23 Parliament of India Structure, Powers and Procedure

Parliament under Part V of Constitution

The Parliament stands as the legislative cornerstone of India's Union government, commanding a pre-eminent and central role in the nation's democratic framework. This pivotal position stems from the adoption of the parliamentary form of government—familiarly known as the Westminster model—which fuses executive accountability with legislative supremacy.

Part V of the Constitution, spanning Articles 79 to 122, meticulously outlines the Parliament's organisation, composition, tenure, presiding officers, procedural norms, privileges, powers, and allied aspects, providing a robust blueprint for its functioning.

Organisation of Parliament

The Indian Parliament, as enshrined in the Constitution, comprises three essential components: the President, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). In 1954, these bodies officially adopted their Hindi names, with the Rajya Sabha serving as the Upper House—often called the House of Elders or Second Chamber—and the Lok Sabha as the Lower House, or Popular House, representing the First Chamber. While the Rajya Sabha embodies the interests of India's states and union territories, the Lok Sabha directly reflects the will of the Indian people as a whole.

Although the President is neither a member of either House nor attends its sessions, they form an integral part of Parliament. No bill passed by both Houses can become law without the President's assent, underscoring this vital linkage. The President also oversees key parliamentary functions, such as summoning and proroguing the Houses, dissolving the Lok Sabha, delivering joint addresses to both Houses, and promulgating ordinances during their recess.

This structure draws inspiration from the British model rather than the American one. In the United Kingdom, Parliament includes the Crown (the monarch), the House of Lords (Upper House), and the House of Commons (Lower House), with the Crown embedded as a core element. By contrast, the US Congress—comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives—operates independently of the President, who stands apart from the legislature.

This design reflects the essence of India's parliamentary system, which fosters interdependence between the executive and legislative branches—much like the "Crown-in-Parliament" in Britain. In a presidential system like the United States, however, the emphasis lies on a strict separation of powers, keeping the executive distinct from the legislature.

Composition of the Rajya Sabha

The Rajya Sabha, as the Upper House of India's Parliament, has a maximum strength of 250 members. Of these, 238 are indirectly elected representatives from the states and Union Territories, while the remaining 12 are nominated by the President.

In its current form, the Rajya Sabha consists of 245 members: 229 representing the states, 4 from the Union Territories, and 12 nominated by the President. This allocation ensures a balanced federal representation, with seats distributed according to population and constitutional provisions.

The Fourth Schedule of the Constitution governs the precise allocation of these seats among the states and Union Territories, providing a clear framework for their periodic replenishment through elections.

Representation of States in the Rajya Sabha

In India's Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, representatives from each state are indirectly elected by the elected members of that state's Legislative Assembly. This election follows the principle of proportional representation through the single transferable vote system, ensuring fair allocation of seats based on voter preferences. The total number of seats assigned to each state reflects its population size, leading to significant variation: larger states like Uttar Pradesh send 31 members, while smaller ones like Tripura contribute just one.

This population-based approach stands in sharp contrast to the United States, where the Senate grants equal representation to every state regardless of size—two senators per state, yielding 100 members from its 50 states. Such differences highlight how federal structures balance regional equity with demographic realities.

Representation of Union Territories in the Rajya Sabha

Representatives from union territories to the Rajya Sabha are chosen through an indirect election by a specially constituted electoral college. This process mirrors the method used for states, employing proportional representation via the single transferable vote system, which ensures fair allocation of seats based on voter preferences.

Among India's nine union territories, only three—Delhi, Puducherry, and Jammu & Kashmir—currently enjoy representation in the Rajya Sabha. The remaining six have populations too small to warrant seats, reflecting the chamber's design to prioritize demographic scale in its composition.

Nominated Members

A distinctive feature of the Rajya Sabha is the President's power to nominate 12 members, chosen from individuals with special knowledge or practical experience in fields like art, literature, science, and social service. This mechanism ensures that eminent personalities can contribute their expertise to the Upper House without navigating the demands of an electoral process. For context, this stands in contrast to the American Senate, which relies entirely on elected representatives and includes no such nominated members.

Lok Sabha Strength and Composition

The Constitution caps the maximum strength of the Lok Sabha at 552 members. This allocation provides for up to 530 representatives directly elected from the states, 20 from the union territories, and 2 nominated by the President to represent the Anglo-Indian community.

In its current composition, the Lok Sabha has 545 members: 530 elected from the states, 13 from the union territories, and the 2 Anglo-Indian members nominated by the President.

Representation of States

In the Lok Sabha, representatives from states are directly elected by the people through territorial constituencies, embodying the democratic cornerstone of universal adult franchise. This means every Indian citizen aged 18 or above—who is not otherwise disqualified under the Constitution or any prevailing law—has the right to vote in these elections. This inclusive voting threshold came into effect through the 61st Constitutional Amendment Act, 1988, which wisely lowered the age from 21 to 18, empowering a larger segment of India's youth to shape its parliamentary future.

Representation of Union Territories

The Indian Constitution grants Parliament the authority to decide how representatives from Union Territories are elected to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. In exercise of this power, Parliament enacted the Union Territories (Direct Election to the House of the People) Act, 1965. This key legislation ensures that Lok Sabha members from Union Territories are chosen through direct elections by their residents, bringing their representation in line with the democratic process followed across the states.

Nominated Members

In a unique provision to safeguard minority representation, the President of India may nominate up to two members from the Anglo-Indian community to the Lok Sabha if, in the President's opinion, this historically significant group lacks adequate representation in the House. Enshrined in the Constitution to address post-independence demographic realities, this mechanism was initially designed as a temporary measure, set to lapse in 1960. Parliament later recognized its enduring value by enacting the 95th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2009, which extended the provision until January 25, 2020.

Lok Sabha Electoral Process

The electoral process for the Lok Sabha, India's directly elected lower house of Parliament, encompasses several key aspects. These are outlined below.

Territorial Constituencies for Lok Sabha Elections

To facilitate direct elections to the Lok Sabha, the Indian Constitution divides each state into territorial constituencies. This process is governed by two key provisions designed to ensure fair representation.

First, seats in the Lok Sabha are allocated to states based on their population, maintaining a uniform ratio of seats to population across all states. However, this rule does not apply to states with a population below six million, allowing flexibility for smaller states.

Second, within each state, the territory is further divided into constituencies such that the ratio of population to the number of seats allotted remains consistent throughout the state.

In essence, these provisions guarantee uniformity in representation on two fronts: between different states and among constituencies within the same state. Here, "population" refers specifically to the figures from the most recent preceding census, once those figures have been officially published. This approach anchors the entire system in reliable, up-to-date demographic data.

Delimitation and Seat Allocation Freeze

Every decennial census in India triggers a mandatory readjustment in two key areas: the allocation of seats to states in the Lok Sabha, and the division of each state into territorial constituencies. Parliament holds the authority to decide the body responsible and the process for this exercise. To implement it, Parliament has periodically enacted the Delimitation Commission Acts in 1952, 1962, 1972, and 2002.

This routine was paused by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976, which froze both the seat allocation among states and the division of constituencies within states at the 1971 Census levels until 2000. The freeze aimed to incentivize states to control population growth, as higher populations could otherwise lead to more seats. Recognizing the need for further time, the 84th Amendment Act of 2001 extended this moratorium by another 25 years, pushing it to 2026.

Even during this freeze, the 84th Amendment allowed for some flexibility: it permitted the government to redraw and rationalize territorial constituencies within states using 1991 Census data, without changing the total seats per state in the Lok Sabha. Building on this, the 87th Amendment Act of 2003 refined the approach by shifting the basis to the 2001 Census figures—still preserving the existing seat allocations to states. These measures balanced electoral fairness with the push for demographic stability.

Reservation of Seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

While the Indian Constitution explicitly rejects communal representation, it ensures representation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) by reserving seats in the Lok Sabha proportional to their population. This balanced approach promotes inclusion without fragmenting the electorate along communal lines.

Initially envisioned as a temporary measure, this reservation was set to last just ten years, until 1960. Parliament has since extended it periodically in ten-year increments. The most recent extension, through the 95th Amendment Act of 2009, secures these seats until 2020.

Importantly, reserved constituencies do not create separate electorates: candidates from SCs or STs are chosen by the entire voter base in that area, fostering broader democratic participation. Moreover, members of these communities face no bar from contesting general (unreserved) seats, allowing flexibility in political representation.

Adjustments to the allocation of these reserved seats have also evolved. The 84th Amendment Act of 2001 mandated refixing them based on the 1991 Census figures, aligning with the rationalization of general seats. This was refined further by the 87th Amendment Act of 2003, which shifted the basis to the 2001 Census for greater accuracy.

First-Past-The-Post System

India's Constitution embraces proportional representation for elections to the Rajya Sabha, yet it deliberately opts against this for the Lok Sabha. Instead, it employs territorial representation, commonly known as the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, to elect members to the lower house of Parliament.

In this FPTP framework, each legislator represents a defined geographical area called a constituency, with only one representative elected per constituency—making these single-member constituencies. Victory goes to the candidate securing the highest number of votes, even if it falls short of an absolute majority. While straightforward, this simple-majority approach often fails to mirror the full spectrum of voter preferences, sidelining smaller groups or minorities who lack the numbers to dominate any single seat.

Proportional representation, by contrast, addresses these shortcomings by ensuring that every segment of society secures seats roughly in line with its share of the electorate. Even the tiniest factions gain a voice proportional to their support, fostering broader inclusivity. This system comes in two main variants: the single transferable vote and the list system. India adopts the former for Rajya Sabha and state legislative council elections, as well as for choosing the President and Vice-President.

Despite advocacy from some Constituent Assembly members for proportional representation in Lok Sabha polls, the framers rejected it for two key reasons. First, its complexity—requiring voters to rank preferences or navigate intricate ballots—posed challenges in a nation with widespread low literacy at the time. Second, it risked fragmenting politics by encouraging a proliferation of parties, which could destabilize parliamentary governance through chronic coalition instability.

Proportional representation carries additional drawbacks that influenced this decision. It demands substantial financial resources, leaves no room for by-elections to fill vacancies, and severs the close, personal ties between representatives and their local voters. Moreover, it can nurture narrow minority mindsets and factional loyalties over national unity, while elevating party machinery at the expense of individual voter agency. These factors underscore why India's framers favored the pragmatic, territorially rooted FPTP for direct public elections.

Rajya Sabha: Permanence and Tenure

Unlike the Lok Sabha, which faces periodic dissolution, the Rajya Sabha—first constituted in 1952—stands as a permanent chamber of India's Parliament. It cannot be dissolved entirely, ensuring continuity in legislative oversight. Instead, approximately one-third of its members retire every two years, creating a staggered renewal process. These vacancies are promptly filled through fresh elections and presidential nominations at the start of every third year, with retiring members remaining eligible for re-election or renomination as many times as they qualify.

The Constitution wisely left the precise term of office for Rajya Sabha members to Parliament's discretion, rather than prescribing a fixed duration. Exercising this authority, Parliament enacted the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which established a standard six-year term for each member. To address the inaugural Rajya Sabha, the Act granted the President of India the power to shorten terms where necessary. For the first group of members, retirement order was determined by lottery, preventing any arbitrary selection. Additionally, the Act empowered the President to issue rules regulating the sequence of retirements for subsequent cycles, embedding flexibility into the system's foundational design. This mechanism guarantees the Rajya Sabha's enduring stability while allowing for regular democratic refreshment.

Duration of Lok Sabha

In stark contrast to the Rajya Sabha, which operates as a permanent chamber, the Lok Sabha has a fixed lifespan. Its standard term lasts five years, calculated from the date of its first sitting following general elections, at which point it automatically stands dissolved. This ensures periodic renewal through fresh democratic mandates.

Yet, the President holds the authority to dissolve the Lok Sabha prematurely, even before the five-year mark, and this decision remains beyond judicial review. Such flexibility allows the executive to respond to political exigencies without legal hindrance.

During a proclaimed national emergency, Parliament may extend the Lok Sabha's term through legislation, renewable in increments of one year for as long as the emergency persists. Crucially, however, no extension can outlast six months after the emergency ends, safeguarding against indefinite prolongation and reinforcing the primacy of electoral accountability.

Qualifications for Members of Parliament

The Indian Constitution outlines clear qualifications for individuals aspiring to become members of Parliament, ensuring they meet fundamental standards of citizenship, loyalty, maturity, and statutory requirements. Primarily, a candidate must be a citizen of India and take an oath or affirmation before an authority designated by the Election Commission. This oath commits them to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. Additionally, they must be at least 25 years old for election to the Lok Sabha or 30 years old for the Rajya Sabha. Parliament has further specified other qualifications through legislation.

Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, candidates must also be registered as electors in any parliamentary constituency—a rule that applies equally to both Houses. For Rajya Sabha elections, a key amendment in 2003 removed the earlier requirement that candidates be electors specifically in the state they represent; the Supreme Court upheld this change's constitutional validity in 2006, broadening access to the Upper House. Regarding reserved seats, individuals from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes must belong to these categories to contest such seats in any state or Union Territory. That said, members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes remain free to contest unreserved seats as well, promoting inclusivity without rigid barriers.

Disqualifications for Election to Parliament

The Constitution of India sets out clear grounds under which a person is disqualified from being elected as a member of Parliament. These include holding any office of profit under the Union or state government—except for the position of a minister or other roles specifically exempted by Parliament. A candidate is also barred if declared of unsound mind by a competent court, if they remain an undischarged insolvent, if they are not a citizen of India (or have voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship or owe allegiance to a foreign state), or if disqualified by any law enacted by Parliament. These provisions ensure that only those free from such conflicts or incapacities can represent the nation's highest legislative body.

Parliament has further refined these rules through the Representation of the People Act, 1951, introducing additional disqualifications to uphold electoral integrity. A candidate stands disqualified if found guilty of election offences or corrupt practices; convicted of any offence carrying imprisonment of two years or more (though detention under preventive detention laws does not count); or if they fail to submit election expense accounts on time. Financial or business interests pose further barriers: no one with stakes in government contracts, works, or services can contest, nor can directors, managing agents, or holders of offices of profit in corporations where the government owns at least 25 percent of shares. Similarly, individuals dismissed from government service for corruption or disloyalty to the state, or convicted of promoting enmity between groups, bribery, or social crimes like untouchability, dowry, or sati, are ineligible.

In cases of doubt over whether a disqualification applies, the President's decision is final. However, the President must seek and follow the opinion of the Election Commission before ruling, blending constitutional authority with electoral expertise.

Disqualification on the Ground of Defection

The Indian Constitution provides a robust mechanism to curb political defection, disqualifying any person from membership in Parliament if they violate the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. This anti-defection law targets specific acts of disloyalty by elected or nominated members. A legislator incurs disqualification in several key scenarios: voluntarily relinquishing membership in the political party on whose ticket they were elected; voting or abstaining from a vote in the House against the explicit direction issued by their party; an independently elected member joining any political party post-election; or a nominated member affiliating with a political party after the initial six-month period.

The authority to adjudicate these cases rests not with the President but with the presiding officers of the respective Houses—the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. This decentralized decision-making process ensures parliamentary autonomy. However, in a landmark 1992 judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that such decisions by the Chairman or Speaker remain subject to judicial review, striking a vital balance between legislative independence and constitutional accountability.

Vacation of Seats

Under the provisions of the Indian Constitution, a Member of Parliament vacates their seat in specific circumstances. These cases, detailed in Article 101, ensure accountability and smooth functioning of the legislative process.

Prohibition of Dual Legislative Membership

The Indian Constitution prohibits dual membership in legislatures, ensuring that elected representatives serve in only one house or body at a time. This principle is enshrined in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which addresses scenarios of double membership within Parliament itself.

If a person is elected to both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha simultaneously, they must notify their preferred house within 10 days. Failure to do so results in the automatic vacation of their Rajya Sabha seat. Similarly, if a sitting member of one house is elected to the other, their original seat becomes vacant upon the new election. In cases where an individual secures two seats within the same house, they must choose one; otherwise, both seats stand forfeited.

The same logic extends to membership across different levels of government: no one can hold seats in both Parliament and a state legislature concurrently. Should a person be elected to both, they must resign from the state legislature within 14 days. Neglect to do so leads to the vacation of their parliamentary seat. These provisions prevent conflicts of interest and promote undivided legislative focus.

2. Disqualification

A sitting Member of Parliament must vacate their seat if they incur any disqualification outlined in the Constitution. This exhaustive list explicitly encompasses disqualification on grounds of defection, as governed by the provisions of the Tenth Schedule.

Acceptance of MPs Resignations

Members of either House of Parliament may resign their seat by tendering a written resignation to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, as applicable. The seat falls vacant only upon the presiding officer's acceptance of the resignation. That said, the Chairman or Speaker retains the authority to decline it if they determine that the resignation was not voluntary or genuine.

Absence of Members

A legislative House possesses the power to declare a member's seat vacant if the member remains absent from all its meetings for a continuous period of sixty days without the House's permission. This provision ensures accountability by preventing prolonged, unexcused absences that could disrupt proceedings.

When calculating this sixty-day period, certain interruptions do not count: specifically, any time during which the House is prorogued or adjourned for more than four consecutive days is excluded. This adjustment accounts for normal legislative recesses, focusing the rule solely on active session days.

Other Grounds for Vacating a Parliamentary Seat

Beyond the standard grounds of disqualification, a member of Parliament must vacate their seat in several additional scenarios. These include: if a court declares their election void; if the House expels them; if they are elected to the office of President or Vice-President; or if they are appointed as Governor of a state. Such provisions ensure that parliamentary membership aligns with constitutional offices and maintains the integrity of the legislative process.

The Constitution itself does not outline a specific procedure for declaring void the election of a disqualified person to Parliament. Instead, this is governed by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which empowers a High Court to nullify such an election. Any aggrieved party may then appeal the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court, providing a clear judicial safeguard against irregularities.

Oath or Affirmation by Members of Parliament

Before assuming their seat in either House of Parliament, every member must make and subscribe to an oath or affirmation in the presence of the President or an individual authorized by the President for this purpose. This solemn commitment requires the member to pledge three key obligations: to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India; to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India; and to faithfully discharge the duties of their office.

Failure to take this oath or affirmation has serious repercussions. Without it, a member cannot vote, participate in House proceedings, or claim parliamentary privileges and immunities. In essence, the oath serves as the formal gateway to active membership.

Moreover, the law imposes strict penalties for unauthorized participation. A member faces a fine of ₹500 for each day they sit or vote under any of these circumstances: before completing the prescribed oath or affirmation; when aware of their own disqualification or lack of qualification for membership; or when prohibited from sitting or voting by any parliamentary law. These provisions underscore the Constitution's emphasis on accountability and constitutional fidelity from the outset of parliamentary service.

Salaries and Allowances of Members of Parliament

Members of either House of Parliament receive salaries and allowances as determined by Parliament through legislation. Notably, the Constitution does not provide for pensions for these members, though Parliament has since extended this benefit. The cornerstone of these provisions is the Salaries, Allowances and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954, which has been amended over time to reflect economic realities.

In 2018, Parliament raised the monthly salary for members from ₹50,000 to ₹1,00,000, the constituency allowance from ₹45,000 to ₹70,000, and the office expenses allowance from ₹45,000 to ₹60,000. Earlier, in 2010, the daily allowance for each day of residence on parliamentary duty increased from ₹1,000 to ₹2,000. Since 1976, members have also been eligible for a pension calculated on a graduated scale, based on each five-year term served in either House. In addition, they enjoy a range of facilities, including travel allowances, free accommodation, telephone reimbursements, vehicle advances, and medical benefits.

Salaries and Allowances of Parliamentary Officers

The salaries and allowances for key parliamentary officers—the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha—are similarly set by Parliament. Unlike other expenditures, these are charged directly to the Consolidated Fund of India, making them non-votable in the annual budget process.

These arrangements are governed by the Salaries and Allowances of Officers of Parliament Act, 1953, which defines "Officer of Parliament" to include precisely these four positions. In 2018, Parliament significantly enhanced the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha's salary from ₹1.25 lakh to ₹4 lakh per month. The other officers—the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha—receive salaries equivalent to those of Members of Parliament.

Further aligning with members' entitlements, each of these officers (except the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha) qualifies for a daily allowance throughout their term at the same rate as members, as well as a constituency allowance on par with members. The Act also specifies sumptuary allowances: the Speaker of the Lok Sabha receives ₹2,000 per month, matching the rate for a Cabinet Minister, while the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha each receive ₹1,000 per month, equivalent to a Minister of State. These measures ensure that parliamentary leadership is adequately supported to fulfill its constitutional roles.

Parliamentary Presiding Officers and Panels

Each House of the Indian Parliament maintains its own presiding officer to ensure orderly conduct of business. The Lok Sabha is headed by the Speaker, assisted by a Deputy Speaker, while the Rajya Sabha is presided over by the Chairman, supported by a Deputy Chairman. To further streamline proceedings, particularly during the absence of these principal officers, a Panel of Chairpersons is appointed for the Lok Sabha and a Panel of Vice-Chairpersons for the Rajya Sabha.

Election and Tenure of the Speaker

The Speaker of the Lok Sabha is elected from among its members, typically soon after the House holds its first sitting. The President determines the date for this election. Whenever the Speaker's office falls vacant, the Lok Sabha promptly elects a new member to fill it, ensuring continuity in leadership.

The Speaker generally serves for the full term of the Lok Sabha. However, this tenure ends prematurely in three specific scenarios: if the Speaker ceases to be a member of the House; if they resign by submitting a letter to the Deputy Speaker; or if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution removing them, supported by a majority of all its then members. Importantly, such a removal resolution requires at least 14 days' advance notice before it can be introduced.

During the consideration of a removal resolution, the Speaker steps aside from the chair and cannot preside over the House's proceedings, though they remain entitled to be present. In these sessions, the Speaker retains the right to speak, participate in debates, and vote—first on any matter, but not to break a tie if votes are equally divided.

A key feature of this office is its stability during transitions: even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, the Speaker does not vacate the position and continues in office until the newly elected House convenes. This provision safeguards institutional continuity amid electoral changes.

Role, Powers, and Functions of the Speaker

The Speaker serves as the presiding officer and principal representative of the Lok Sabha, embodying its authority and dignity. Far more than a mere chairperson, the Speaker acts as the guardian of the rights and privileges of individual members, the House as a whole, and its committees. As the chief spokesperson for the Lok Sabha, the Speaker's rulings on parliamentary matters carry finality, underscoring a position of immense responsibility, honor, and unchallenged authority within the chamber.

These extensive powers and duties stem from three primary sources: the Constitution of India, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha, and parliamentary conventions, which fill in unwritten or unspecified areas. Together, they equip the Speaker to fulfill a range of critical functions with precision and impartiality.

At the core of the Speaker's role is maintaining order and decorum during proceedings, ensuring smooth conduct of business—a responsibility where their authority is absolute. The Speaker also stands as the final interpreter of the Constitution, the Lok Sabha's rules, and established parliamentary precedents, providing clarity on procedural disputes. In practical terms, this extends to managing the House's quorum, fixed at one-tenth of its total strength; without it, the Speaker must adjourn or suspend the sitting.

The Speaker's voting rights are uniquely restrained: they do not vote initially but hold a casting vote to break ties, preventing deadlocks on key questions. Beyond routine sessions, the Speaker presides over joint sittings of both Houses of Parliament, convened by the President to resolve legislative impasses, such as disagreements over a bill. For sensitive matters, the Speaker may permit a secret sitting at the Leader of the House's request, barring strangers from the chamber, lobby, or galleries without explicit approval.

In legislative matters, the Speaker wields decisive influence. They certify whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill, a judgment that is binding; this certification accompanies the bill when forwarded to the Rajya Sabha for recommendations or to the President for assent. Similarly, under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker adjudicates disqualifications of Lok Sabha members on grounds of defection, though the Supreme Court in 1992 clarified that such decisions remain subject to judicial review.

Outside the House, the Speaker's influence extends further. As ex-officio chair of the Indian Parliamentary Group, they foster ties between India's Parliament and global counterparts, while also leading the Conference of Presiding Officers of the country's legislative bodies. Within Parliament, the Speaker appoints chairs for all Lok Sabha committees, oversees their operations, and personally leads key panels like the Business Advisory Committee, Rules Committee, and General-Purpose Committee.

Through these roles, the Speaker not only upholds the Lok Sabha's procedural integrity but also safeguards its democratic ethos, making them indispensable to India's parliamentary framework.

Independence and Impartiality

The Speaker of the Lok Sabha holds an office of immense prestige, authority, and influence, making independence and impartiality its very cornerstone—essential prerequisites for upholding the dignity of parliamentary democracy.

Several constitutional and procedural safeguards reinforce this impartial stature. First, the Speaker enjoys security of tenure, removable only through a resolution passed by a special majority in the Lok Sabha—a majority of all then-existing members of the House, rather than a simple majority of those present and voting. Moreover, this motion can only be introduced with the backing of at least 50 members, ensuring it is not a casual or politically motivated exercise.

Financial autonomy further bolsters independence: the Speaker's salary and allowances are determined by Parliament and drawn directly from the Consolidated Fund of India, exempting them from annual parliamentary approval. The House cannot casually critique the Speaker's conduct; any such discussion requires a substantive motion. Additionally, the Speaker's authority to regulate proceedings, conduct business, and maintain order remains beyond judicial review, shielding these core functions from external interference.

To prevent bias in decision-making, the Speaker refrains from voting except in cases of a tie, where a casting vote breaks the deadlock—a mechanism that underscores neutrality. The Speaker's elevated status is also reflected in the official order of precedence, ranking seventh alongside the Chief Justice of India, above all Cabinet ministers except the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister.

In contrast to Britain, where the Speaker severs all party ties upon election and adheres to a strict convention of political neutrality, India has not fully embraced this practice. Here, Speakers typically retain their party membership, highlighting an area where parliamentary traditions continue to evolve.

The Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha

The Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha is elected from among its members, much like the Speaker, but only after the Speaker's election. The Speaker fixes the date for this election. Whenever the position falls vacant, the Lok Sabha promptly elects a new member to fill it.

The Deputy Speaker typically holds office for the full term of the Lok Sabha. However, this tenure can end earlier if the individual ceases to be a member of the House, resigns in writing to the Speaker, or is removed by a resolution passed by a majority of all then-existing members. Such a removal resolution requires 14 days' advance notice.

When the Speaker's office is vacant or the Speaker is absent from a sitting, the Deputy Speaker steps in, fully assuming the Speaker's powers and duties. This includes presiding over joint sittings of both Houses of Parliament if the Speaker is unavailable. Importantly, the Deputy Speaker is not subordinate to the Speaker but answers directly to the House itself.

One unique privilege enhances the Deputy Speaker's role: upon appointment to any parliamentary committee, they automatically become its chairperson. While presiding, the Deputy Speaker follows the same voting protocol as the Speaker—refraining from an initial vote but casting a deciding vote in case of a tie. During debates on their own removal, they cannot preside, though they may remain present in the House.

When the Speaker is in the chair, the Deputy Speaker functions as an ordinary member, free to speak, participate, and vote on any matter. The position also carries a salary and allowances set by Parliament, drawn directly from the Consolidated Fund of India.

A key convention has shaped these roles since the 11th Lok Sabha. Prior to that, both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker usually hailed from the ruling party. Now, by consensus, the Speaker represents the ruling party or alliance, while the Deputy Speaker post goes to the principal opposition party. Neither officeholder takes a separate oath upon assuming duties.

The origins of these institutions trace back to 1921, under the Government of India Act, 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms). Initially termed the President and Deputy President of the Central Legislative Assembly, these roles evolved from the Governor-General's earlier practice of presiding over the Central Legislative Council. Frederick Whyte and Sachidanand Sinha became the first appointees as President and Deputy President, respectively. In 1925, Vithalbhai J. Patel marked a milestone as the first Indian and first elected holder of the role.

The Government of India Act, 1935 officially renamed them Speaker and Deputy Speaker, though the older titles lingered until 1947, as the Act's federal provisions were never implemented. In independent India, G.V. Mavalankar and Ananthasayanam Ayyangar became the inaugural Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Mavalankar's tenure was extraordinary: he also served as Speaker of the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) and provisional Parliament, holding the Lok Sabha Speaker's post continuously from 1946 to 1956—a full decade.

Panel of Chairpersons in the Lok Sabha

In the Lok Sabha, the Speaker plays a pivotal role in maintaining order by nominating a Panel of Chairpersons from among the House's members, limited to no more than ten individuals. These chairpersons step in to preside over proceedings whenever both the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker are absent. While occupying the chair, they wield the same authority and powers as the Speaker, ensuring seamless continuity in the House's functioning. Members of the panel serve until the Speaker nominates a fresh panel, providing a reliable mechanism for temporary leadership.

Should no member of the panel be available, the House itself decides on another member to act as the presiding officer. However, a critical limitation applies: no chairperson from the panel can preside if the offices of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker fall vacant. In such scenarios, the President appoints a member of the House to discharge the Speaker's duties temporarily. Elections to fill these vacancies are conducted at the earliest opportunity, restoring the regular hierarchy without delay. This structured arrangement underscores the robustness of parliamentary procedures in handling leadership gaps.

The Speaker Pro Tem: A Temporary Bridge in the Lok Sabha

Under the Indian Constitution, the Speaker of the outgoing Lok Sabha must vacate the office immediately before the first meeting of the newly elected House. To ensure a smooth transition, the President appoints a member of the Lok Sabha as the Speaker Pro Tem—typically the seniormost member in terms of continuous service. The President personally administers the oath of office to this appointee, underscoring the provisional yet pivotal role it plays at the dawn of a new parliamentary term.

Endowed with all the powers of the full-fledged Speaker, the Speaker Pro Tem presides over the inaugural sitting of the fresh Lok Sabha. The primary responsibility lies in administering oaths or affirmations to the newly elected members, allowing them to take their seats. Beyond this, the Pro Tem facilitates the House's election of the permanent Speaker, guiding proceedings with authority until that key moment arrives.

Once the new Speaker assumes office, the position of Speaker Pro Tem automatically lapses. Thus, it remains a fleeting arrangement, enduring only for the initial few days of the Lok Sabha's term and serving as an essential mechanism for orderly commencement.

Chairman of the Rajya Sabha: Role, Powers, Removal

The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha serves as the presiding officer of the Upper House of Parliament. By constitutional design, this position is held ex-officio by the Vice-President of India. However, when the Vice-President steps in to act as President or discharge the President's functions, they cease to perform the duties of Chairman during that period.

Unlike the Speaker of the Lok Sabha—who is an elected member of the House—the Chairman is not a member of the Rajya Sabha. Removal from the Chairmanship is possible only through the Vice-President's removal from office. In terms of powers and functions, the Chairman's role mirrors that of the Speaker, with two key exceptions: the Speaker alone certifies whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill, with their decision being final; and the Speaker presides over any joint sitting of the two Houses. On voting, both officers refrain from an initial vote but hold a casting vote in the event of a tie.

A notable procedural safeguard applies during a resolution for the Vice-President's removal: they cannot preside over Rajya Sabha proceedings at that time. Yet, the Vice-President may remain present, address the House, and participate in debates—though without voting. (In contrast, the Speaker retains full voting rights, including an initial vote, during a similar resolution in the Lok Sabha.) The Chairman's salary and allowances, like the Speaker's, are determined by Parliament and charged directly to the Consolidated Fund of India, shielding them from annual budgetary scrutiny. Finally, when acting as President, the Vice-President forgoes the Chairman's emoluments in favor of the President's salary and allowances.

Deputy Chairman: Election, Vacancy and Powers

The Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is elected directly by the members of the House from among themselves. This process repeats whenever the position falls vacant, ensuring continuity in leadership.

The office becomes vacant in one of three scenarios: when the Deputy Chairman ceases to be a member of the Rajya Sabha; when they resign by submitting a letter to the Chairman; or when the House passes a resolution for removal by a majority of its total membership at the time. Notably, such a removal resolution requires at least 14 days' advance notice before it can be introduced.

In the Chairman's absence—whether due to a vacancy in that office, the Vice-President's temporary role as Acting President, or simply the Chairman's unavailability during a sitting—the Deputy Chairman steps in to preside. During these periods, they wield all the powers and authority of the Chairman. Importantly, the Deputy Chairman operates independently, answerable directly to the Rajya Sabha rather than subordinate to the Chairman.

While presiding, the Deputy Chairman follows the same voting restrictions as the Chairman: they cannot vote in the first instance but may cast a deciding vote if there is a tie. Additionally, if a resolution for their own removal is under debate, they must relinquish the chair, though they may remain present in the House. Conversely, when the Chairman presides, the Deputy Chairman functions as an ordinary member, free to speak, participate in debates, and vote on any matter.

Like the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman receives a salary and allowances determined by Parliament and drawn directly from the Consolidated Fund of India, underscoring their constitutional stature.

Panel of Vice-Chairpersons in the Rajya Sabha

In the Rajya Sabha, the Chairman plays a pivotal role in maintaining order by nominating a panel of vice-chairpersons from among the House's members, as per its established rules. Any member from this panel steps in to preside over proceedings whenever both the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman are absent. While occupying the Chair, such a vice-chairperson wields the same authority and powers as the Chairman himself. These appointments remain effective until the Chairman nominates a fresh panel, ensuring continuity in leadership.

Should no member of the panel be available either, the House itself decides on another member to temporarily act as Chairman. However, a critical limitation applies: members of the panel cannot preside if the offices of either the Chairman or Deputy Chairman fall vacant. In such scenarios, the President intervenes by appointing a suitable member of the House to discharge the Chairman's duties. To restore normalcy, elections are conducted at the earliest opportunity to fill these vacancies, underscoring the constitutional emphasis on prompt and democratic succession.

Secretariat of Parliament

India's Parliament functions through two distinct Houses—the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha—each supported by its own dedicated secretariat. These secretariats maintain separate staff, though a few specialized posts may serve both Houses. Parliament itself regulates the recruitment and service conditions of this personnel, ensuring uniformity and accountability. Leading each secretariat is a Secretary-General, a permanent officer appointed by the House's presiding officer—the Speaker in the case of the Lok Sabha, and the Chairman (Vice-President) for the Rajya Sabha. This structure underscores the autonomy and efficiency of parliamentary operations.

Leader of the House

In the Indian Parliament, the Leader of the House plays a pivotal role in steering legislative proceedings. According to the Rules of the Lok Sabha, this position is held by the Prime Minister if they are a member of the Lower House; otherwise, the Prime Minister nominates another minister who is a Lok Sabha member to serve in this capacity. The Rajya Sabha mirrors this arrangement, with its own Leader of the House—a minister who is also a member of the Upper House, similarly nominated by the Prime Minister.

This leader wields significant authority in both Houses, directly shaping the agenda and conduct of business. They can even appoint a deputy leader to assist in these duties. For context, the equivalent role in the United States Congress is known as the majority leader, underscoring a shared democratic tradition of centralized legislative coordination.

Leader of the Opposition

In each House of Parliament, the Leader of the Opposition plays a pivotal role in India's parliamentary democracy. This position is formally assigned to the leader of the largest opposition party that commands at least one-tenth of the House's total seats. In a parliamentary system, the Leader of the Opposition offers constructive criticism of government policies while presenting a viable alternative administration, ensuring robust democratic accountability.

India granted statutory recognition to these leaders in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in 1977, affirming their institutional importance. They receive salary, allowances, and facilities on par with a Cabinet Minister. Notably, the first official recognition occurred in 1969, marking a milestone in formalizing opposition leadership.

Internationally, parallels exist: in the United States, the equivalent is the "minority leader." The British system, however, features a distinctive institution—the Shadow Cabinet. Formed by the opposition, it mirrors the ruling Cabinet by assigning "shadow" ministers to scrutinize and counter each government counterpart, grooming them for potential future roles. This setup positions the Shadow Cabinet as a ready "alternative government" in the event of a change in power. As constitutional scholar Ivor Jennings aptly described, the Leader of the Opposition thus serves as the "alternative Prime Minister," enjoying ministerial status and government remuneration.

The Role of the Whip in Indian Parliament

While the positions of Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition find no explicit mention in India's Constitution, they are enshrined in the Rules of the respective Houses and relevant parliamentary statutes. In contrast, the office of the whip—a cornerstone of party discipline—derives entirely from the unwritten conventions of parliamentary democracy, absent from the Constitution, House Rules, or any statute.

Every political party, whether in government or opposition, appoints its own whip in Parliament to act as the enforcer of party unity on the floor of the House. Serving as an assistant to the party's floor leader, the whip's primary duties revolve around mobilizing members: ensuring high attendance during key debates and votes, rallying support for or against specific bills and motions, and closely monitoring members' conduct to maintain cohesion. Party members are expected to strictly adhere to the whip's directives, known as the "party whip." Defiance invites disciplinary measures, such as warnings, suspension from party activities, or even expulsion, underscoring the whip's pivotal role in upholding the government's legislative agenda or the opposition's strategic resistance.

Summoning of Parliament

The President of India holds the authority to summon each House of Parliament as needed, ensuring the legislature remains active and responsive. Constitutionally, no more than six months can elapse between the conclusion of one session and the start of the next, meaning Parliament must convene at least twice a year. In practice, it typically holds three sessions annually: the Budget Session from February to May, the Monsoon Session from July to September, and the Winter Session from November to December.

A parliamentary session commences with the first sitting of a House—following the President's summons—and continues until its prorogation, or in the case of the Lok Sabha, until dissolution. Throughout a session, the House assembles daily to conduct legislative business, debates, and deliberations. The interval between the prorogation of one session and the reassembly for the next is known as a recess, during which Parliament is temporarily inactive but poised for reconvening.

Parliamentary Sittings and Closure Mechanisms

A parliamentary session unfolds through multiple meetings, each day's proceedings neatly divided into two sittings: a morning session from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., followed by a post-lunch session from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. These sittings draw to a close through one of four mechanisms—adjournment, adjournment sine die, prorogation, or dissolution (the last applying solely to the Lok Sabha). In particular, an adjournment merely suspends the sitting's business for a fixed interval, whether a few hours, days, or weeks, allowing work to resume later without ending the session.

Adjournment Sine Die in Parliament

Adjournment sine die refers to the termination of a parliamentary sitting without fixing a date for its resumption, effectively suspending proceedings for an indefinite period. This procedural step marks the end of a session when the House adjourns without scheduling a specific day to reconvene.

The authority to grant such an adjournment rests solely with the presiding officer—be it the Speaker in the Lok Sabha or the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha. This power extends further: the presiding officer may summon the House to meet earlier than the previously adjourned date or even convene a fresh sitting at any time after an adjournment sine die, ensuring flexibility in managing legislative business.

Prorogation of the House

Prorogation marks the formal end of a parliamentary session. Once the business of the session concludes, the presiding officer—either the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha—declares the House adjourned sine die, meaning without appointing a fixed date for resumption. Shortly thereafter, typically within a few days, the President issues an official notification proroguing the session, effectively closing it.

Notably, the President also holds the power to prorogue the House even while it is still in session, without waiting for its natural completion. This underscores the executive's role in parliamentary proceedings.

For a clear comparison, the key differences between adjournment and prorogation are outlined in Table 22.1.

Dissolution of the Lok Sabha

Unlike the Rajya Sabha, which is a permanent body never subject to dissolution, the Lok Sabha has a fixed five-year term and can be dissolved, effectively ending its life. Fresh general elections then pave the way for a new House. This process starkly contrasts with prorogation, which merely suspends proceedings without terminating the House itself.

The Lok Sabha dissolves in one of two ways: automatically, upon the expiry of its five-year term (or any extension during a national emergency); or at the discretion of the President, who holds the authority to issue such an order. Importantly, if dissolution occurs before the full term ends, it is irrevocable—no reversal is possible.

Dissolution wipes the slate clean: all pending business, including bills, motions, resolutions, notices, petitions, and matters before committees, lapses entirely. These must be reintroduced afresh in the new Lok Sabha. A few exceptions apply, however. Pending assurances referred to the Committee on Government Assurances survive dissolution, as do certain bills, depending on their stage in the legislative process.

The rules on bills are precise:
1. Any bill pending in the Lok Sabha—whether it originated there or came from the Rajya Sabha—lapses.
2. A bill passed by the Lok Sabha but still pending in the Rajya Sabha lapses.
3. If the two Houses disagree on a bill and the President has already notified a joint sitting before dissolution, the bill does not lapse.
4. A bill pending in the Rajya Sabha (but not yet passed by the Lok Sabha) survives.
5. A bill passed by both Houses but awaiting the President's assent does not lapse.
6. Even if the President returns a bill passed by both Houses for reconsideration, it does not lapse upon dissolution.

This framework ensures legislative continuity for advanced-stage bills while resetting the rest, reflecting the Constitution's balance between renewal and stability.

Quorum

In the parliamentary system, quorum refers to the minimum number of members who must be present for either House of Parliament to conduct any business legitimately. Constitutionally mandated under Article 100, this threshold stands at one-tenth of the total membership of the respective House, including the presiding officer. For the Lok Sabha, with its strength of 552 members, this translates to at least 55 members; in the Rajya Sabha, comprising 245 members, the requirement is 25.

Should the quorum fall short during a sitting, the presiding officer—be it the Speaker in the Lok Sabha or the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha—holds the authority to either adjourn the House or suspend proceedings until the necessary numbers are met. This safeguard ensures that decisions reflect a representative gathering, upholding the democratic integrity of legislative deliberations.

Voting in the Houses of Parliament

In the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, or a joint sitting of both Houses, decisions on all matters are typically made by a simple majority of members present and voting, with the presiding officer excluded from this count. Exceptions, explicitly outlined in the Constitution, demand a special majority. These include critical processes like the impeachment of the President, constitutional amendments, and the removal of presiding officers of Parliament.

The presiding officer—be it the Speaker in the Lok Sabha or the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha—refrains from voting at the outset. However, in the event of a tie, they cast a decisive vote to break the deadlock. Importantly, the validity of House proceedings remains unaffected by unauthorized voting, irregular participation, or even vacancies in membership.

The voting process in the Lok Sabha unfolds methodically under the Speaker's guidance. At the end of a debate, the Speaker puts the question to the House, inviting members in favor to say "Aye" and those opposed to say "No." The Speaker then announces their view: "The Ayes have it" (or "the Noes," as appropriate). If unchallenged, this judgment is reaffirmed twice, settling the matter.

Should any member challenge the Speaker's assessment, the Lobbies are cleared after a brief interval of three minutes and thirty seconds. The Speaker repeats the question and declares their opinion once more. A second challenge triggers a formal division: votes are recorded via the automatic vote recorder, Aye/No slips, or members proceeding to the respective Lobbies.

In cases where the Speaker deems a full division unnecessary—perhaps due to an unwarranted claim—they may simply direct Aye and No supporters to stand in their places for a quick count. The Speaker then declares the outcome, though individual names are not recorded in this streamlined process. This structured approach ensures efficiency while upholding democratic precision.

Language in Parliament

The Indian Constitution designates Hindi and English as the official languages for conducting business in Parliament. This ensures smooth communication across India's linguistic diversity. However, the presiding officer of either House—be it the Lok Sabha Speaker or Rajya Sabha Chairman—may grant permission for a member to speak in their mother tongue, fostering inclusivity. To support this flexibility, both Houses provide facilities for simultaneous interpretation, allowing members and listeners to follow proceedings seamlessly.

Originally, the Constitution envisioned phasing out English as a parliamentary language after 15 years from its commencement in 1950—that is, by 1965—to prioritize Hindi. Yet, recognizing practical challenges, the Official Languages Act, 1963, extended English's use alongside Hindi indefinitely, a provision that remains in place today. This balanced approach upholds the spirit of linguistic federalism while maintaining parliamentary efficiency.

Privileges of Ministers and Attorney General

Beyond the elected members of Parliament, ministers and the Attorney General of India enjoy a unique privilege: they may speak in and otherwise participate in the proceedings of either House, any joint sitting of both Houses, or any parliamentary committee of which they are members. Crucially, however, they hold no right to vote.

This provision serves two essential purposes, reflecting the practical demands of India's parliamentary system. First, it enables a minister from one House—say, the Lok Sabha—to fully engage in debates and proceedings in the other House, the Rajya Sabha, and vice versa. This cross-House participation ensures ministerial accountability and expertise are available wherever needed, without rigid membership barriers. Second, it accommodates ministers who are not yet members of either House. Under the Constitution, such individuals can serve for up to six months while laying the groundwork for election or nomination, allowing them to contribute meaningfully to both Houses during this interim period. Together, these features underscore Parliament's emphasis on collective responsibility over individual voting rights.

Lame-Duck Session

In Indian parliamentary practice, the lame-duck session denotes the final session of an outgoing Lok Sabha, convened after a new House has been elected. This transitional phase allows the existing assembly to complete its business even as a fresh mandate takes shape. The term "lame ducks" specifically applies to those members of the previous Lok Sabha who failed to secure re-election, underscoring their diminished authority as they wrap up their tenure amid the shadow of the incoming legislature.

Question Hour

Every sitting of Parliament begins with Question Hour, a dedicated one-hour slot that allows members to hold the government accountable. During this time, MPs pose questions to ministers, who respond either orally or in writing. These questions fall into three main categories: starred, unstarred, and short-notice, each designed to suit different levels of urgency and detail.

A starred question, marked by an asterisk, receives an oral answer from the minister, paving the way for supplementary questions that enable MPs to probe deeper. In contrast, an unstarred question demands only a written reply, submitted to the member without opportunity for follow-ups. A short-notice question, tabled with fewer than ten days' advance notice, is also answered orally, making it ideal for matters of pressing public importance.

Beyond ministers, questions may target private members—non-governmental MPs—when the subject pertains to a Bill, resolution, or other House business they are handling. The process mirrors that for ministerial questions, ensuring consistency. To aid quick identification, the question lists appear in distinct colors: green for starred, white for unstarred, light pink for short-notice, and yellow for those addressed to private members. This vibrant system keeps the lively proceedings of Question Hour organized and efficient.

Zero Hour

In India's parliamentary proceedings, Zero Hour offers a striking contrast to the rigidly structured Question Hour. While the Question Hour is formally outlined in the Rules of Procedure, Zero Hour finds no such place in those rules. Instead, it serves as an informal device, empowering Members of Parliament to raise pressing matters spontaneously, without any prior notice.

This session kicks off immediately after the Question Hour ends and runs until the House turns to its regular agenda for the day. Put simply, Zero Hour fills the brief interlude between these two phases of business. A uniquely Indian innovation in parliamentary practice, it has been a fixture since 1962, injecting flexibility and immediacy into the otherwise methodical flow of legislative debates.

Categories of Parliamentary Motions

In the Indian Parliament, no discussion on a matter of general public importance can proceed without a formal motion, which requires the presiding officer's consent. Through the adoption or rejection of such motions—proposed by either ministers or private members—the House articulates its decisions or opinions on a wide array of issues.

Members introduce motions to spark debates on various topics, and these fall into three principal categories: substantive motions, substitute motions, and subsidiary motions.

A substantive motion is a standalone, self-contained proposal addressing a matter of profound significance, such as the impeachment of the President or the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner. It forms the core of the House's deliberation without needing reference to any prior motion.

A substitute motion, by contrast, arises as an alternative to an existing motion. If the House adopts it, the substitute fully displaces the original, redirecting the proceedings.

Subsidiary motions, however, derive their purpose and meaning from an underlying motion or ongoing House business; they cannot independently reflect the House's will. These divide into three subtypes. Ancillary motions serve as procedural tools to advance routine business smoothly. Superseding motions, introduced amid debate on another matter, seek to override and displace that issue entirely. Amendments, meanwhile, target only a specific portion of the original motion, proposing modifications or partial substitutions to refine it.

Four Types of Closure Motion

In parliamentary proceedings, a Closure Motion serves as a crucial procedural tool, allowing a member to abruptly end debate on a pending matter and bring it directly to a vote. Once approved by the House, discussion ceases immediately, ensuring timely decision-making amid potentially protracted deliberations. This mechanism comes in four distinct forms, each tailored to specific scenarios.

The simplest variant, known as Simple Closure, occurs when a member proposes that "the matter, having been sufficiently discussed, be now put to vote." This straightforward motion prioritizes efficiency by halting further debate without additional conditions.

Closure by Compartments organizes complex items, such as the clauses of a bill or an extensive resolution, into logical groupings before debate begins. Members discuss each compartment as a whole, after which the entire group is put to vote, streamlining the process for voluminous agendas.

Under Kangaroo Closure, debate and voting focus solely on the most critical clauses, with intervening ones "skipped over" and deemed passed automatically. This selective approach, evoking the bounding leap of a kangaroo, accelerates proceedings by bypassing less contentious elements.

Finally, Guillotine Closure acts as a time-bound guillotine, slicing through unfinished business when allotted discussion time expires. Here, undiscussed clauses of a bill or resolution are bundled with those already debated and put to vote en masse, preventing indefinite delays.

Privilege Motion

A Privilege Motion serves as a parliamentary tool to address breaches of privilege committed by a minister against the House or its members. Any member may introduce it upon believing that the minister has withheld key facts in a case or deliberately provided distorted or inaccurate information. The motion's core objective is to censure the offending minister, thereby upholding the sanctity of legislative proceedings.

Calling Attention Motion in Parliament

The Calling Attention Motion empowers any member of Parliament to draw a minister's immediate attention to a matter of urgent public importance, urging an authoritative statement on the issue. This device, an innovative feature of Indian parliamentary practice introduced in 1954, mirrors the spontaneity of the Zero Hour. Yet, unlike the Zero Hour—which operates informally—it enjoys explicit recognition in the Rules of Procedure, lending it a structured legitimacy within legislative proceedings.

Adjournment Motion

In the Indian Parliament, the adjournment motion serves as a powerful tool for members to spotlight a definite matter of urgent public importance. To be admitted, it requires the backing of at least 50 members, and once allowed, it halts the House's regular business—an extraordinary measure that carries an implicit censure of the government. For this reason, the Rajya Sabha lacks the authority to initiate such a motion. If debated, the discussion must extend for at least two and a half hours, ensuring thorough scrutiny.

However, the right to propose an adjournment motion comes with strict limitations to prevent misuse. The matter must be definite, factual, urgent, and of clear public significance; it cannot encompass multiple issues or be phrased vaguely. Nor can it address a single broad topic in general terms, revive debates from the same session, raise privilege questions, pertain to ongoing court cases, or duplicate issues suitable for a separate motion. These safeguards maintain parliamentary discipline while preserving the motion's role as a vital accountability mechanism.

No-Confidence Motion

The cornerstone of parliamentary accountability in India lies in Article 75 of the Constitution, which mandates that the Council of Ministers holds collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha. This principle ensures that the ministry remains in office only as long as it commands the confidence of the majority of Lok Sabha members. Should this support waver, the Lok Sabha wields the power to unseat the government through a no-confidence motion—a direct mechanism to enforce democratic oversight.

To initiate such a motion, at least 50 members must lend their support for its admission in the House. Once tabled and debated, a simple majority suffices for its passage, compelling the ministry to either resign or seek a fresh mandate from the people. This tool underscores the Lok Sabha's supremacy in matters of executive stability, preventing any government from clinging to power without legislative backing.

Confidence Motion

In India's parliamentary democracy, the confidence motion has emerged as a vital procedural tool to address the challenges of unstable governments, particularly those arising from fractured electoral mandates. These situations often lead to hung parliaments—where no single party secures a clear majority—minority administrations, or fragile coalition setups. When a government forms with a razor-thin majority, the President may direct it to demonstrate its support on the floor of the Lok Sabha, ensuring legitimacy through a direct vote.

Governments may also proactively introduce a confidence motion to affirm their majority and consolidate their position. Success in securing the House's backing reinforces stability, but defeat spells the end: the government must resign, paving the way for fresh alternatives or elections. This mechanism underscores the Lok Sabha's supremacy in upholding collective responsibility, as enshrined in the Constitution.

Censure Motion in Indian Parliament

A censure motion in the Indian Parliament serves as a formal expression of disapproval against the Council of Ministers, an individual minister, or even a specific government policy. Unlike a no-confidence motion, which targets the government as a whole and, if passed, compels the Prime Minister and Council to resign, a censure motion does not carry such consequences—it merely censures without destabilizing the government. Key distinctions between the two, including their scope, procedural requirements, and outcomes, are summarized in Table 22.2. This mechanism underscores Parliament's oversight role, allowing members to voice grievances on targeted issues while preserving governmental stability.

Motion of Thanks

The President addresses Parliament during two key occasions: the first session following each general election and the first session of every fiscal year. In this address, the President outlines the government's policies and programmes for the preceding year as well as the year ahead. Modeled on Britain's Speech from the Throne, this speech sets the stage for parliamentary scrutiny.

Both Houses of Parliament discuss the President's address through a Motion of Thanks. Members debate its contents at length, using the opportunity to examine the government's performance, highlight administrative lapses, and voice pointed criticisms. The motion concludes with a vote, and its passage is essential—if defeated, it signals the government's loss of confidence and potential downfall. Thus, this ritual not only launches the legislative agenda but also holds the executive accountable from the very outset.

No-Day-Yet-Named Motion

In the Lok Sabha, a No-Day-Yet-Named Motion is one that the Speaker has formally admitted, but without an assigned date for debate. This procedural step ensures that only relevant motions proceed while respecting the House's demanding schedule.

The Speaker plays a pivotal role in scheduling such motions. After evaluating the overall business before the House, they consult the Leader of the House or consider recommendations from the Business Advisory Committee. Based on this, the Speaker allots an appropriate slot—be it a full day, multiple days, or merely part of a day—for the motion's discussion. This flexible mechanism balances legislative priorities and maintains orderly proceedings.

Dilatory Motion

In the parliamentary proceedings of the Indian House, a dilatory motion serves as a procedural tool to pause or slow down the ongoing business. Specifically, it seeks the adjournment of debate on a bill, motion, resolution, or any other matter under consideration, effectively delaying its progress. Any member may introduce such a motion at any point after the original motion has been proposed, injecting a tactical element into the House's deliberations.

Once moved, the debate on a dilatory motion remains strictly confined to its own content, preventing it from derailing the primary discussion. However, the Speaker holds significant authority here: if they deem the motion an abuse of the House's rules—perhaps as a frivolous tactic to obstruct proceedings—they may immediately put it to a vote or simply refuse to entertain it altogether. This safeguard ensures that dilatory motions enhance procedural flexibility without undermining the efficiency of legislative work.

Point of Order in Indian Parliament

In the dynamic arena of India's parliamentary proceedings, a point of order emerges as a vital tool for upholding procedural integrity. Any member of the House may invoke it when they perceive that the ongoing business deviates from established norms. Specifically, it must pertain to the interpretation or enforcement of the House's Rules of Procedure or relevant constitutional provisions that govern its operations—and crucially, the issue must fall within the Speaker's authority to adjudicate.

Typically wielded by opposition members to check the government's actions, this device is extraordinary in nature: it instantly halts the House's proceedings until resolved. Importantly, no debate is permitted on a point of order, ensuring swift attention to procedural lapses and reinforcing the Speaker's pivotal role in maintaining order.

Half-an-Hour Discussion

In the Lok Sabha, the Half-an-Hour Discussion provides a streamlined mechanism for addressing matters of substantial public importance. It targets issues that have already sparked intense debate and now demand clear, factual clarification to resolve lingering uncertainties. The Speaker exercises discretion to schedule these sessions on up to three days each week, ensuring timely intervention without disrupting the House's broader agenda. Crucially, no formal motion is tabled, and no voting occurs, keeping the focus squarely on elucidation rather than decision-making.

Short Duration Discussion

The Short Duration Discussion, commonly called the two-hour discussion, allows Members of Parliament to spotlight matters of urgent public importance without the constraints of a full debate. As the name suggests, the entire proceedings are capped at two hours, ensuring focused and timely deliberation.

Any MP can initiate such a discussion, prompting the Speaker—who may allocate up to two days per week for these sessions—to admit it if deemed suitable. Notably, no formal motion is tabled, and no voting follows, making it a swift mechanism for raising awareness rather than deciding outcomes. Introduced in 1953, this device remains a vital instrument in the Lok Sabha for ventilating pressing public concerns efficiently.

Special Mention and Rule 377

In the Rajya Sabha, the Special Mention serves as a vital procedural tool, allowing members to highlight urgent public matters that cannot be raised through standard channels. These include points of order, Question Hour, half-an-hour discussions, short-duration discussions, adjournment motions, calling attention notices, or any other rule of the House. By enabling brief mentions without formal debate, it ensures key issues reach the floor efficiently. The Lok Sabha offers a parallel mechanism known as Notice (Mention) under Rule 377, providing similar flexibility for its members.

Resolutions in the Indian Parliament

In the Indian Parliament, resolutions serve as a vital tool for members to spotlight matters of general public interest, directing the attention of the House or the government toward pressing issues. Discussions on these resolutions must remain strictly relevant to their scope, ensuring focused deliberation. Importantly, a member who introduces a resolution—or an amendment to it—cannot withdraw it without the explicit permission of the House.

Resolutions fall into three distinct categories, each governed by specific procedural norms. A Private Member’s Resolution, moved by any non-ministerial member, is debated exclusively on alternate Fridays during the afternoon session, reflecting its lower priority in the parliamentary schedule. In contrast, a Government Resolution, introduced by a minister, enjoys greater flexibility and can be taken up any day from Monday to Thursday. Then there are Statutory Resolutions, which may be tabled by either a private member or a minister; these are mandated by provisions in the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, underscoring their legal compulsion.

While resolutions and motions both facilitate parliamentary business, they differ in key ways. Every resolution qualifies as a substantive motion—one that stands alone and proposes a definitive course of action. However, not all motions are substantive; some are ancillary or procedural. Crucially, all resolutions must culminate in a vote by the House, whereas many motions do not require one, allowing for swifter disposal of routine matters. This distinction highlights resolutions' role as instruments of deliberate, binding intent.

Youth Parliament Scheme and Implementation

The Youth Parliament scheme was launched following recommendations from the Fourth All India Whips Conference, marking a deliberate effort to engage India's younger generations with the nation's parliamentary traditions. At its core, the initiative seeks to familiarize students with the practices and procedures of Parliament, fostering a deep appreciation for its inner workings. Beyond mere procedural knowledge, it aims to instill the spirit of discipline and tolerance, while nurturing strong character traits essential for future leaders. Ultimately, the program works to embed the fundamental values of democracy in the student community, equipping them with a clear and balanced understanding of how democratic institutions truly function.

To ensure widespread adoption, the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs plays a pivotal role by offering targeted training and sustained encouragement to state governments, helping them effectively implement the scheme across schools and colleges.

Classification and Procedure of Bills

The legislative process in India's Parliament unfolds identically in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, with every bill navigating the same sequence of stages in each House. At its core, a bill represents a formal proposal for new legislation; it transforms into an enforceable law—or Act—only upon receiving presidential assent after bicameral approval.

Bills introduced in Parliament fall into two broad types: public bills, sponsored by the government to address matters of national interest, and private bills, tabled by individual members of Parliament (known as private members' bills) for more localized or specific concerns. While both types follow the identical procedural path through the House, they diverge in key aspects, such as sponsorship, scope, and priority in parliamentary time.

Beyond this distinction, bills can also be categorized into four principal varieties based on their subject matter:

• Ordinary bills, which cover any issue except financial matters.
• Money bills, exclusively dealing with taxation, public expenditure, or related fiscal policies.
• Financial bills, which touch on financial issues but differ procedurally from money bills.
• Constitution amendment bills, aimed at altering the Constitution's provisions.

The Constitution prescribes distinct enactment procedures for each category to ensure appropriate scrutiny and checks. This chapter details the processes for ordinary bills, money bills, and financial bills, while the procedure for Constitution amendment bills is covered separately in Chapter 10.

Ordinary Bills

In the Indian Parliament, every ordinary bill must navigate five essential stages before it can be enacted into law and enshrined on the Statute Book. These stages ensure thorough scrutiny, debate, and refinement, reflecting the democratic rigor of the legislative process.

First Reading of an Ordinary Bill

The first reading marks the formal introduction of an ordinary bill in Parliament, a process that can occur in either House. Any member, whether a minister or a private member, may propose such a bill. To do so, the mover must first seek the House's permission by asking for leave. If granted, they introduce the bill simply by reading out its title and objectives—no debate or discussion follows at this preliminary stage. The bill is then published in the Gazette of India for public record and wider dissemination.

Notably, if the bill has already been published in the Gazette prior to introduction, the formality of seeking leave is dispensed with. Together, the introduction and publication complete the first reading, setting the stage for subsequent scrutiny without delving into the bill's merits just yet.

Second Reading of a Bill

The Second Reading marks the heart of the legislative process, where a bill undergoes both general and meticulous scrutiny to assume its final form. This stage, arguably the most critical in enacting a law, unfolds in three interconnected substages: the stage of general discussion, the committee stage, and the consideration stage.

The process begins with the stage of general discussion. Printed copies of the bill are distributed to all members of the House, who then debate its underlying principles and broad provisions without delving into細節. At this juncture, the House has four options: it may take the bill into consideration immediately or on a specified future date; refer it to a Select Committee composed solely of members from the originating House; send it to a Joint Committee drawn from both Houses of Parliament; or circulate it widely to gather public opinion.

In practice, bills are most often referred to a Select Committee during the committee stage. This body conducts a thorough, clause-by-clause examination, proposing amendments that refine the bill without undermining its core principles. Once its detailed scrutiny and deliberations conclude, the committee submits its report—and the revised bill—back to the House.

The consideration stage follows, as the House takes up the committee's version for line-by-line review. Members discuss and vote on each clause individually, with opportunities to propose and debate further amendments. Those accepted by majority vote are incorporated, paving the way for the bill's evolution into a polished legislative proposal.

Third Reading

The third reading marks the final stage of a bill's passage through a House of Parliament, where debate focuses solely on accepting or rejecting the bill in its entirety. No amendments are permitted at this point, since the bill's core principles and detailed provisions have already undergone thorough scrutiny during the second reading. If a majority of members present and voting approve it, the bill is deemed passed by that House. The presiding officer then authenticates the bill and forwards it to the other House for its consideration and approval. Crucially, a bill becomes law only after both Houses of Parliament have agreed to its final form—whether identical or with amendments agreed upon by both.

Second House Options and Joint Sitting

When a bill reaches the second House of Parliament—typically the Rajya Sabha if it originated in the Lok Sabha, or vice versa—it must navigate the same three stages as in the first House: first reading, second reading, and third reading. At this point, the second House has four clear options. It can pass the bill exactly as received, without any changes; approve it with amendments and send it back to the first House for reconsideration; reject it outright; or simply take no action, leaving the bill pending indefinitely.

If the second House passes the bill unchanged, or if the first House accepts all proposed amendments from the second, the bill is considered passed by both Houses and proceeds to the President for assent. However, disagreements can create a deadlock. This occurs if the first House rejects the second House's amendments, if the second House rejects the bill entirely, or if the second House fails to act on it within six months. In such cases, the President may summon a joint sitting of both Houses to break the impasse. There, the bill passes if it secures a majority of members present and voting, effectively deeming it approved by Parliament as a whole.

Assent of the President

Once a bill has cleared both Houses of Parliament—whether passed separately or at a joint sitting—it must be presented to the President for his assent. At this stage, the President faces three clear choices. He may grant his assent, transforming the bill into law and adding it to the Statute Book. Alternatively, he may withhold his assent, effectively killing the bill and preventing it from becoming an Act. Or, he may return the bill to the Houses for reconsideration.

Should the President opt for return, and if both Houses pass the bill again—with or without amendments—and resubmit it, the President is constitutionally bound to grant his assent. This mechanism underscores that the President's power amounts to a suspensive veto alone: it can delay legislation but cannot block it indefinitely once Parliament reaffirms its will.

Money Bills: Definition and Procedure

Article 110 of the Indian Constitution meticulously defines a Money Bill, deeming it such only if it exclusively deals with one or more of the following matters: the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration, or regulation of any tax; the regulation of the Union government's borrowing; the custody of the Consolidated Fund of India or the Contingency Fund of India, including payments into or withdrawals from these funds; the appropriation of money from the Consolidated Fund; the declaration of any expenditure charged on it or any increase in such expenditure; the receipt, custody, issue, or audit of money from the Consolidated Fund or the Public Account of India; or any incidental matters connected to these.

Importantly, a bill does not qualify as a Money Bill merely because it involves the imposition of fines or pecuniary penalties; the demand or payment of fees for licenses or services rendered; or the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration, or regulation of taxes by local authorities for local purposes. Should any doubt arise about a bill's status, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha holds the final authority, and this decision is beyond challenge in any court, the other House of Parliament, or even by the President. The Speaker endorses the bill as a Money Bill when transmitting it to the Rajya Sabha or presenting it to the President.

The Constitution prescribes a unique procedure for Money Bills to underscore the Lok Sabha's primacy in financial matters. These bills can be introduced solely in the Lok Sabha, and only with the President's prior recommendation. As government bills, they must be tabled by a minister. Once passed by the Lok Sabha, the bill moves to the Rajya Sabha, which wields limited influence: it cannot reject or amend the bill but may only recommend changes and must return it within 14 days, with or without suggestions.

The Lok Sabha then decides whether to accept or reject any or all of the Rajya Sabha's recommendations. Acceptance incorporates the modifications, effectively passing the bill in its revised form by both Houses. Rejection leaves it unchanged from the Lok Sabha's original version, also deemed passed by both. If the Rajya Sabha fails to return the bill within 14 days, it is treated as passed in the Lok Sabha's original form. This mechanism grants the Lok Sabha overriding powers over Money Bills, in stark contrast to ordinary bills, where both Houses enjoy equal authority.

Finally, upon presentation to the President, a Money Bill requires his assent or withholding thereof—he cannot send it back for reconsideration. In practice, given the bill's introduction with his prior approval, the President routinely grants assent, ensuring swift enactment of financial legislation.

Classification of Financial Bills in India

Financial bills in the Indian Parliament address fiscal matters, primarily those involving government revenue or expenditure. While the term might suggest a broad category at first glance, the Constitution employs it in a precise, technical sense, classifying financial bills into three distinct types: Money Bills under Article 110, Financial Bills (I) under Article 117(1), and Financial Bills (II) under Article 117(3).

This classification underscores a key hierarchical relationship: all Money Bills are financial bills, but not all financial bills qualify as Money Bills. Only those bills that exclusively cover the specific provisions outlined in Article 110—such as taxation, borrowing, or the Consolidated Fund—earn this designation, and they must be certified as such by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. In contrast, Financial Bills (I) and Financial Bills (II) fall under Article 117, which governs their introduction and passage with procedural safeguards to protect fiscal discipline, though they extend beyond the narrow scope of Money Bills to include other expenditure or revenue-related matters.

Financial Bills (I) — Procedure and Amendments

Financial Bills (I) represent a hybrid category in India's legislative framework, blending provisions outlined in Article 110—typically associated with Money Bills—with elements of ordinary legislation. For example, a bill might include a clause authorizing government borrowing while also addressing unrelated policy matters, distinguishing it from a pure Money Bill, which deals exclusively with such financial subjects.

In two key respects, a Financial Bill (I) mirrors the stringent rules for a Money Bill: it can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha, never in the Rajya Sabha, and only with the prior recommendation of the President. Beyond these constraints, however, it follows the standard procedure for an ordinary bill. This means the Rajya Sabha retains full powers to reject or amend it, fostering bicameral deliberation.

A notable caveat applies to amendments: any proposal, other than one seeking the reduction or abolition of a tax, requires the President's recommendation before it can be moved in either House. Amendments for tax reductions or abolition, by contrast, do not need this prior approval.

Should the two Houses deadlock on a Financial Bill (I), the President may summon a joint sitting to resolve the impasse, much like with ordinary bills. Upon passage, when presented for assent, the President has three options: grant assent, withhold it outright, or return the bill for reconsideration by the Houses. This balanced process underscores the bill's position as a bridge between fiscal exclusivity and general lawmaking.

Financial Bills (II)

A Financial Bill (II) deals exclusively with expenditures from the Consolidated Fund of India but excludes any matters covered under Article 110 of the Constitution, such as taxation or the Consolidated Fund's appropriation. Unlike Money Bills, it follows the standard legislative process for ordinary bills, ensuring parity in parliamentary scrutiny. This classification keeps routine financial matters within the realm of regular lawmaking, preventing them from bypassing the Rajya Sabha's full deliberative role.

The key distinction lies in a single procedural safeguard: neither House of Parliament can pass the bill without the President's prior recommendation for its consideration. However, this recommendation is not required at the introduction stage, allowing the bill to be tabled in either the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha on the government's initiative alone. Once introduced, it remains fully amendable or rejectable by both Houses, fostering robust debate. Should a deadlock arise between the two Houses, the President holds the authority to convene a joint sitting for resolution—a mechanism that underscores parliamentary supremacy while maintaining executive oversight.

Upon passage by both Houses (or via joint sitting), the bill reaches the President, who may grant assent, withhold it, or return it for reconsideration. This balanced framework ensures fiscal proposals involving public expenditure receive thorough legislative review without the stringent controls reserved for more pivotal financial legislation.

Joint Sitting of Parliament's Two Houses

The Constitution provides for a joint sitting of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha as a rare but powerful mechanism to break deadlocks over ordinary or financial bills. This extraordinary step arises only after one House passes a bill and sends it to the other, where a stalemate emerges in one of three specific scenarios: outright rejection by the second House; final disagreement on proposed amendments; or the passage of more than six months from receipt without the bill being passed.

In such cases, the President may summon both Houses to convene jointly, deliberate, and vote on the bill. Importantly, this provision applies exclusively to ordinary and financial bills—not to Money Bills, where the Lok Sabha holds decisive authority, nor to Constitutional Amendment Bills, which require separate passage by each House. When calculating the six-month window, any period during which the receiving House is prorogued or adjourned for more than four consecutive days is excluded.

Timing constraints add further nuance. If the disputed bill has already lapsed due to the Lok Sabha's dissolution, no joint sitting can occur. However, if the President notifies the intention to summon one before dissolution, the sitting can proceed, as the bill remains alive. Once notified, neither House may take further action on the bill independently.

The Lok Sabha Speaker presides over the joint sitting, deputized by the Deputy Speaker if absent. Should both be unavailable, the Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman takes the chair; if he too is absent, members present elect another presiding officer. Notably, the Rajya Sabha Chairman plays no role, as he is not a member of either House. The quorum requires one-tenth of the total membership of both Houses, and proceedings follow the Lok Sabha's Rules of Procedure.

Passage demands a simple majority of members present and voting from both Houses combined. Given the Lok Sabha's larger strength, it typically prevails. Amendments are tightly restricted: only those causing the original disagreement or necessitated by passage delays may be introduced—no others.

Since 1950, Parliament has resorted to this provision just three times, underscoring its exceptional nature. The bills successfully passed were the Dowry Prohibition Bill, 1960; the Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977; and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2002.

Budget in Parliament

The Indian Constitution does not explicitly use the term "budget"; instead, it refers to this key document as the annual financial statement under Article 112. This popular shorthand encapsulates the government's comprehensive financial blueprint for the year.

At its core, the budget outlines the estimated receipts and expenditures of the Government of India for a financial year, which runs from April 1 to March 31 of the following year. Beyond these core estimates, it incorporates several vital elements: projections for both revenue and capital receipts, along with strategies for mobilizing funds; detailed forecasts of expenditures; a review of the previous year's actual receipts and spending, including explanations for any surplus or deficit; and an overview of the upcoming year's economic and fiscal policies, such as taxation proposals, revenue outlook, spending priorities, and new schemes or projects.

Historically, until 2017, the government presented two distinct budgets: the Railway Budget, covering only the Ministry of Railways' receipts and expenditures, and the General Budget, which accounted for all other ministries. This bifurcation originated in 1924, following the recommendations of the Acworth Committee Report (1921). The separation aimed to bring flexibility to railway finances, adopt a more business-like approach to railway operations, shield general revenues from railway fluctuations through a fixed annual contribution, and allow the railways to reinvest their profits in development after meeting that obligation.

In a significant reform, the Central Government merged the Railway Budget into the General Budget in 2017, streamlining the process into a single Union Budget for the entire government.

Constitutional Framework for the Budget

The Constitution of India lays down a meticulous framework for the enactment of the annual budget, ensuring fiscal discipline, accountability, and a clear division of powers between the executive and legislature, as well as between the two Houses of Parliament.

At the heart of this process is the President's pivotal role. For every financial year, the President must cause a statement of the Government of India's estimated receipts and expenditures to be presented before both Houses of Parliament. No demand for grants can be made without the President's recommendation, and similarly, no Money Bill imposing a tax may be introduced in Parliament—nor in the Rajya Sabha—except on such recommendation. Funds cannot be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India except through appropriation by law, and no tax can be levied or collected without the authority of law.

Parliament's authority over taxation is carefully circumscribed: it may reduce or abolish a tax but cannot increase it. The budget estimates must clearly separate expenditures charged on the Consolidated Fund of India from other expenditures, while also distinguishing revenue account spending from capital or other outlays.

A key feature of this framework is the asymmetric roles of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in budget matters, reflecting the Lok Sabha's primacy in financial legislation. Money Bills or Finance Bills dealing with taxation must originate exclusively in the Lok Sabha; the Rajya Sabha has no power to introduce them or vote on demands for grants—that privilege belongs solely to the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha must return any such Bill to the Lok Sabha within 14 days, and the Lok Sabha may accept or reject its recommendations at will.

Finally, expenditures charged on the Consolidated Fund of India—such as salaries of judges, the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and certain debt obligations—are not submitted to Parliament's vote. Parliament can, however, discuss them thoroughly, providing a forum for scrutiny without the power to alter them. This structure safeguards essential payments while upholding democratic oversight.

Charged Expenditure

India's Union Budget divides expenditures from the Consolidated Fund of India into two distinct categories: those that are "charged" on the fund and those that are "voted" by Parliament. This classification ensures that essential, non-discretionary payments—vital for the functioning of key constitutional institutions and obligations—are protected from routine parliamentary cuts. While Parliament must approve the voted expenditures through a formal voting process, charged expenditures are non-votable. Members can discuss them to seek clarifications or express views, but they cannot reject or reduce them; they are automatically included in the appropriation once the relevant demands are voted.

The Constitution specifies the following items as charged on the Consolidated Fund:

1. Emoluments and allowances of the President, along with other expenditures relating to the President's office.
2. Salaries and allowances of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
3. Salaries, allowances, and pensions of Supreme Court judges.
4. Pensions of High Court judges.
5. Salary, allowances, and pension of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
6. Salaries, allowances, and pensions of the Chairman and members of the Union Public Service Commission.
7. Administrative expenses of the Supreme Court, the Comptroller and Auditor General's office, and the Union Public Service Commission—including salaries, allowances, and pensions of persons serving in these offices.
8. Debt charges for which the Government of India is liable, such as interest, sinking fund charges, redemption charges, and other expenditures related to raising loans, servicing debt, and its redemption.
9. Any sums required to satisfy judgments, decrees, or awards from courts or arbitral tribunals.
10. Any other expenditure that Parliament declares by law to be charged on the Consolidated Fund.

This framework, enshrined in Articles 112 and 113 of the Constitution, underscores the priority given to institutional independence and fiscal commitments, safeguarding democracy's core pillars even amid budgetary debates.

Stages in the Enactment of the Union Budget

The Union Budget, once prepared by the government, undergoes a meticulous six-stage process in Parliament to ensure thorough scrutiny, debate, and approval. This structured journey transforms financial proposals into enforceable law, reflecting the principles of legislative oversight in India's parliamentary democracy.

The process begins with the presentation of the Budget, typically delivered by the Finance Minister in the Lok Sabha on the first day of the Budget session—usually 1 February. This ceremonial yet pivotal moment unveils the government's fiscal blueprint, including revenue estimates, expenditure plans, and policy announcements, setting the tone for ensuing deliberations.

Following presentation comes the general discussion, where members of Parliament engage in a broad debate over the Budget as a whole. Spread over several days, this stage allows MPs to critique the government's economic policies, priorities, and assumptions without delving into specific demands for grants. It fosters a holistic exchange of views, highlighting national concerns.

Next, the Budget faces detailed scrutiny by departmental standing committees (also known as subject-specific committees). Referred to these panels shortly after the general discussion, the demands for grants are examined in depth. Committee members summon officials, review data, and submit reports with recommendations, injecting expert analysis and accountability into the process.

The fourth stage involves voting on demands for grants, the core of parliamentary control over expenditure. The Lok Sabha votes on each ministry's demands individually, with the Rajya Sabha offering recommendations (non-binding on the Lower House). No amendments to the amounts are permitted; MPs can only approve, reduce, or reject them outright—a powerful check on executive spending.

With demands approved, Parliament proceeds to the passing of the Appropriation Bill. This bill authorizes the withdrawal of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India to meet the voted grants and charged expenditures (like salaries of the President or judges). Introduced immediately after voting, it follows a streamlined discussion and receives the President's assent, legally enabling government disbursements.

Finally, the Finance Bill—embodying tax proposals and amendments—is taken up. Discussed alongside the Appropriation Bill but voted on separately, it completes the cycle once passed by both Houses and assented to by the President. With this, the Budget evolves from proposal to law, ready for implementation from 1 April.

This sequential framework underscores Parliament's role as the ultimate guardian of public finances, balancing expedition with deliberation.

Presentation of the Budget

The Union Budget is traditionally presented to the Lok Sabha by the Finance Minister on the last working day of February. However, since 2017, this has been advanced to the 1st of February, allowing Parliament and stakeholders more time to deliberate on its provisions before the fiscal year begins on April 1.

Flexibility is built into the process: the Budget may be presented in two or more parts, with each part treated separately as if it were the full Budget. Importantly, no discussion occurs on the day of presentation itself, ensuring members first receive and review the documents.

The Finance Minister introduces the Budget through a detailed Budget Speech in the Lok Sabha. Once concluded there, the Budget is laid on the table of the Rajya Sabha, which can debate it but lacks the authority to vote on the demands for grants—a power reserved exclusively for the lower House.

Accompanying the speech is a comprehensive array of Budget documents laid before Parliament. These include the Budget Speech itself; the Annual Financial Statement (the core document outlining estimated receipts and expenditures); Demands for Grants (detailing ministry-wise spending proposals); the Appropriation Bill (to authorize withdrawals from the Consolidated Fund); and the Finance Bill (embodying tax proposals). Mandated under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003, are three key statements: the Macro-Economic Framework Statement, Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement, and Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Statement. Rounding out the package are the Expenditure Budget, Receipts Budget, Expenditure Profile, Memorandum Explaining the Provisions in the Finance Bill, Budget at a Glance, and Outcome Budget (which links expenditures to measurable outcomes).

Notably, the Economic Survey—a vital report prepared by the Finance Ministry assessing the state of the national economy—is no longer tabled alongside the Budget. Instead, it is presented a day or a few days earlier, providing essential context for parliamentary discussions.

General Discussion

A few days after the presentation of the Union Budget, Parliament embarks on the general discussion stage. This phase occurs simultaneously in both Houses—the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha—and typically unfolds over three to four days, allowing members to engage with the budget's broad contours.

In the Lok Sabha, the focus remains on the budget as a whole or on key principles underlying it. Members cannot introduce cut motions, nor does the House vote on the budget at this juncture. To cap the proceedings, the Finance Minister enjoys the right to deliver a comprehensive reply.

Scrutiny by Departmental Committees

Once the general discussion on the Union Budget concludes in Parliament, both Houses adjourn for a period of three to four weeks. This interlude allows the 24 departmental standing committees—one for each major ministry—to conduct a thorough examination of the respective ministers' demands for grants. These committees delve into the details, scrutinizing proposed expenditures and preparing comprehensive reports that are then submitted to both Houses for their consideration.

Instituted in 1993 and significantly expanded in 2004, this standing committee system has transformed parliamentary oversight of government finances. It enables a far more meticulous, hands-on, and exhaustive scrutiny of ministerial spending, strengthening legislative control in ways that were previously unattainable.

Voting on Demands for Grants

Once the departmental standing committees have submitted their reports, the Lok Sabha proceeds to vote on the Demands for Grants. These demands are presented ministry by ministry, and each one transforms into an official grant only after it receives parliamentary approval through voting.

Two fundamental aspects merit attention here. First, this voting power rests exclusively with the Lok Sabha; the Rajya Sabha holds no authority to vote on these demands. Second, the process applies solely to the votable portion of the budget. Expenditures charged on the Consolidated Fund of India—such as those for the President, judiciary, or debt servicing—cannot be subjected to a vote and can only be discussed.

The Lok Sabha votes on each demand individually, providing members of Parliament (MPs) an opportunity to scrutinize the budget's finer details. During these debates, MPs may introduce cut motions to reduce a specific demand, signaling discontent and prompting focused deliberation. There are three distinct types of cut motions.

A Policy Cut Motion signals outright disapproval of the policy behind the demand, proposing that the amount be slashed to a nominal Re 1. It allows MPs to propose alternative policies as well. An Economy Cut Motion, by contrast, targets potential savings in expenditure, calling for a reduction by a specified sum—whether a lump-sum cut or the elimination or trimming of particular items. Finally, a Token Cut Motion draws attention to a precise grievance within the Union government's purview, advocating a symbolic reduction of ₹100.

For a cut motion to be admissible, it must adhere to strict criteria set by parliamentary procedure. It should pertain to only one demand; be phrased clearly without arguments or defamatory content; focus on a single specific issue; avoid proposing amendments or repeals to existing laws; concern matters primarily under Union government responsibility; exclude charged expenditures on the Consolidated Fund; steer clear of issues under court adjudication; refrain from raising privilege questions; and not revisit decisions from the same session. Additionally, it must not address trivial matters, impugn the character or conduct of individuals (unless via a substantive motion), anticipate discussions already scheduled for the session, or probe matters pending before statutory tribunals, authorities with judicial or quasi-judicial roles, commissions, or courts of inquiry.

Cut motions serve a vital purpose: they enable targeted discussions on individual demands and reinforce the principle of responsible government by holding the executive accountable. In practice, however, their impact remains limited. Governments, backed by majority support, rarely allow them to pass. Should a cut motion succeed, it signals a loss of parliamentary confidence, potentially forcing the government's resignation.

To conclude the process efficiently, on the final day allotted for demands, the Speaker applies the guillotine. This procedure bundles all remaining undiscussed demands into a single vote, ensuring the budget advances without further delay.

Appropriation Bill and Vote on Account

The Constitution of India strictly mandates that no funds may be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India—the primary reservoir of government revenues—except through appropriation authorized by law. To give effect to this principle, the government introduces the Appropriation Bill in Parliament. This bill serves a precise purpose: it sanctions the withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund of all moneys needed to cover (a) the grants approved by the Lok Sabha during the budget process, and (b) expenditures that are charged directly on the Fund, such as salaries of key constitutional officeholders or debt repayments.

Parliamentary rules impose firm restrictions on this bill to safeguard fiscal discipline. No amendments are permitted in either House that would alter the amount of any voted grant, redirect its purpose, or vary the sum of any charged expenditure. Once Parliament passes the bill and the President grants assent, it transforms into the Appropriation Act, legally authorizing payments from the Consolidated Fund. Until this enactment, the government is constitutionally barred from accessing these funds—a process that often extends into late April due to legislative deliberations.

This timing creates a practical challenge: the financial year ends on 31 March, yet the government must continue essential operations without interruption. The Constitution addresses this through a provisional mechanism called the vote on account. After the initial general discussion on the Budget, the Lok Sabha may approve an advance grant to cover estimated expenditures for a portion of the upcoming financial year. Typically limited to two months and equivalent to one-sixth of the total budgeted amount, this interim measure bridges the gap until the full demands for grants are voted and the Appropriation Bill becomes law.

6. Passing of the Finance Bill

The Finance Bill serves as the key legislative vehicle to implement the Government of India's financial proposals for the upcoming year. Introduced in the Lok Sabha, it adheres to all the procedural rigors applicable to a Money Bill, ensuring swift passage without the Rajya Sabha's veto power. A notable distinction from the Appropriation Bill lies in the flexibility it offers: members may propose amendments to reject or reduce proposed taxes, fostering debate on revenue measures while still prioritizing expedition.

Under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, the bill must be fully enacted—passed by Parliament and receiving presidential assent—within 75 days of its introduction. This timeline prevents prolonged uncertainty in tax collections, which often begin provisionally to keep government finances flowing.

Once enacted, the Finance Bill transforms into the Finance Act, which validates the budget's income provisions and brings the entire budgetary process to completion. Together with the Appropriation Act, it solidifies the fiscal blueprint for the year ahead.

Other Grants

Beyond the annual Budget, which lays out the government's routine estimates of income and expenditure for a single financial year, Parliament authorizes a range of additional grants to address extraordinary or special circumstances. These provisions ensure flexibility in public finance, allowing the government to respond swiftly to unforeseen needs without disrupting the standard budgetary cycle.

Supplementary Grant

Parliament authorizes a supplementary grant when the funds initially approved through the Appropriation Act for a specific service during the current financial year prove insufficient to meet actual requirements. This mechanism ensures that essential expenditures can continue without disruption, allowing the government to adapt to unforeseen needs while maintaining fiscal accountability.

Additional Grant for New Services

In the intricate machinery of India's public finance, an Additional Grant serves a precise purpose. It is extended by Parliament when an unforeseen need emerges during the ongoing financial year for fresh expenditure on a new service—one that was entirely absent from the original budget estimates. This mechanism ensures fiscal flexibility, allowing the government to address emergent priorities without disrupting the approved financial framework.

Excess Grant

An excess grant becomes necessary when the government overspends on a particular service during a financial year, exceeding the amount originally sanctioned in that year's budget. This overrun reflects actual expenditure that outpaces parliamentary approval, prompting the need for retrospective authorization. Once the financial year concludes, the Lok Sabha votes on these excess demands to regularize the spending. Crucially, before these demands reach the Lok Sabha for approval, they undergo scrutiny and endorsement by Parliament's Public Accounts Committee, ensuring accountability and fiscal discipline in public expenditure.

Vote of Credit in India

Vote of Credit

In Indian parliamentary practice, the Vote of Credit serves as a vital mechanism to tackle unforeseen demands on the nation's resources. Parliament grants it when the sheer magnitude of the expenditure or its inherently indefinite nature makes it impossible to specify details in the usual budget estimates. Effectively, this provision hands the Executive a blank cheque, endorsed by the Lok Sabha, empowering flexible spending in exceptional circumstances.

Exceptional Grants in Indian Parliament

An Exceptional Grant represents a distinctive tool in India's parliamentary financial framework, reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Unlike standard budgetary provisions, it is approved for a specific, one-off purpose and stands apart from the "current service"—the routine, ongoing expenditures—of any financial year. This ensures flexibility for unforeseen needs without disrupting the regular fiscal cycle.

Token Grant and Reappropriation Procedure

Token Grant

A token grant comes into play when funding for a new service can be sourced through reappropriation—the transfer of funds from one budget head to another, without incurring any additional overall expenditure. In this process, the government presents a demand for a nominal token sum of Re 1 to the Lok Sabha for its vote. Upon approval, the reappropriated funds become available for the intended purpose.

Notably, supplementary, additional, excess, and exceptional grants, along with votes on credit, adhere to the same procedural rules as those governing the regular budget.

Constitutional Funds of India

The Constitution of India establishes three principal funds to manage the Central government's finances with precision and accountability. These include the Consolidated Fund of India (Article 266), which serves as the primary repository for all revenues, loans, and other receipts; the Public Account of India (also under Article 266), which holds transactions like provident funds and deposits that do not form part of government revenue; and the Contingency Fund of India (Article 267), designed as an emergency reserve to meet unforeseen expenditures until Parliament authorizes them. Together, these funds form the bedrock of India's public financial architecture.

Consolidated Fund of India

The Consolidated Fund of India stands as the cornerstone of the central government's financial operations, functioning as the single account where all public receipts are credited and all authorized payments are debited. This fund encompasses three key inflows: first, all revenues generated by the Government of India, such as taxes and duties; second, proceeds from loans raised through mechanisms like treasury bills, long-term borrowings, or short-term ways and means advances; and third, repayments received on earlier loans extended by the government. On the expenditure side, every legally sanctioned payment—whether for salaries, development projects, or debt servicing—must draw exclusively from this fund. To safeguard public money, no appropriation or withdrawal is permissible without the explicit sanction of Parliament through duly enacted legislation, ensuring rigorous legislative oversight over government spending.

Public Account of India

In India's financial framework, the Public Account of India serves as the repository for all public moneys received by or on behalf of the Government of India, excluding those credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. This encompasses a wide array of deposits, such as provident funds, judicial deposits, savings bank accounts, departmental collections, remittances, and similar funds held in a custodial capacity. Unlike the Consolidated Fund, which requires parliamentary approval for withdrawals, the Public Account operates through executive action alone—meaning payments can be made without prior legislative appropriation. These transactions are essentially banking-like in nature, reflecting the government's role as a trustee rather than a spender of its own revenues.

Contingency Fund of India

The Indian Constitution empowers Parliament to create the Contingency Fund of India by appropriating specific sums through legislation. In line with this provision, Parliament promptly passed the Contingency Fund of India Act, 1950, establishing the fund as a dedicated reserve for emergencies.

This fund remains at the President's disposal, allowing advances to cover unforeseen expenditures until Parliament formally authorizes them through appropriation. The Finance Secretary holds and manages the fund on behalf of the President, operating it via executive orders—much like the Public Account of India, without requiring prior parliamentary approval for routine transactions. This mechanism ensures swift governmental response to urgent needs while upholding legislative oversight in the long term.

Powers and Functions of Parliament

In the Indian politico-administrative system, Parliament holds a pivotal central position, wielding extensive powers to fulfill its multifaceted constitutional mandate. Far from being a mere legislative body, it serves as the nation's primary forum for debate, oversight, and decision-making, ensuring democratic accountability and governance. These powers and functions fall into several key categories: legislative, which encompass law-making; executive, involving control over the government; financial, relating to budgeting and taxation; constituent, for amending the Constitution; judicial, such as impeachment proceedings; electoral, like choosing key officeholders; and a range of other miscellaneous roles that underscore its dynamic influence.

1. Legislative Powers and Functions

At its core, the Indian Parliament serves as the nation's primary law-making body, crafting legislation to govern the country. It holds exclusive legislative authority over subjects listed in the Union List—currently comprising 98 items, up from the original 97—and extends this power to residuary matters, those not mentioned in any of the three constitutional lists. On the Concurrent List, which now includes 52 subjects (originally 47), Parliament enjoys overriding authority: in any clash between a central law and a state law, the former takes precedence.

The Constitution further grants Parliament the flexibility to legislate on State List subjects—presently 59 in number, reduced from an initial 66—under five exceptional conditions. These include a special resolution passed by the Rajya Sabha; during a National Emergency; upon a joint request from two or more states; to implement international agreements, treaties, or conventions; and while President's Rule is in force in a state. This mechanism ensures national unity and responsiveness in extraordinary situations.

Parliament also plays a vital role in validating presidential ordinances, which the President can promulgate during parliamentary recesses to address urgent needs. These ordinances must secure Parliament's approval within six weeks of its reassembly; failure to do so renders them inoperative.

In practice, Parliament often enacts laws in a skeletal or outline form, delegating the executive branch to flesh out detailed rules and regulations within the parent act's framework. Known as delegated legislation, executive legislation, or subordinate legislation, these subordinate measures are then laid before Parliament for scrutiny, upholding legislative oversight while enabling efficient governance.

2. Executive Powers and Functions

India's Constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government, where the executive branch remains accountable to Parliament for its policies and actions. This accountability ensures that Parliament maintains vigilant oversight through a range of procedural tools, including the Question Hour, Zero Hour, half-an-hour discussions, short-duration discussions, calling attention motions, adjournment motions, no-confidence motions, censure motions, and general debates. Complementing these, parliamentary committees—such as the Committee on Government Assurances, Committee on Subordinate Legislation, and Committee on Petitions—provide detailed scrutiny of executive activities, fostering transparency and efficiency.

At the heart of this system lies the principle of ministerial responsibility. Ministers bear collective responsibility to Parliament as a whole, and particularly to the Lok Sabha, meaning the Council of Ministers must resign if it loses the Lok Sabha's confidence. This collective duty encompasses individual responsibility as well, with each minister personally accountable for the effective administration of their ministry. Consequently, the Council of Ministers holds office only as long as it commands majority support in the Lok Sabha. The lower house can signal or enforce a lack of confidence through several decisive mechanisms: by rejecting the motion of thanks on the President’s Address; defeating a Money Bill; passing a censure or adjournment motion; rejecting the government on a critical policy issue; or approving a cut motion in financial legislation.

In essence, Parliament's primary role is to identify and empower a group to form the government, sustain it in power while it retains public confidence, and remove it when that confidence wanes—ultimately leaving the electorate to render judgment at the next general election.

3. Financial Powers and Functions

In India's parliamentary democracy, the executive cannot levy taxes, collect revenue, or incur expenditure without the explicit authority and approval of Parliament. This fundamental principle ensures democratic oversight of public finances. To operationalize it, the government presents its annual budget to Parliament, which scrutinizes and enacts it into law. This process legitimizes all government receipts and expenditures for the upcoming financial year.

Beyond approval, Parliament maintains rigorous control through its specialized financial committees: the Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings. These bodies meticulously review government spending and financial performance, uncovering instances of illegal, irregular, unauthorized, improper, wasteful, or extravagant use of public funds. Their reports hold the executive accountable, fostering transparency and efficiency.

Parliamentary oversight thus unfolds in two distinct phases. The first is budgetary control, exercised before funds are appropriated, as Parliament debates and approves the budget. The second is post-budgetary control, conducted afterward by the three financial committees, which audit actual spending against approved grants.

A key feature of this system is the annuity principle, under which Parliament authorizes funds strictly for one financial year. Any unspent balance lapses at year-end and reverts to the Consolidated Fund of India—a practice known as the rule of lapse. This prevents the executive from creating unauthorized reserves, reinforcing Parliament's grip on finances. However, it also triggers a frenzied "March Rush," where officials hurry to exhaust allocations before the deadline, often leading to inefficient spending.

4. Constituent Powers and Functions

Parliament holds the exclusive authority to amend India's Constitution through addition, variation, or repeal of any provision. This constituent power operates in three distinct ways, each tailored to the nature of the changes involved. Most provisions require a special majority—a majority of the total membership of each House of Parliament, plus at least two-thirds of the members present and voting in each House. Certain others, typically procedural or less fundamental, can be amended by a simple majority, meaning just a majority of members present and voting. A select few provisions demand even stricter consensus: a special majority in Parliament plus ratification by at least half of all state legislatures, each acting by simple majority.

Crucially, the power to initiate any amendment rests solely with Parliament; state legislatures play no direct role in proposing changes. There is one narrow exception: a state legislature may pass a resolution urging Parliament to create or abolish a Legislative Council within that state. Parliament can then enact a constitutional amendment to give effect to this request.

Yet, Parliament's amending power is not absolute. It remains bound by the basic structure doctrine, a judicial safeguard ensuring that core features of the Constitution—such as democracy, federalism, secularism, and judicial review—cannot be altered or destroyed. The Supreme Court first articulated this principle in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case (1973), holding that while Parliament could amend any provision, it could not touch the Constitution's essential framework. This ruling was reaffirmed and strengthened in the Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India case (1980), cementing the judiciary's role as the ultimate guardian of constitutional identity.

5. Judicial Powers and Functions

Beyond its primary legislative role, Parliament wields significant judicial powers, enabling it to safeguard constitutional integrity and maintain institutional discipline. One of its most critical functions is the impeachment of the President for proven violations of the Constitution. This process requires a special majority in both Houses, underscoring Parliament's role as the ultimate guardian against executive overreach.

Parliament also holds the authority to remove the Vice-President from office through a resolution passed by an effective majority of the Rajya Sabha, followed by an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha. This mechanism ensures accountability at the highest levels of leadership.

Furthermore, Parliament can recommend the removal of key constitutional functionaries to the President, including judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts (along with the Chief Justice of India), the Chief Election Commissioner, and the Comptroller and Auditor-General. These recommendations, once initiated through parliamentary motion, trigger formal inquiries and presidential action, reinforcing judicial and electoral independence.

Finally, Parliament possesses the power to punish its members or even outsiders for breaching its privileges or committing contempt. This inherent judicial authority allows it to protect the sanctity of its proceedings, much like a court's contempt powers, ensuring orderly deliberation in the nation's legislative heart.

6. Electoral Powers and Functions

Parliament wields significant influence in India's electoral landscape, directly participating in the selection of top constitutional officeholders. It collaborates with state legislative assemblies to elect the President, while holding the exclusive responsibility for choosing the Vice-President. Internally, the Lok Sabha elects its Speaker and Deputy Speaker, and the Rajya Sabha appoints its Deputy Chairman, ensuring smooth leadership within each House.

Parliament's authority extends further to crafting laws that regulate these critical elections—including those for the President and Vice-President, both Houses of Parliament, and state legislatures. In exercise of this power, it has enacted key statutes such as the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which form the bedrock of India's electoral framework.

7. Other Powers and Functions

Beyond its core legislative role, Parliament wields a diverse array of powers that reinforce its position as the cornerstone of India's democratic framework. Serving as the country's highest deliberative body, it offers a crucial platform for in-depth discussions on matters of national and international significance, enabling lawmakers to shape public policy through rigorous debate.

Parliament plays a pivotal oversight function by approving all three types of emergencies proclaimed by the President—national, state, and financial—thus providing legislative checks during times of crisis. It also holds authority over state legislatures, with the power to create or abolish legislative councils upon the recommendation of the concerned state assembly.

In matters of federal restructuring, Parliament can reshape the Indian Union by increasing or decreasing a state's area, altering its boundaries, or changing its name, ensuring adaptability to evolving administrative needs. Extending to the judiciary, it regulates the organization and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and high courts, and may even establish a common high court to serve two or more states. These functions highlight Parliament's expansive influence across governance domains.

Ineffectiveness of Parliamentary Control in India

In theory, India's Parliament wields significant authority over the executive and administration, serving as the ultimate check on governmental power. Yet, in practice, this control proves far less robust than envisioned in the Constitution. A confluence of structural, procedural, and political factors undermines its efficacy, rendering parliamentary oversight more symbolic than substantive.

One primary challenge stems from Parliament's sheer scale and the administration's escalating complexity. With over 700 members in the Lok Sabha alone, the House often struggles to function cohesively, diluting focused scrutiny. Moreover, the explosive growth in governmental activities—spanning diverse sectors from defense to welfare—leaves little time for in-depth review. Parliamentarians, lacking specialized expertise, find it daunting to dissect the intricate workings of a vast bureaucracy.

Financial oversight, a cornerstone of parliamentary control, fares no better. Demands for grants are mired in technical jargon that lay members of Parliament cannot readily comprehend, curtailing meaningful debate. Even specialized bodies like the Public Accounts Committee conduct only postmortem examinations of expenditures long after they occur, offering hindsight rather than real-time restraint. The frequent use of the 'guillotine'—chopping off debates to expedite voting—further erodes this domain, as bills pass with scant deliberation.

The executive's dominance exacerbates these issues. As the source of legislative leadership, it shapes policies from inception, often presenting Parliament with ready-made agendas. Bolstered by a reliable majority, the government neutralizes opposition criticism, transforming sessions into procedural formalities. This imbalance is compounded by the rise of delegated legislation, where Parliament enacts broad frameworks and cedes rule-making to bureaucrats, thereby amplifying administrative autonomy at the legislature's expense. Similarly, the President's frequent ordinance-making bypasses parliamentary deliberation altogether, issuing laws by executive fiat.

At its core, parliamentary control remains sporadic, broad-brush, and predominantly political, lacking the continuity needed for systemic accountability. The absence of a strong, consistent opposition—coupled with declining standards in parliamentary conduct and ethics—has only deepened this malaise, leaving the administration largely unchecked in India's democratic framework.

Position of the Rajya Sabha

The constitutional standing of the Rajya Sabha—India's Upper House of Parliament—vis-à-vis the Lok Sabha, its Lower House counterpart, reflects a deliberate federal design that balances representation and stability. This position can be insightfully examined from three key angles: first, domains where the two Houses wield equal powers; second, areas where the Rajya Sabha holds an inferior or unequal status; and third, exclusive prerogatives granted solely to the Rajya Sabha, unmatched by the Lok Sabha.

Equal Powers: Rajya Sabha on Par with Lok Sabha

While the Lok Sabha holds primacy in certain domains, the Rajya Sabha stands on equal footing with it in a range of critical functions, ensuring a balanced bicameral legislature. This parity underscores the Upper House's vital role in India's parliamentary democracy.

In legislative matters, both Houses wield identical authority. They share equal powers in introducing and passing ordinary bills, Constitutional amendment bills, and financial bills that authorize expenditures from the Consolidated Fund of India. This equivalence extends to executive processes, including the election and impeachment of the President, as well as the election and removal of the Vice-President. A notable distinction arises in the Vice-President's removal: the Rajya Sabha alone initiates the process through a resolution passed by an effective majority—a form of special majority—which the Lok Sabha must then approve by a simple majority.

The Rajya Sabha's co-equal status further shines in oversight roles. Both Houses jointly recommend to the President the removal of key officials, such as the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, the Chief Election Commissioner, and the Comptroller and Auditor General. They also collaborate in approving presidential ordinances and proclamations of all three types of emergencies—national, state, and financial—providing a crucial check on executive actions.

Additionally, both chambers participate equally in appointing ministers, including the Prime Minister, who may hail from either House under the Constitution. However, regardless of their House affiliation, ministers remain accountable solely to the Lok Sabha. The Houses also jointly consider reports from constitutional bodies like the Finance Commission, Union Public Service Commission, and Comptroller and Auditor General, fostering informed deliberation.

Finally, decisions to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Union Public Service Commission require the consent of both Houses, reinforcing their shared influence over institutional expansions. Through these mechanisms, the Rajya Sabha complements the Lok Sabha, safeguarding federalism and deliberation in governance.

Unequal Status of the Rajya Sabha vis-à-vis the Lok Sabha

While the Indian Parliament's two Houses—the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha—generally enjoy co-equal powers, the Rajya Sabha occupies a subordinate position in several critical areas. This deliberate design, rooted in the Constitution, underscores the Lok Sabha's primacy as the directly elected House representing the people's will.

The most striking asymmetry arises with Money Bills, which can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha lacks the authority to amend or reject such bills; it must return them within 14 days, either with recommendations or without. The Lok Sabha can then accept or reject any or all of these recommendations, and in either case, the bill is deemed passed by both Houses. Ultimately, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha holds the final say on whether a bill qualifies as a Money Bill.

A similar but less rigid imbalance applies to other financial bills—those not exclusively covering matters under Article 110. Like Money Bills, these can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha, but both Houses wield equal powers in their passage.

In joint sittings convened to resolve deadlocks on ordinary bills, the Lok Sabha's numerical superiority typically prevails, as it has more members. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha presides over these sessions, further tilting the balance—unless the ruling coalition commands a majority across both Houses combined.

The Rajya Sabha's limitations extend to budgetary matters: it can deliberate on the Union Budget but cannot vote on demands for grants, a privilege reserved solely for the Lok Sabha.

Beyond finances, the Rajya Sabha cannot initiate a resolution to discontinue a national emergency; that power rests exclusively with the Lok Sabha. Likewise, it cannot pass a no-confidence motion to remove the Council of Ministers, which remains collectively responsible only to the Lok Sabha. However, the Rajya Sabha retains the right to discuss and critique government policies and actions, ensuring robust oversight without veto power.

Special Powers of the Rajya Sabha

In India's parliamentary framework, the Rajya Sabha, or Council of States, enjoys four exclusive powers that set it apart from the Lok Sabha, the directly elected House of the People. These privileges underscore its role as a stabilizing federal chamber.

First, under Article 249, the Rajya Sabha can authorize Parliament to legislate on subjects in the State List, typically reserved for state governments, but only if it passes a resolution by a two-thirds majority deeming it necessary in the national interest. Second, through Article 312, it holds the sole authority to initiate the creation of new All-India Services—such as the Indian Administrative Service—that serve both the Centre and states, again requiring a special majority resolution. Third, the process for removing the Vice-President begins exclusively in the Rajya Sabha, as per Article 67; a resolution there, supported by a majority of its total membership and two-thirds of those present and voting, triggers the full impeachment procedure. Finally, in times of crisis, proclamations issued by the President for a national emergency (Article 352), President's Rule in a state (Article 356), or a financial emergency (Article 360) can gain approval from the Rajya Sabha alone if the Lok Sabha stands dissolved or dissolves before the required timeframe expires. This ensures continuity of essential governance even amid electoral disruptions.

These powers position the Rajya Sabha as neither as subordinate as Britain's House of Lords—prone to override by the Commons—nor as dominant as the American Senate, with its expansive treaty and appointment roles. Instead, it stands broadly equal and coordinate with the Lok Sabha in most domains, except for money bills and collective ministerial accountability, where the lower house prevails.

Despite wielding fewer powers overall, the Rajya Sabha's value endures for compelling reasons. It acts as a vital check against hasty, flawed, or poorly drafted legislation from the Lok Sabha, offering a forum for thorough revision and deliberation. It also ensures representation for distinguished experts, professionals, and luminaries—like scientists, artists, and social thinkers—who may not contest direct elections; the President nominates 12 such members to enrich its expertise. Above all, as a body elected by state legislatures, it safeguards federal balance by shielding state interests from excessive central overreach, fostering collaborative governance in India's diverse union.

Scope of Parliamentary Privileges

Parliamentary privileges represent the special rights, immunities, and exemptions granted to the two Houses of Parliament, their committees, and individual members. These protections are essential to safeguard the independence and effectiveness of parliamentary functions. Without them, the Houses would struggle to uphold their authority, dignity, and honour, or to shield members from any undue interference while fulfilling their legislative duties.

The Constitution extends these privileges beyond elected members to others who participate in parliamentary proceedings, such as the Attorney General of India and Union ministers, ensuring smooth deliberation in the Houses or their committees.

Importantly, these privileges do not apply to the President, even though the President forms an integral part of Parliament under the constitutional framework.

Classification of Parliamentary Privileges

Parliamentary privileges are broadly classified into two categories: those exercised by each House of Parliament collectively and those enjoyed by individual members.

The collective privileges empower the House—whether the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha—to maintain its authority, regulate proceedings, and protect its dignity as an institution. In contrast, individual privileges safeguard the personal rights of members, ensuring they can perform their legislative duties without undue interference or fear of external repercussions. This distinction underscores the dual nature of parliamentary immunities in upholding both institutional autonomy and personal freedoms.

Collective Privileges of Parliament

Each House of Parliament possesses a set of collective privileges that collectively safeguard its autonomy, dignity, and effective functioning. These powers enable the Houses to operate independently while maintaining order and confidentiality when needed. For instance, a House has the authority to publish its own reports, debates, and proceedings, and it can prohibit others from doing so. The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 restored press freedom to report parliamentary proceedings accurately without prior permission, though this does not extend to secret sittings. Complementing this, a House may exclude strangers from its proceedings and convene closed sessions to deliberate on sensitive matters, ensuring focused discussions free from external interference.

Beyond these procedural safeguards, Parliament asserts strong oversight and self-regulatory powers. It can frame its own rules to govern procedures, conduct business, and resolve internal disputes. To enforce discipline, a House may punish members or outsiders for breaching privileges or committing contempt—through reprimands, admonitions, imprisonment, or, in the case of members, suspension or expulsion. Additionally, it holds the right to receive immediate notification of any member's arrest, detention, conviction, imprisonment, or release. Houses can also launch inquiries, summon witnesses, and demand relevant papers or records, bolstering their investigative reach.

Finally, these privileges shield parliamentary proceedings from external scrutiny and disruption. Courts are barred from inquiring into the deliberations of a House or its committees, preserving legislative independence. Within the precincts of the House, no arrests—whether of members or outsiders—nor any civil or criminal legal processes can occur without the presiding officer's explicit permission, creating a protected sanctuary for parliamentary work.

Individual Privileges of Members

Members of Parliament enjoy a set of personal privileges that shield them from undue external pressures, ensuring they can perform their legislative duties without fear. These privileges, rooted in parliamentary tradition and constitutional safeguards, apply to individual members rather than the House as a whole.

A cornerstone of these is freedom from arrest during active sessions of Parliament, extending 40 days before the session begins and 40 days after it ends. This protection operates strictly in civil cases, offering no immunity in criminal proceedings or under preventive detention laws—a deliberate balance to prevent abuse while upholding the rule of law.

Equally essential is the freedom of speech in Parliament. No member can be hauled into any court for anything said or any vote cast during proceedings in the House or its committees. This robust shield, enshrined in the Constitution, remains bounded by its own provisions and the procedural rules and standing orders of Parliament.

Members also receive practical exemptions to avoid distractions from core responsibilities. They are absolved from jury service and can refuse to give evidence or appear as witnesses in ongoing court cases while Parliament is in session, allowing undivided focus on national affairs.

Breach of Privilege and Contempt of the House

In parliamentary practice, a breach of privilege occurs when any individual or authority disregards or attacks the privileges, rights, or immunities of a member of the House—or of the House itself in its collective capacity. Such an offense is punishable directly by the House, underscoring its authority to safeguard its own integrity.

Closely related is contempt of the House, which encompasses any act or omission that obstructs the House, its members, or its officers in performing their duties. It also includes conduct that, directly or indirectly, undermines the dignity, authority, or honor of the House. While the terms "breach of privilege" and "contempt of the House" are often used interchangeably, they carry distinct implications.

A breach of privilege typically amounts to a contempt of the House, and contempt may sometimes involve a breach. However, contempt has broader scope: it can arise without violating any specific privilege. For instance, actions that offend the House's dignity and authority—yet do not infringe on a defined privilege—still qualify as contempt. A classic example is disobedience to a legitimate order of the House, which is not a breach of privilege but can be punished as contempt. This distinction ensures the House can address a wide array of threats to its functioning and prestige.

Sources of Parliamentary Privileges

Article 105 of the Indian Constitution originally specified two explicit privileges for members of Parliament: freedom of speech within the House and the right to publish its proceedings. For all other privileges—enjoyed by each House, its committees, and members—the provision mirrored those of the British House of Commons as they stood on January 26, 1950, the date of the Constitution's commencement. Parliament was empowered to define these privileges through legislation at any time.

The 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978 refined this framework without altering its essence. It shifted the reference point to the privileges prevailing on June 20, 1979—the date the amendment took effect—while omitting the direct mention of the British House of Commons. In practice, this was merely a verbal adjustment; the underlying privileges remained unchanged, pending any future codification by Parliament.

To date, Parliament has not enacted a comprehensive law to fully enumerate these privileges. Instead, they draw from five key sources: constitutional provisions, laws passed by Parliament itself, the rules of procedure governing both Houses, established parliamentary conventions, and judicial interpretations by the courts. This blend ensures flexibility while anchoring privileges in a rich, evolving tradition.

Sovereignty of Parliament

The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, often called the supremacy of Parliament, lies at the heart of the British constitutional system. In essence, sovereignty refers to the supreme authority within a state, and in Great Britain, this power resides unequivocally with Parliament. Unlike many other systems, it faces no legal limits on its authority or jurisdiction, allowing it to legislate without restraint.

This principle, famously articulated by the British jurist A.V. Dicey, carries three key implications. First, Parliament holds unlimited legislative power: it can enact, amend, replace, or repeal any law whatsoever. As the political analyst De Lolme vividly put it, Parliament can do "everything except make a woman a man, and a man a woman." Second, constitutional laws receive no special treatment; Parliament follows the same simple procedure for them as for ordinary statutes, blurring any distinction between its roles as a constituent and legislative body. Third, courts lack the power to strike down parliamentary enactments as unconstitutional—judicial review, a cornerstone of many modern democracies, simply does not exist in Britain.

In stark contrast, the Indian Parliament does not enjoy such absolute sovereignty. While it wields immense legislative authority, clear legal restrictions circumscribe its power and jurisdiction, setting it apart from its British counterpart.

1. Written Nature of the Constitution

India's Constitution stands as the supreme law of the land, meticulously outlining the powers, jurisdictions, and interrelationships among the three pillars of the Union government: the legislature, executive, and judiciary. This written framework ensures that Parliament, as the legislative organ, functions strictly within prescribed boundaries, preventing any overreach. A key feature is the clear legal distinction between Parliament's ordinary legislative authority—to enact everyday laws—and its constituent authority, which is limited to amending the Constitution under specific procedures. Notably, certain amendments demand ratification by at least half of the states, reinforcing federal checks and balances.

In stark contrast, Britain's constitution remains unwritten, evolving through statutes, conventions, judicial precedents, and customs, with no single document serving as a fundamental law to bind Parliament's sovereignty. This fundamental difference underscores the rigidity and supremacy embedded in India's constitutional design.

2. Federal System of Government

India embraces a federal system of government, enshrined in its Constitution through a clear division of powers between the Union (central government) and the states. This framework ensures that each tier operates strictly within its allocated sphere, preventing overlap and promoting balanced governance. Parliament's law-making powers, for instance, are limited to subjects in the Union List and Concurrent List; it cannot legislate on matters reserved for the State List, except under five exceptional circumstances—and even then, only for a limited duration.

By contrast, Britain adheres to a unitary system, where all authority resides with the central government, leaving no such constitutional carve-outs for regional bodies.

3. System of Judicial Review

India's Constitution establishes an independent judiciary armed with the power of judicial review, which meaningfully checks the supremacy of Parliament. The Supreme Court and High Courts hold the authority to strike down any parliamentary law as void and ultra vires—meaning unconstitutional—if it violates even a single provision of the Constitution. This mechanism ensures that no legislation can override the foundational principles enshrined in the supreme law of the land.

By contrast, Britain operates without judicial review, rooted in its doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. British courts must faithfully apply Acts of Parliament to individual cases, without questioning their constitutionality, legality, or reasonableness. This fundamental difference underscores how India's written Constitution elevates judicial oversight above unchecked legislative power.

4. Fundamental Rights

A cornerstone of India's constitutional framework lies in Part III, which enshrines a set of justiciable fundamental rights that explicitly curb the authority of Parliament. Under Article 13, the State is barred from enacting any law that wholly abolishes or even partially undermines these rights. As a result, any parliamentary legislation that violates fundamental rights stands void to the extent of the inconsistency. This built-in safeguard ensures that individual liberties remain paramount, overriding even the will of the legislature.

In stark contrast, Britain's unwritten constitution lacks any codified catalog of fundamental rights. Parliament there has never formalized a charter of citizen rights through statute. Yet, this absence does not leave Britons rightless. Instead, the revered principle of the Rule of Law fosters unparalleled personal liberty, safeguarding freedoms through longstanding conventions, judicial precedents, and parliamentary restraint rather than explicit guarantees.

These differences underscore a profound divergence despite superficial resemblances in structure and nomenclature between the two parliaments. The Indian Parliament, unlike its British counterpart, is not sovereign in the absolute sense. Its powers are meticulously defined, circumscribed, and subject to constitutional limits.

This feature aligns the Indian Parliament more closely with the United States Congress. In America, congressional authority faces similar legal constraints from the written Constitution, the federal structure of government, robust judicial review, and the Bill of Rights, collectively ensuring that no legislative body reigns supreme.