Parliamentary Executive: Articles 74–75

India's Constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government, closely modeled on the British Westminster pattern. In this framework, the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, serves as the real executive authority, wielding effective power within the politico-administrative structure.

While the Constitution does not elaborate on the principles of this parliamentary system in detail, it addresses them broadly through two key provisions: Article 74 and Article 75. Article 74 outlines the status and composition of the Council of Ministers, emphasizing its collective responsibility to aid and advise the President. Complementing this, Article 75 covers essential aspects of ministerial roles, including their appointment by the President, tenure (which hinges on maintaining the confidence of the Lok Sabha), collective and individual responsibility to Parliament, qualifications, oath of office, and salaries and allowances. Together, these articles provide the foundational scaffolding for the executive's operations, leaving much of the system's nuances to evolve through conventions and judicial interpretations.

Article 74: Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise the President

Article 74 establishes the foundational principle of collective responsibility in India's executive framework. It mandates a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, to aid and advise the President. In exercising his functions, the President is constitutionally bound to act in accordance with this advice, embodying the parliamentary system's core idea that real executive power resides with the elected government rather than the head of state.

However, the provision includes a nuanced safeguard: the President may require the Council to reconsider its advice. Once reconsidered and tendered anew, the President must then follow it without further deviation. This clause preserves the President's role as a deliberative authority while upholding the supremacy of ministerial counsel.

Finally, Article 74 shields the decision-making process from judicial scrutiny. No court can inquire into the advice provided by the Ministers to the President, ensuring the smooth functioning of governance free from legal interruptions. This non-justiciable aspect underscores the article's role in maintaining executive autonomy.

Article 75: Other Provisions as to Ministers

Article 75 of the Indian Constitution lays down essential rules governing the appointment, composition, and functioning of the Council of Ministers, ensuring accountability and stability at the executive's helm. The Prime Minister is appointed directly by the President, while other ministers are appointed on the Prime Minister's advice, underscoring the PM's pivotal role in forming the government. To prevent an oversized executive, the total number of ministers—including the Prime Minister—cannot exceed 15% of the Lok Sabha's total strength; this cap was introduced by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003. Additionally, the same amendment bars anyone disqualified from Parliament membership due to defection under the anti-defection law from serving as a minister, reinforcing party discipline and curbing opportunistic shifts.

Ministers hold office at the President's pleasure, a principle that in practice aligns with the government's parliamentary support, and the Council as a whole bears collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha—a cornerstone of India's parliamentary democracy that allows the lower house to enforce accountability through votes of no confidence. The President personally administers the oaths of office and secrecy to each minister, symbolizing their solemn commitment to constitutional duties.

Further safeguards include a strict limit on non-members: a minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament must secure membership within six consecutive months, or they cease to hold office. Finally, Parliament determines the salaries and allowances of ministers, maintaining legislative oversight over executive emoluments. These provisions collectively balance executive authority with democratic checks.

Conduct of Government Business

Article 77: Conduct of Business of the Government of India

At the heart of India's executive framework lies Article 77 of the Constitution, which ensures orderly and accountable governance by channeling all actions of the Union government through the President. This provision underscores the formal unity of the executive while accommodating the practical realities of ministerial administration.

The article's first clause mandates that every executive action of the Government of India must be explicitly expressed as taken in the name of the President. This requirement symbolizes the President's nominal headship of the executive, even though real authority rests with the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister.

To prevent disputes over authenticity, the second clause empowers the President to prescribe rules for authenticating orders and instruments issued in their name. Once properly authenticated, such documents gain legal validity and cannot be challenged in court merely on the grounds that the President did not personally make or execute them. This safeguard streamlines administration and protects official decisions from technical invalidation.

Finally, the third clause authorizes the President to frame rules that facilitate the efficient transaction of government business and its allocation among ministers. These rules promote clear division of responsibilities, minimize overlaps, and ensure smooth coordination within the Union executive, forming the operational backbone of India's central government.

Article 78: Duties of the Prime Minister

Article 78 of the Indian Constitution clearly delineates the Prime Minister's responsibilities toward the President, ensuring seamless coordination between the executive's collective decision-making and the head of state. At its core, the Prime Minister must promptly communicate to the President every decision taken by the Council of Ministers on matters of Union administration, as well as all proposals for legislation. This keeps the President fully informed of the government's key actions and intentions.

Beyond routine updates, the Prime Minister is duty-bound to supply any additional information the President may seek regarding Union affairs or pending legislation, fostering transparency and accountability. In a further safeguard against unilateral ministerial actions, if the President so directs, the Prime Minister must place before the full Council of Ministers for reconsideration any decision made by an individual Minister that has not yet been collectively deliberated. These provisions underscore the Prime Minister's pivotal role as the vital link between the Council and the President, upholding the constitutional framework of collective responsibility.

Rights of Ministers in Parliament

Article 88: Rights of Ministers in Respect of the Houses

Article 88 of the Indian Constitution grants every Minister a key privilege: the right to speak and fully participate in the proceedings of either House of Parliament—be it the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha—any joint sitting of the two Houses, or any parliamentary committee to which they are named as a member. This ensures Ministers can contribute their insights and represent the government's position effectively. However, this right comes with a clear limitation: Ministers are not entitled to vote in these proceedings, preserving the voting authority for elected members alone.

Nature of Advice by Ministers

Article 74 of the Indian Constitution establishes a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, to aid and advise the President in exercising all his functions. The 42nd and 44th Constitutional Amendment Acts transformed this advisory role into a binding obligation: the President is now constitutionally required to act on the Council's advice. Moreover, courts are barred from inquiring into the nature or content of this advice, underscoring the deeply confidential and trusted relationship between the President and the ministers.

This principle has been firmly reinforced by landmark Supreme Court rulings. In 1971, during the crisis following the dissolution of the Lok Sabha, the Court clarified that the Council of Ministers does not vacate office immediately. Article 74 is mandatory, meaning the President cannot wield executive power independently—it must always be on the aid and advice of the Council. Any unilateral action would violate the Constitution. Building on this, the Court ruled in 1974 that whenever the Constitution refers to the "satisfaction of the President," it is not his personal judgment but the collective satisfaction of the Council of Ministers, exercised through their aid and advice. These decisions cement the Council's pivotal role in India's parliamentary executive framework.

Appointment of Ministers

In India's parliamentary system, the President plays a pivotal role in forming the Council of Ministers, though this is guided by constitutional conventions. The Prime Minister is appointed directly by the President, typically the leader of the majority party or coalition in the Lok Sabha. All other ministers are then appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, effectively limiting the President's choice to those individuals recommended by the Prime Minister. This mechanism underscores the Prime Minister's central authority in cabinet composition.

Ministers are ordinarily drawn from the ranks of Parliament, serving in either the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. However, the Constitution allows flexibility: a person who is not a member of either House at the time of appointment can still be named a minister. Such an appointee must secure membership in one of the Houses—through election or nomination—within six months. Failure to do so results in the automatic cessation of their ministerial office, ensuring that the executive remains accountable to Parliament.

To facilitate effective governance across both Houses, a minister who belongs to one House enjoys the right to speak and participate in the proceedings of the other. Yet, voting rights are strictly confined to the House of which they are a member, preserving the bicameral balance of power.

Oaths and Salaries of Ministers

Before assuming office, every minister must take two oaths administered by the President: the oath of office and the oath of secrecy. These oaths underscore the minister's unwavering commitment to the Constitution and the nation's interests.

In the oath of office, the minister pledges to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, uphold the sovereignty and integrity of the country, faithfully discharge the duties of the office, and do right to all people according to the Constitution and laws—without fear, favor, affection, or ill will. Complementing this, the oath of secrecy binds the minister not to directly or indirectly reveal any matter that comes under their consideration or knowledge in their capacity as a Union minister, except as necessary for performing official duties. This dual commitment ensures both ethical governance and the protection of sensitive state information.

A notable judicial clarification arose in 1990 when Devi Lal's oath as Deputy Prime Minister was challenged as unconstitutional. Critics argued that the Constitution mentions only the Prime Minister and ministers, with no provision for a "Deputy Prime Minister." The Supreme Court upheld the oath's validity, ruling that such titles are merely descriptive and confer no additional powers akin to those of the Prime Minister. Designations like Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State, or Deputy Minister—absent from the Constitution—do not invalidate the oath, provided its substantive content remains intact.

Ministers' salaries and allowances, meanwhile, are set by Parliament and subject to periodic revision. Each minister receives the same salary and allowances as a Member of Parliament, supplemented by rank-based perks such as sumptuary allowance, free official accommodation, travel allowances, and medical facilities. For instance, in 2001, Parliament raised the Prime Minister's sumptuary allowance from ₹21,500 to ₹3,000 per month; a Cabinet Minister's from ₹1,000 to ₹2,000; a Minister of State's from ₹500 to ₹1,000; and a Deputy Minister's from ₹300 to ₹600. These provisions reflect the balance between accountability and the practical needs of high office.

Collective Responsibility of the Council of Ministers

At the heart of India's parliamentary system lies the principle of collective responsibility, which ensures that the Council of Ministers functions as a unified team accountable to the people's representatives. As enshrined in Article 75 of the Constitution, the Council is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. This means every minister shares joint accountability for the government's actions—whether through commission or omission. They stand or fall together: a no-confidence motion passed against the Council in the Lok Sabha triggers the resignation of all ministers, including those from the Rajya Sabha. In response, the Council may advise the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha, arguing that it no longer reflects the electorate's mandate and fresh elections are needed. However, the President is not bound to accept this advice from a Council that has already lost the House's confidence.

This principle extends further, binding all Cabinet ministers—and even other ministers—to Cabinet decisions, regardless of personal dissent during deliberations. Publicly and in Parliament, every minister must defend these decisions wholeheartedly. Disagreement without resignation is not an option; failure to support the Cabinet undermines the system's integrity. History bears this out through notable resignations. In 1953, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar stepped down over differences with colleagues on the Hindu Code Bill. Similarly, C.D. Deshmukh resigned amid disputes on the policy for states' reorganization, and Arif Mohammed quit in opposition to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. These instances underscore the non-negotiable discipline that collective responsibility demands.

Article 75: Individual Ministerial Responsibility

Article 75 of the Indian Constitution embodies the principle of individual responsibility, reinforcing the Prime Minister's authority over the Council of Ministers. It stipulates that ministers hold office only during the pleasure of the President, granting the President the formal power to dismiss any minister—even when the Council as a whole retains the confidence of the Lok Sabha. In practice, however, this power is exercised exclusively on the advice of the Prime Minister, underscoring the latter's pivotal role in maintaining ministerial accountability.

This mechanism allows the Prime Minister to address differences of opinion or dissatisfaction with a minister's performance by requesting their resignation or advising the President to dismiss them. Such individual accountability is essential for upholding the broader doctrine of collective responsibility, as it enables the Prime Minister to align the Council's actions with parliamentary confidence. As Dr. B.R. Ambedkar insightfully remarked during the Constituent Assembly debates: “Collective responsibility can be achieved only through the instrumentality of the Prime Minister. Therefore, unless and until we create that office and endow that office with statutory authority to nominate and dismiss ministers, there can be no collective responsibility.” This observation highlights how individual responsibility serves as the bedrock of the Council's unity and effectiveness.

In Britain, the principle of royal immunity is firmly upheld through a system of ministerial accountability. Every public order issued by the King must be countersigned by a responsible minister, who thereby assumes full legal liability. Should the order violate any law, the minister—not the monarch—faces accountability in court. This longstanding doctrine, encapsulated in the maxim "The King can do no wrong," ensures that the sovereign remains beyond judicial scrutiny and cannot be sued personally.

India's constitutional framework, by contrast, adopts a markedly different approach, eschewing any explicit requirement for ministerial countersignature on the President's public orders. Unlike Britain, there is no provision mandating that ministers bear legal responsibility in this manner. Furthermore, Article 74(2) of the Constitution shields the advisory process from judicial review, barring courts from probing the nature or content of advice tendered by ministers to the President. This arrangement underscores the President's position as a ceremonial head of state, insulated from direct legal repercussions.

Composition of the Council of Ministers

At the heart of India's executive machinery lies the Council of Ministers, collectively known as the "ministry." This body comprises several categories of ministers—Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers—distinguished primarily by their rank, pay, and political influence. Towering above them all is the Prime Minister, the country's paramount executive authority, who coordinates and leads the entire council.

Cabinet Ministers helm the most critical portfolios of the Union government, such as home affairs, defence, finance, and external affairs. As full-fledged members of the Cabinet—the apex decision-making forum—they participate in its meetings and shape national policies. Their oversight thus spans the breadth of central administration, making them pivotal architects of governance.

Ministers of State occupy the next tier. They may hold independent charge of smaller ministries or departments, in which case they wield powers akin to those of Cabinet Ministers. Alternatively, they assist Cabinet Ministers by managing specific departments or tasks within larger ministries, always under the Cabinet Minister's supervision and ultimate responsibility. Unlike their senior counterparts, Ministers of State are not Cabinet members and attend its meetings only when specially invited to discuss matters pertaining to their portfolios.

Deputy Ministers rank below them, without independent charge of any ministry or department. Attached to Cabinet Ministers or Ministers of State, they provide support in administrative, political, and parliamentary functions but hold no Cabinet membership or attendance rights.

A lesser-known category, Parliamentary Secretaries, forms the lowest rung. Lacking any departmental control, they aid senior ministers solely with parliamentary duties. However, this position has been largely obsolete since 1967, with appointments occurring only briefly during the early phase of Rajiv Gandhi's government.

Occasionally, the Council may also feature a Deputy Prime Minister, a role typically created for political exigencies rather than structural necessity.

Council of Ministers vs. Cabinet

In discussions of Indian governance, the terms Council of Ministers and Cabinet are routinely used interchangeably, masking a clear and significant distinction between them. These bodies differ fundamentally in their composition, functions, and roles—a nuance critical for understanding the executive's inner workings. The key contrasts are summarized in Table 20.1.

Role of the Cabinet

In India's politico-administrative system, the Cabinet occupies the highest rung as the ultimate decision-making authority. It formulates the core policies of the Central government, exercises supreme executive power, and ensures seamless coordination across the sprawling central administration.

Beyond these foundational roles, the Cabinet acts as the President's principal advisor, with its recommendations carrying binding force. It also serves as the nation's chief crisis manager, deftly navigating emergencies and unforeseen challenges. On legislative and financial fronts, it holds sway over all major matters, while exercising oversight on critical appointments—including constitutional authorities and senior secretariat officials. Finally, the Cabinet shapes and directs foreign policy and all international affairs, safeguarding the country's global interests.

Distinguishing the Council of Ministers from the Cabinet

In India's parliamentary system, the Council of Ministers and the Cabinet form the core of executive decision-making, yet they differ significantly in composition, functions, and authority. The Council of Ministers is the broader entity, typically comprising 60 to 70 members drawn from all three tiers of ministers: Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. As a constitutional body enshrined in Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution, it holds all governmental powers in theory. However, it does not convene as a collective body to conduct business, lacking any formal collective functions. Instead, its role is largely implementational: it executes decisions taken elsewhere, with its functions dictated by higher authority. The Council's size and three-tier classification are not specified in the Constitution; these are shaped by the Prime Minister based on situational needs and draw from British parliamentary conventions. Legislative backing comes via the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952, which defines a "minister" as any member of the Council, regardless of title, including Deputy Ministers. Ultimately, the Council bears collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of Parliament.

By contrast, the Cabinet is a compact nucleus within the Council, limited to 15–20 senior Cabinet Ministers. It meets regularly—often weekly—as a deliberative body, exercising the Council's powers in practice and transacting government business through binding policy decisions. These directives guide the entire Council, which it supervises for faithful implementation. Unlike the expansive Council, the Cabinet's pivotal role was not part of the original Constitution; it gained explicit mention through the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978, which inserted a definition into Article 352. This provision describes the Cabinet simply as "the council consisting of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Cabinet rank" appointed under Article 75, without detailing its powers or functions. Like the Council, its authority rests on British conventions, but the Cabinet enforces the Council's collective accountability to the Lok Sabha, ensuring unified executive action. This interplay underscores the Cabinet's dominance: it coordinates, decides, and oversees, while the Council provides the wider ministerial framework.

Cabinets Central Role in Government

Eminent political scientists and constitutional experts have offered vivid metaphors to capture the Cabinet's central role in Britain's parliamentary system—descriptions that apply with equal force to India. Ramsay Muir likened it to "the steering wheel of the ship of the state", guiding the nation's course with unwavering authority. A.V. Dicey echoed this by calling it "the keystone of the political arch", the indispensable element holding the structure together. Sir John Marriott saw it as "the pivot around which the whole political machinery revolves", while William Gladstone described it as "the solar orb around which the other bodies revolve", radiating influence over all lesser institutions. Ernest Barker termed it "the magnet of policy", drawing disparate elements into coherent action, and Walter Bagehot famously portrayed it as "a hyphen that joins, [and] the buckle that binds the executive and legislative departments together". Sir Ivor Jennings emphasized its foundational importance, declaring the Cabinet "the core of the British constitutional system" that "provides unity to the British system of government". L.S. Amery, too, hailed it as "the central directing instrument of government", underscoring its command over policy and administration.

This exalted position has grown so dominant that Ramsay Muir went further, dubbing it the "Dictatorship of the Cabinet". In his book How Britain is Governed, he observed: "A body which wields such powers as these may fairly be described as 'omnipotent' in theory, however incapable it may be of using its omnipotence. Its position, whenever it commands a majority, is a dictatorship only qualified by publicity. This dictatorship is far more absolute than it was two generations ago." These words ring true in the Indian context as well, where the Cabinet, backed by a parliamentary majority, exercises profound sway over governance, tempered only by democratic accountability and public scrutiny.

Kitchen Cabinet in Indian Politics

In the Indian parliamentary system, the Cabinet—a compact group led by the Prime Minister and comprising 15 to 20 senior ministers—serves as the formal pinnacle of decision-making. Yet, real power often resides in an even tighter circle known as the Kitchen Cabinet or Inner Cabinet. This informal advisory group, typically consisting of the Prime Minister and just two to four trusted confidants, becomes the true nerve center of governance. These close allies—drawn not only from Cabinet ranks but also from personal friends or family—offer candid counsel on critical political and administrative matters, helping the Prime Minister navigate complex choices with speed and discretion.

Nearly every Indian Prime Minister has relied on such an inner circle, a "circle within a circle" that streamlines leadership amid the demands of office. The term Kitchen Cabinet gained particular notoriety during Indira Gandhi's tenure, when it wielded extraordinary influence, shaping policies behind closed doors before presenting them to the full Cabinet for rubber-stamp approval.

Prime Ministers turn to this extra-constitutional mechanism for clear advantages. Its small size fosters swift, efficient deliberations far superior to those of the larger Cabinet. It convenes frequently, tackling urgent business without bureaucratic drag, and shields sensitive discussions—especially on politically charged issues—from premature leaks, preserving strategic secrecy.

Despite these strengths, the Kitchen Cabinet draws sharp criticism. By sidelining the formal Cabinet, it diminishes the collective authority of ministers, undermining the constitutional ideal of shared governance. Worse, it bypasses legal norms by granting unelected outsiders undue sway over state affairs, eroding transparency and accountability.

This shadowy dynamic is hardly unique to India. Similar informal power clusters thrive in the United States and Britain, quietly steering government decisions even in established democracies.