sixths of the Council's members are indirectly elected, while one-sixth are Governor's nominees. These elections use the system of proportional representation through a single transferable vote, promoting fair and balanced outcomes. Notably, the propriety of the Governor's nominations cannot be questioned or challenged in any court of law.

This constitutional blueprint for the Council's composition is provisional rather than permanent. Parliament holds the authority to amend or overhaul it entirely, though no such legislation has been passed to date.

Duration of the Legislative Assembly

Much like the Lok Sabha, the Legislative Assembly of a state is not a permanent body. Its standard term lasts five years, calculated from the date of its first meeting following general elections. Once this five-year period expires, the assembly stands automatically dissolved, marking the end of its life without any further formalities.

The Governor holds the authority to dissolve the assembly prematurely—at any point before the full five years are up—to trigger fresh elections and ensure continuity in governance.

In times of national emergency, however, Parliament may extend the assembly's term through legislation, granting one-year extensions at a time for as long as needed. Crucially, such extensions cannot persist beyond six months after the emergency ends, compelling the holding of fresh elections within that window to restore normal democratic functioning.

Duration of the Legislative Council

Much like the Rajya Sabha, the Legislative Council operates as a permanent, continuing chamber that is never subject to dissolution. Instead of wholesale renewal, one-third of its members retire every two years in a staggered manner, with each individual serving a fixed six-year term. These vacancies are filled promptly at the beginning of every third year through fresh elections for elected seats and nominations by the Governor for nominated ones. Retiring members face no restrictions and can seek re-election or re-nomination as many times as they wish, fostering continuity and experience within the house.

Qualifications for State Legislature Candidates

The Constitution of India outlines clear qualifications for individuals seeking election to a state legislature, ensuring they meet fundamental standards of citizenship, loyalty, maturity, and eligibility. Primarily, a candidate must be a citizen of India. Additionally, before assuming office, they must take an oath or affirmation before an authority designated by the Election Commission. This pledge commits them to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. Age is another key criterion: candidates for the Legislative Council (the upper house, where it exists) must be at least 30 years old, while those for the Legislative Assembly (the lower house) must be at least 25.

Beyond these constitutional requirements, Parliament has prescribed further qualifications through the Representation of the People Act, 1951, tailoring them to the specific nature of state legislatures. For election to the Legislative Council, a candidate must be an elector in any assembly constituency within the state; those nominated by the Governor must also reside in the state. For the Legislative Assembly, the requirement is straightforward: the candidate must be an elector in an assembly constituency of that state. Regarding reserved seats, a person from the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes must belong to the respective category to contest such a seat. However, members of these communities remain free to contest unreserved general seats as well. These provisions collectively safeguard the democratic integrity of state legislatures while promoting broad representation.

2. Disqualifications

The Indian Constitution lays down clear grounds on which a person stands disqualified from being elected to, or continuing as, a member of a state's Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council. These include holding any office of profit under the Union or state government—excluding the post of Minister or other positions exempted by state law. Disqualification also applies if the person has been declared of unsound mind by a competent court, remains an undischarged insolvent, is not a citizen of India, has voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, owes allegiance to a foreign state, or faces disqualification under any parliamentary enactment.

Building on these constitutional provisions, Parliament has outlined additional disqualifications in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, mirroring those applicable to membership of Parliament. A candidate or member is barred if they have been found guilty of specified election offences or corrupt practices; convicted of any offence carrying imprisonment for two years or more (though detention under preventive detention laws does not count); failed to submit their election expense accounts within the stipulated time; hold any direct or indirect interest in government contracts, works, or services; serve as a director, managing agent, or in any office of profit in a corporation where the government owns at least 25% of the shares; been dismissed from government service for corruption or disloyalty; convicted of promoting enmity between groups on grounds of religion, race, or similar factors, or for bribery; or punished for preaching and practicing social evils such as untouchability, dowry, or sati.

In cases where a member's eligibility comes into question due to these disqualifications, the Governor holds the final authority to decide. However, the Governor must first seek the opinion of the Election Commission and proceed in accordance with its advice, ensuring a balanced and informed process.

Disqualification on Ground of Defection

The Indian Constitution provides for the disqualification of members from either House of a state legislature if they are found guilty of defection, as outlined in the Tenth Schedule. This provision aims to curb the malaise of political defections that undermine legislative stability.

The authority to decide such disqualifications rests solely with the Chairman of the Legislative Council or the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly—not the Governor. In a landmark 1992 judgment, the Supreme Court held that these decisions by the Chairman or Speaker are amenable to judicial review, ensuring checks against arbitrary exercise of power.

State Legislators Oath, Penalties and Salaries

Before assuming their seats in either House of a state legislature, every member must make and subscribe to an oath or affirmation. This solemn undertaking is administered by the Governor or a person authorized by the Governor for the purpose.

The oath requires the member to pledge three key commitments: to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, and to faithfully discharge the duties of their office. Only after fulfilling this requirement can a member vote, participate in House proceedings, or enjoy the privileges and immunities of the legislature.

Failure to comply carries strict consequences. A member who sits or votes without having taken the prescribed oath or affirmation faces a penalty of ₹500 for each day of such violation. The same penalty applies if the member knows they are unqualified or disqualified for membership, or if they are barred from sitting or voting under any law enacted by Parliament or the state legislature.

In addition to these procedural mandates, members of state legislatures receive salaries and allowances as determined from time to time by the state legislature itself, ensuring their financial independence in serving the public interest.

4. Vacation of Seats

Members of a state legislature must vacate their seats under specific circumstances, ensuring the integrity and smooth functioning of the legislative process. These rules prevent conflicts of interest, address disqualifications, and maintain attendance standards.

A key restriction prohibits double membership: no individual can simultaneously hold seats in both Houses of the state legislature. If someone is elected to both, the seat in one House automatically falls vacant, as determined by a law enacted by the state legislature itself.

Similarly, disqualification triggers immediate vacancy. Should a member incur any disqualification—such as those outlined under constitutional provisions—their seat becomes vacant without further delay.

Members may also resign voluntarily by submitting a written notice to the Chairman of the Legislative Council or the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, depending on the House. The seat falls vacant only upon official acceptance of the resignation.

Persistent absence is another ground: if a member remains away from all meetings of the House for 60 consecutive days without its permission, the House may declare the seat vacant.

Beyond these, several other scenarios compel a member to relinquish their seat in either House:

• If a court declares their election void;
• If the House expels them;
• If they are elected to the office of President or Vice-President; or
• If they are appointed as Governor of a state.

These provisions, rooted in the Constitution, uphold the dynamism and accountability essential to state legislatures.

Presiding Officers of State Legislatures

In India's state legislatures, each house operates under the guidance of its own presiding officer, ensuring orderly proceedings and impartial conduct of business. The Legislative Assembly—the lower house in unicameral states or the popular chamber in bicameral ones—is headed by a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. These roles mirror their national counterparts in Parliament, with the Speaker wielding significant authority over debates, quorum, and disciplinary matters.

Where a state maintains a bicameral structure, the Legislative Council—the upper house—has its own leadership in the form of a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman. To provide continuity and support during absences, a Panel of Chairmen is appointed for the Assembly, and a Panel of Vice-Chairmen for the Council. These panels allow members to temporarily preside, maintaining the house's momentum without disruption.

The Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly

The Speaker of a state legislative assembly is elected by the assembly members from among themselves, embodying the principle of internal democracy in legislative functioning. Typically, the Speaker serves for the full term of the assembly, providing continuity and stability to its proceedings. However, this tenure can end prematurely in three specific circumstances: if the Speaker ceases to be a member of the assembly; if they resign by submitting a written notice to the Deputy Speaker; or if they are removed through a resolution passed by a majority of all then-existing assembly members. Importantly, such a removal resolution requires at least 14 days' advance notice, ensuring deliberate and fair process.

As the presiding officer, the Speaker holds a pivotal role in upholding the assembly's dignity and efficiency. Their primary responsibility is to maintain order and decorum, regulating proceedings with final authority—no appeal lies against their decisions in this domain. The Speaker also serves as the ultimate interpreter of key documents within the assembly: the Constitution of India, the rules of procedure and conduct of business, and established legislative precedents. In practical terms, they adjourn or suspend meetings if a quorum is absent, and while they do not vote initially, they cast a deciding vote in case of a tie.

Beyond these, the Speaker wields significant procedural and decisional powers. They may permit a secret sitting of the House at the Leader of the House's request, safeguarding sensitive discussions. Crucially, the Speaker determines whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill, with their ruling being conclusive and beyond challenge. They also adjudicate disqualifications of members under the Tenth Schedule on grounds of defection, a responsibility that underscores their role in preserving party discipline. Finally, the Speaker appoints chairs for all assembly committees and oversees their operations, personally leading the Business Advisory Committee, the Rules Committee, and the General Purpose Committee to guide the assembly's agenda and functioning.

Deputy Speaker: Election, Tenure, Duties

The Deputy Speaker of a state legislative assembly, much like the Speaker, is elected by the assembly itself from among its members, but only after the Speaker's election. This ensures a structured leadership hierarchy right from the outset.

The Deputy Speaker typically holds office for the duration of the assembly's term. However, the position falls vacant earlier in any of three scenarios: if the Deputy Speaker ceases to be a member of the assembly; if they resign by submitting a letter to the Speaker; or if they are removed through a resolution passed by a majority of all then-existing members of the assembly. Importantly, such a removal resolution requires 14 days' advance notice, safeguarding against hasty decisions.

When the Speaker's office is vacant or the Speaker is absent from an assembly sitting, the Deputy Speaker steps in to perform all the Speaker's duties and exercises the full range of the Speaker's powers. To provide additional continuity, the Speaker nominates a panel of chairmen from among the assembly members. Any member from this panel can preside over proceedings in the absence of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, wielding the same authority as the Speaker during that time. Members of the panel serve until a new panel is nominated, ensuring seamless functioning of the house.

Chairman of Legislative Council: Election, Powers, Remuneration

The Chairman of the Legislative Council is elected by the council members from among themselves. He vacates office under three circumstances: if he ceases to be a council member; if he resigns by submitting a letter to the Deputy Chairman; or if he is removed through a resolution passed by a majority of all current council members, provided 14 days' advance notice has been given before moving the resolution.

As the presiding officer, the Chairman's powers and functions mirror those of the Speaker in the Legislative Assembly. One key distinction, however, lies with the Speaker, who alone holds the authority to determine whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill—a decision that is final and binding.

The salaries and allowances for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, as well as the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council, are determined by the state legislature. These are charged directly to the Consolidated Fund of the State, exempting them from the annual voting process in the legislature.

Deputy Chairman: Election, Removal and Powers

The Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, much like the Chairman, is elected by the Council itself from among its members, ensuring internal democratic selection.

He vacates office under three specific circumstances: if he ceases to be a member of the Council; if he resigns by submitting a written notice to the Chairman; or if he is removed through a resolution passed by a majority of all then-existing members, provided 14 days' advance notice has been given for moving such a resolution. This structured process safeguards stability while allowing for accountability.

In the event of a vacancy in the Chairman's office or the Chairman's absence from a Council sitting, the Deputy Chairman steps in to perform all the Chairman's duties and exercises his full powers. To further ensure seamless proceedings, the Chairman nominates a panel of vice-chairmen from among the members. Any member of this panel can preside over the Council in the absence of both the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, wielding the same authority as the Chairman during that time. A vice-chairman continues in this role until a new panel is nominated, providing continuity and flexibility in leadership.

Summoning of the State Legislature

The Governor plays a pivotal role in convening the state legislature by summoning each House to meet at appropriate intervals. Under the Constitution, the interval between two successive sessions cannot exceed six months, which ensures that the legislature assembles at least twice a year. Each session, in turn, comprises multiple sittings, providing the necessary time for lawmakers to deliberate and conduct business effectively.

Adjournment in Legislative Proceedings

In the workings of a state legislature, an adjournment marks a temporary pause in the business of a House during its sitting, halting proceedings for a fixed period that might span mere hours, several days, or even weeks. This procedural tool allows lawmakers a structured break while keeping the session intact for future resumption.

By contrast, adjournment sine die brings the sitting to a definitive close for an indefinite duration, without scheduling a return. In both instances—whether a routine adjournment or one sine die—the presiding officer of the House wields sole authority, ensuring disciplined management of legislative time.

Prorogation

Prorogation brings a decisive close to a session of the House, distinguishing it from the temporary pauses of adjournments. When the business of a session concludes, the presiding officer—be it the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha—formally declares the House adjourned sine die, meaning without appointing a fixed date for resumption. Shortly thereafter, typically within a few days, the Governor issues an official notification to prorogue the session, effectively ending it.

The Governor also possesses the authority to prorogue the House even while it remains in session, underscoring the executive's role in legislative scheduling. Unlike an adjournment, which merely suspends proceedings to a later time within the same session, prorogation terminates the session altogether, resetting the legislative calendar and pending matters like unresolved notices or questions.

Dissolution

In states with bicameral legislatures, the Legislative Council stands as a permanent body, immune to dissolution—its members retire gradually, one-third every two years, ensuring continuity. The Legislative Assembly, however, faces periodic dissolution, marking the end of its term and the life of the House itself. This starkly contrasts with prorogation, which only suspends proceedings temporarily without extinguishing the House. Upon dissolution, fresh general elections pave the way for a new Assembly.

The fate of pending bills hinges on their stage in the legislative process when the Assembly dissolves. Any bill still under consideration in the Assembly—whether it originated there or was sent over from the Council—lapses entirely. Similarly, a bill already passed by the Assembly but awaiting action in the Council also lapses.

Not all bills meet this end, however. One pending exclusively in the Council, without prior passage by the Assembly, survives the dissolution unscathed. Moreover, in unicameral states, bills passed by the Assembly alone—or in bicameral states, those cleared by both Houses—do not lapse if they are merely awaiting the Governor's or President's assent. The same holds for bills passed by the Assembly (in unicameral setups) or both Houses (in bicameral ones) that the President has returned for reconsideration; these remain alive for the new House to address. This framework preserves legislative momentum while respecting the electoral reset.

Quorum

In the functioning of India's Parliament, the quorum serves as the essential minimum number of members who must be present for the House—whether Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha—to validly transact any business. This requirement is met by the presence of at least ten members or one-tenth of the House's total membership (including the presiding officer), whichever figure is greater. If the quorum is lacking at any point during a sitting, the presiding officer must either adjourn the House or suspend proceedings until the threshold is achieved, ensuring that decisions reflect adequate representation.

Voting in the House

In the proceedings of either House of a state legislature—whether the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council—all matters are decided by a simple majority of votes from members present and voting, with the presiding officer excluded from the initial count. This ordinary majority rule applies to nearly everything, but the Constitution carves out narrow exceptions for critical actions, such as removing the Speaker of the Assembly or the Chairman of the Council, which instead demand a special majority.

The presiding officer—be it the Speaker in the Assembly, the Chairman in the Council, or anyone acting in that capacity—does not vote in the first instance. Their role becomes pivotal only in the event of a tie, when they cast a decisive vote to resolve the deadlock and ensure a clear outcome.

Language in State Legislatures

The Indian Constitution designates the official language or languages of a state—along with Hindi or English—as the medium for transacting business in its legislature. This provision promotes efficiency while honoring regional linguistic identities. To add flexibility, the presiding officer may permit any member to address the House in their mother tongue, fostering an inclusive environment.

State legislatures also hold the power to decide whether to retain or drop English as a language for proceedings after 15 years from the Constitution's commencement in 1950 (that is, from 1965). Certain states enjoy extended timelines due to their unique formation histories: Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura have 25 years, while Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Mizoram have 40 years. These adjustments reflect the evolving federal structure of India.

Rights of Ministers and the Advocate General

In the state legislatures of India, ministers and the Advocate General hold distinct participatory rights that extend beyond those of ordinary House members. Specifically, every minister and the state's Advocate General may speak in, and otherwise take part in, the proceedings of either House of the legislature—or any of its committees to which they are named a member. Importantly, however, they lack the right to vote.

This provision, enshrined in the Constitution, addresses two practical needs of legislative functioning. First, it allows a minister who is not a member of a particular House to engage directly in its debates and deliberations. Second, it permits a minister who belongs to neither House to participate in the proceedings of both Houses. By facilitating such broad involvement, the rule ensures that executive leaders remain answerable to the full legislature, promoting seamless coordination between government and lawmakers.

Passage of Ordinary Bills in State Legislatures

Ordinary bills, which form the bulk of legislative business, can originate in either house of a bicameral state legislature or simply in the legislative assembly of a unicameral one. Introduced by a minister or any member, such a bill navigates three distinct stages in its originating house: first reading (introduction and title announcement), second reading (discussion, clause-by-clause scrutiny, and amendments), and third reading (final approval or rejection). Once passed here, it moves to the other house for identical scrutiny, unless in a unicameral setup, where it proceeds straight to the governor.

In the second house—typically the legislative council—the bill again undergoes all three readings. The council wields limited influence, facing four options: pass it unamended; amend and return it; reject it outright; or let it linger indefinitely. Harmony is straightforward—if the council approves without changes or the assembly accepts its amendments, the bill advances to the governor. Disagreements, however, trigger a structured resolution favoring the assembly.

Should the council amend (and the assembly reject those changes), reject the bill, or delay action for three months, the assembly can repass it and resend. The council then gets one final month: another rejection, unacceptable amendments, or inaction deems the bill passed in the assembly's latest version. Thus, the assembly holds ultimate authority, with the council able to delay at most four months total (three initially, one later). Unlike Parliament's joint sittings to break Lok Sabha-Rajya Sabha deadlocks on ordinary bills, states lack this mechanism. Bills originating in the council fare worse—if rejected by the assembly, they die entirely. This underscores the council's subordinate role compared to the more empowered Rajya Sabha.

Governor's Assent and Beyond

Post-passage by the assembly (or both houses), every bill reaches the governor, who has four choices: assent (enacting it into law); withhold assent (killing it); return for reconsideration; or reserve for the President. Assent places it on the statute book as an Act. Withholding ends it outright. A returned bill, if repassed by the house(s)—with or without amendments—binds the governor to assent, granting only a suspensive veto, much like the President's over Union bills.

Reservation for the President arises in rare cases, such as potential repugnancy with central laws. The President may assent, withhold, or return for state reconsideration within six months. If repassed and resubmitted—with or without changes—the Constitution is silent on whether assent is mandatory, leaving room for presidential discretion. This layered process ensures checks while affirming the assembly's primacy in state lawmaking.

Money Bills in State Legislatures

The Indian Constitution establishes a distinct procedure for Money Bills in states with bicameral legislatures, ensuring the legislative assembly's dominance while limiting the council's role. This mechanism underscores the assembly's primacy in financial matters, much like at the national level.

A Money Bill can only be introduced in the legislative assembly, and solely on the governor's prior recommendation. Deemed a government bill, it must be presented by a minister, preventing private members from initiating fiscal legislation.

Once passed by the assembly, the bill moves to the legislative council for review. The council's authority is sharply curtailed: it cannot reject or amend the bill but may only suggest recommendations. It must return the bill to the assembly within 14 days. The assembly then decides whether to accept or reject these suggestions in full or part.

If the assembly incorporates any recommendations, the bill is considered passed by both houses in its revised form. Rejection of recommendations results in the bill being deemed passed in its original assembly version. Should the council fail to return it within 14 days, the bill automatically stands passed by both houses as originally approved by the assembly. In essence, the council can delay a Money Bill for at most two weeks, but the assembly holds overriding power.

Upon final passage, the bill reaches the governor, who may grant assent, withhold it, or reserve it for the President's consideration—but cannot send it back for legislative reconsideration. Governors typically assent to such bills, given their introduction under prior approval. If reserved, the President similarly has the option to assent or withhold, without remitting it back to the state legislature. This streamlined process safeguards swift handling of financial measures essential to state governance.

Constitutional Position of Legislative Council

The constitutional position of the Legislative Council—India's upper house in bicameral state legislatures—vis-à-vis the Legislative Assembly can be analyzed through two complementary lenses. On one hand, certain spheres grant the Council parity with the Assembly, affirming its co-equal role in key legislative functions. On the other, distinct areas position the Council as subordinate, underscoring the Assembly's primacy in the state's lawmaking architecture.

Legislative Council and Assembly Powers

In several key domains, the Legislative Council of a state holds powers and status equivalent to those of the Legislative Assembly, underscoring their shared role in the bicameral framework of state legislatures. For instance, both houses stand on equal footing when it comes to the introduction and passage of ordinary bills—though, crucially, any deadlock is resolved in favor of the Assembly, reflecting its primacy as the people's directly elected chamber. Similarly, they jointly approve ordinances promulgated by the Governor, ensuring balanced scrutiny of executive actions taken between legislative sessions.

This parity extends to other vital functions. Both houses participate in the selection of ministers, including the Chief Minister, with the Constitution permitting ministers to hail from either chamber; yet, regardless of their affiliation, they remain accountable solely to the Assembly. The Council also joins the Assembly in deliberating reports from constitutional bodies such as the State Finance Commission, the State Public Service Commission, and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, fostering comprehensive oversight. Finally, both chambers collaborate in expanding the jurisdiction of the State Public Service Commission, reinforcing their complementary roles in administrative governance.

The Subordinate Position of the Legislative Council vis-à-vis the Assembly

In the bicameral legislatures of certain Indian states, the Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad) occupies a distinctly subordinate role compared to the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha). This inequality manifests across several critical domains, underscoring the Assembly's dominance. Financial legislation exemplifies this hierarchy most starkly: a Money Bill can only be introduced in the Assembly, not the Council. Once passed by the Assembly, the Council cannot amend or reject it; it must return the bill within 14 days, with or without recommendations. The Assembly then holds the final say—it can accept or reject any recommendations—and the bill is deemed passed by both Houses regardless. Moreover, the Speaker of the Assembly wields the ultimate authority to certify whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill.

This imbalance extends to ordinary bills as well. While the Council can delay such legislation—for up to three months initially and one more month on return—it lacks the power to veto or substantially revise them. Unlike the Rajya Sabha, which serves as a true revising chamber, the Council functions merely as a dilatory or advisory body. The Assembly's will prevails: if it rejects an ordinary bill originating in the Council, the bill dies outright. The Council also plays no role in key electoral processes, such as electing the President of India or nominating state representatives to the Rajya Sabha. Even on constitutional amendments, the Council's ratification holds little weight; the Assembly's decision overrides it. Compounding these limitations, the Council's existence itself hinges on the Assembly: Parliament can abolish it solely on the Assembly's recommendation. The Council can debate the budget and scrutinize government policies but cannot vote on grant demands or pass a no-confidence motion against the Council of Ministers, which remains accountable only to the Assembly.

This arrangement renders the Council's position far weaker than that of the Rajya Sabha relative to the Lok Sabha. The Upper House of Parliament enjoys co-equal powers with the Lok Sabha in most areas, except financial matters and government oversight, ensuring balanced deliberation. In contrast, the state Council yields to the Assembly in every respect, firmly establishing the lower house's predominance.

Constitutional Rationale for the Council's Limited Role

The Constitution deliberately accords the Council lesser stature than the Rajya Sabha for compelling reasons rooted in India's federal structure and democratic principles. The Rajya Sabha embodies the federal principle by representing states and safeguarding their interests against central overreach, necessitating its strength as a revising body. No such federal dynamic applies at the state level, where the Council addresses purely intra-state matters.

Furthermore, the Council's heterogeneous composition—blending elected members from various constituencies, local bodies, and graduates/teachers, plus one-third nominated by the Governor—dilutes its authority and effectiveness. The Rajya Sabha, by contrast, is more uniform, primarily comprising elected state representatives (with only 12 of 245 members nominated). This design aligns with democratic norms, mirroring the British model where the House of Lords, an unelected upper chamber, cannot thwart the popularly elected House of Commons. There, the Lords can delay ordinary bills for up to a year and Money Bills for one month, but ultimate sovereignty rests with the Commons. Similarly, the Assembly, as the people's house, must prevail over the Council.

Criticisms and Enduring Utility

Critics, highlighting the Council's feeble influence, dismiss it as a "secondary chamber," "costly ornamental luxury," or "white elephant." They argue it shelters defeated Assembly candidates, allowing unpopular politicians to linger as chief ministers, ministers, or legislators.

Yet, defenders emphasize its value despite these constraints. The Council tempers the Assembly's potential for hasty or flawed legislation by enabling thorough revision and reflection. It also ensures representation for distinguished experts, professionals, and luminaries who may not contest direct elections, with the Governor nominating one-sixth of its members for this purpose. Thus, while powerless in absolute terms, the Council enriches state deliberation through expertise and caution.

State Legislative Privileges

State legislative privileges encompass a set of special rights, immunities, and exemptions granted to the houses of a state legislature, their committees, and individual members. These safeguards are essential to ensure the independence and effectiveness of legislative functions. Without them, the houses would struggle to uphold their authority, dignity, and honor, while members could face undue obstructions in fulfilling their duties.

The Indian Constitution extends these privileges beyond legislators to others entitled to speak or participate in proceedings of a house or its committees, such as the state's Advocate-General and ministers. Notably, however, these protections do not apply to the governor, despite being an integral part of the state legislature.

Broadly, state legislative privileges fall into two categories: those exercised collectively by each house, and those held individually by members.

Collective Privileges of State Legislatures

Each House of a state legislature enjoys a set of collective privileges that safeguard its autonomy and dignity, much like those of Parliament under the Indian Constitution. These privileges, rooted in Article 194, enable the House to function independently without undue external interference.

Foremost among them is the House's authority to publish its own reports, debates, and proceedings while prohibiting unauthorized publications by others. This ensures control over its narrative and prevents misrepresentation. Complementing this, the House may exclude strangers from its proceedings and convene secret sittings for sensitive discussions, preserving confidentiality when needed.

The House also holds procedural autonomy: it can frame its own rules to regulate proceedings, conduct business, and adjudicate related disputes. To enforce discipline, it possesses punitive powers, reprimanding, admonishing, or even imprisoning members or outsiders for contempt or breach of privilege. Members may face suspension or expulsion as well. Additionally, the House has the right to receive prompt information on any member's arrest, detention, conviction, imprisonment, or release.

Further bolstering its investigative reach, the House can launch inquiries, summon witnesses, and call for relevant papers and records. Judicial oversight is strictly limited—courts cannot probe the proceedings of the House or its committees, upholding legislative supremacy in internal matters.

Finally, the precincts of the House are inviolable: no arrests can occur, and no civil or criminal legal processes can be served within them without the presiding officer's permission. These privileges collectively shield the state legislature, allowing it to deliberate freely on matters of public importance.

Individual Privileges of State Legislature Members

Members of state legislatures in India enjoy specific individual privileges designed to shield them from external pressures, ensuring they can discharge their legislative duties without hindrance. These protections, rooted in the Constitution, apply personally to each member rather than the house as a whole.

A cornerstone of these privileges is freedom from arrest during the session of the state legislature, extending to the 40 days immediately before and after it. This safeguard operates exclusively in civil cases, offering no immunity in criminal proceedings or under preventive detention laws. By insulating members from such disruptions, it upholds the smooth functioning of legislative proceedings.

Equally vital is the privilege of freedom of speech within the house. Members face no liability in any court for anything said or any vote cast during sessions of the state legislature or its committees. This absolute protection fosters candid debate but remains subject to the provisions of the Constitution, as well as the rules and standing orders that regulate house procedures.

Members also receive exemptions from jury duty. During legislative sessions, they can refuse to appear as witnesses or provide evidence in pending court cases, further minimizing distractions from their primary responsibilities. These privileges collectively reinforce the independence and effectiveness of state lawmakers.