Emergency Provisions under Part XVIII
The Emergency provisions, enshrined in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution (Articles 352 to 360), empower the Central government to respond decisively to extraordinary crises. These measures are designed to protect the nation's sovereignty, unity, integrity, security, democratic framework, and the Constitution itself, ensuring stability when normal governance might falter.
In times of Emergency, the Centre assumes sweeping authority, placing states under its direct control and effectively transforming India's federal structure into a unitary one—without needing any formal constitutional amendment. This flexibility, shifting from federalism in peacetime to centralization during crises, sets the Indian Constitution apart. As Dr. B.R. Ambedkar remarked in the Constituent Assembly: "All federal systems, including the American, are placed in a tight mould of federalism. No matter what the circumstances, it cannot change its form and shape. It can never be unitary. On the other hand, the Constitution of India can be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances. In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system. But in times of Emergency, it is so designed as to make it work as though it was a unitary system."
The Constitution outlines three distinct types of Emergencies. The first, under Article 352, arises from war, external aggression, or armed rebellion and is commonly called National Emergency—though the Constitution refers to it formally as a "proclamation of emergency." The second, invoked via Article 356 due to a state's constitutional machinery breaking down, is known as President’s Rule (or sometimes State Emergency or constitutional Emergency), but notably, the Constitution avoids the term "emergency" here. Finally, Article 360 addresses a Financial Emergency, triggered by threats to India's financial stability or credit standing.
National Emergency under Article 352
Under Article 352, the President of India may proclaim a national emergency if the security of the country—or any part of it—faces a grave threat from war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Crucially, this power extends to situations of imminent danger, allowing the President to act preemptively, even before the threat fully materializes.
The President holds flexibility to issue fresh proclamations on these same grounds—war, external aggression, armed rebellion, or their imminent risk—regardless of whether another such proclamation is already in force. This provision, introduced by the 38th Amendment Act of 1975, ensures adaptability in evolving crises. Emergencies declared due to war or external aggression are termed External Emergencies, while those stemming from armed rebellion are known as Internal Emergencies. Moreover, since the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976, a proclamation need not blanket the entire nation; it can be confined to specific regions where the threat is concentrated.
The Constitution originally listed "internal disturbance" as a third ground for emergency, but its vagueness invited misuse, as seen in the 1975 proclamation by the Congress government under Indira Gandhi. To address this, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 replaced it with the narrower term "armed rebellion," preventing overly broad interpretations.
A key safeguard mandates that the President issue such a proclamation only on the basis of a written recommendation from the Union Cabinet as a whole—not merely the Prime Minister's advice. This requirement, also enshrined by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, was a direct response to the 1975 episode, where Indira Gandhi advised the President unilaterally, presenting the Cabinet with a done deal afterward.
Finally, while the 38th Amendment Act of 1975 had shielded emergency declarations from judicial scrutiny, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 reversed this, restoring accountability. The Supreme Court affirmed this in the Minerva Mills case (1980), ruling that proclamations can be challenged in court if based on malafide intent, wholly extraneous or irrelevant facts, or if they appear absurd or perverse. These evolutions reflect the Constitution's commitment to balancing national security with democratic checks.
Parliamentary Approval and Duration of Emergency
A proclamation of Emergency must receive approval from both Houses of Parliament within one month of its issuance. This timeline was shortened from the original two months by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, reflecting a deliberate effort to enhance legislative oversight. In exceptional cases, such as when the Lok Sabha stands dissolved at the time of issuance or dissolves within that one-month window without prior approval, the proclamation remains valid for 30 days from the first sitting of the reconstituted Lok Sabha—provided the Rajya Sabha approves it in the interim.
Once approved by both Houses, the Emergency endures for six months and can be extended indefinitely, but only with fresh parliamentary approval every six months. This periodic review mechanism, too, was introduced by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 to prevent unchecked prolongation. Prior to this change, an approved Emergency could persist as long as the executive (Cabinet) wished. A similar safeguard applies to extensions: if the Lok Sabha dissolves during a six-month period without endorsing continuance, the proclamation survives for 30 days after its reconstitution, contingent on Rajya Sabha approval meantime.
Crucially, every resolution—whether for initial approval or subsequent extensions—demands a special majority in each House. This means a majority of the House's total membership, plus at least two-thirds of members present and voting. The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 imposed this rigorous threshold, replacing the earlier simple majority rule and thereby fortifying democratic checks against hasty or prolonged emergencies.
Revocation of a Proclamation of Emergency
The President holds the authority to revoke a Proclamation of Emergency at any time through a subsequent proclamation, without needing parliamentary approval. This flexibility allows for swift response to improving conditions.
However, a key safeguard ensures democratic oversight: the President must revoke the proclamation if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution disapproving its continuation. This provision, introduced by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, marked a significant shift. Prior to the amendment, the President could continue or revoke the proclamation unilaterally, leaving the Lok Sabha without any say in the matter.
To facilitate this check, the 44th Amendment Act also mandates a special sitting of the Lok Sabha within 14 days if at least one-tenth of its total members submit a written notice to the Speaker—or to the President if the House is not in session—for debating such a disapproval resolution.
It is worth noting the distinction between a resolution disapproving the proclamation's continuation and one approving it. The former requires passage only in the Lok Sabha by a simple majority, empowering the Lower House to act decisively. In contrast, an approval resolution demands passage in both Houses of Parliament by a special majority, reflecting the higher threshold for sustaining emergency powers.
Effects of a National Emergency
A proclamation of National Emergency under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution triggers profound and far-reaching changes across the political landscape. These effects can be broadly classified into three key areas: the dynamics of Centre-State relations, the tenure of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, and the suspension of Fundamental Rights.
Impact on Centre-State Relations
Once a National Emergency is in effect, the constitutional framework governing Centre-State interactions undergoes a fundamental transformation. This shift manifests across three dimensions—executive, legislative, and financial—centralizing authority in the Union government to address perceived national threats.
To prevent misuse, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 introduced critical safeguards. It explicitly required that the decision to proclaim an emergency stem from a written recommendation by the Union Cabinet, eliminating the possibility of the Prime Minister acting unilaterally. Earlier, the 38th Amendment Act of 1975 had shielded such proclamations from judicial review, granting them absolute immunity. However, the 44th Amendment reversed this by restoring the courts' oversight role.
The Supreme Court reinforced this in the landmark Minerva Mills case (1980), ruling that a proclamation of National Emergency could indeed be challenged in court. Grounds for such challenges include malafide intent, reliance on wholly extraneous or irrelevant facts, or if the declaration appears absurd or perverse. These measures ensure that emergency powers, while expansive, remain accountable to constitutional principles and judicial scrutiny.
Parliamentary Approval and Duration
A proclamation of National Emergency must receive approval from both Houses of Parliament within one month of its issuance. This timeline was shortened from the original two months by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, reflecting a deliberate effort to enhance legislative oversight. In exceptional cases, such as when the Lok Sabha stands dissolved at the time of issuance or dissolves within that one-month window without prior approval, the proclamation remains valid for 30 days from the first sitting of the reconstituted Lok Sabha—provided the Rajya Sabha approves it in the interim.
Once approved by both Houses, the emergency endures for six months but can be extended indefinitely, subject to fresh parliamentary approval every six months. This periodic review mechanism, too, was introduced by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 to prevent unchecked prolongation. Prior to this change, an emergency could persist as long as the executive (Cabinet) wished after initial approval. A similar safeguard applies to extensions: if the Lok Sabha dissolves during a six-month period without endorsing continuance, the proclamation survives for 30 days from its first post-reconstitution sitting, again contingent on Rajya Sabha approval.
Crucially, every resolution—whether for initial approval or subsequent extensions—demands a special majority in each House. This means a majority of the House's total membership, plus at least two-thirds of members present and voting. The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 imposed this higher threshold, replacing the earlier simple majority requirement and thereby strengthening democratic checks on such extraordinary powers.
Revocation of a Proclamation of Emergency
The President holds the authority to revoke a Proclamation of Emergency at any time through a subsequent proclamation, without needing parliamentary approval. This flexibility ensures the executive can respond swiftly to improving conditions.
However, a key democratic safeguard mandates the President to revoke the proclamation if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution disapproving its continuation. This provision, introduced by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, marked a significant shift from the pre-amendment era, when the President could continue or revoke the proclamation unilaterally, leaving the Lok Sabha without any say in the matter.
To facilitate this check, the same amendment allows one-tenth of the Lok Sabha's total membership to submit a written notice to the Speaker—or to the President if the House is not in session—prompting a special sitting within 14 days to debate and vote on a resolution disapproving the proclamation's continuance.
Notably, a resolution disapproving continuation differs from one approving it in two fundamental ways. A disapproval resolution requires passage only in the Lok Sabha by a simple majority, empowering the Lower House as the people's direct representatives. In contrast, an approval resolution demands passage in both Houses of Parliament by a special majority, reflecting the gravity of extending such extraordinary powers.
Effects of a National Emergency
A proclamation of National Emergency under the Indian Constitution triggers profound and far-reaching changes across the political landscape. These impacts can be broadly classified into three key areas: alterations in Centre-state relations, changes to the tenure of the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies, and suspensions of fundamental rights. Among these, the transformation in Centre-state relations stands out for its sweeping scope, reshaping executive, legislative, and financial dynamics during the emergency's operation.
In the executive realm, the Centre gains unprecedented authority. Normally, the Union government can issue directions to states only on specific matters listed in the Constitution. However, with a National Emergency in force, the executive power of the Centre extends to directing any state on any aspect of its executive functions. This effectively places state governments under the Union's complete control, without suspending them outright, ensuring a centralized command structure to address the crisis.
Legislatively, the shift is equally dramatic, tilting the federal balance toward a unitary framework. Parliament acquires the power to enact laws on subjects in the exclusive State List, overriding state legislatures, which continue to function but lose precedence. This suspends the usual division of legislative powers, though state assemblies remain intact. Laws passed by Parliament on state subjects lapse six months after the emergency ends. Additionally, if Parliament is not in session, the President can issue ordinances on these state matters. Parliament may also delegate powers and duties to Union officers for implementing such laws, even on matters beyond the Union List. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976 extended these executive and legislative overrides not just to states under emergency but to all states across India.
Financially, the Centre's dominance intensifies further. The President can alter the constitutional allocation of revenues between the Union and states—reducing or even withholding transfers as needed. These modifications persist until the end of the financial year in which the emergency concludes, with every such order laid before both Houses of Parliament for scrutiny. Together, these measures underscore how a National Emergency temporarily reconfigures India's federal polity into a more centralized system, prioritizing national security over routine state autonomy.
Effect on the Life of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies
When a National Emergency is in force, Parliament gains the power to extend the Lok Sabha's normal five-year term through specific legislation. These extensions occur in increments of one year at a time and can continue for as long as the emergency persists. Crucially, however, no extension may last beyond six months after the emergency proclamation is revoked, ensuring that democratic timelines resume promptly once the crisis abates.
A notable historical example is the Fifth Lok Sabha, elected in 1971. Its term was extended twice—once each year—allowing it to function until 1977 amid prolonged emergency conditions.
This mechanism extends equally to state legislative assemblies, whose standard five-year tenure Parliament may prolong by one year at a time during a national emergency. As with the Lok Sabha, any such extension lapses no later than six months after the emergency ends, safeguarding the rhythm of state-level representative democracy.
Impact of National Emergency on Fundamental Rights
A proclamation of National Emergency profoundly affects Fundamental Rights through Articles 358 and 359 of the Constitution. Article 358 specifically addresses the suspension of the six freedoms enshrined in Article 19—speech and expression, assembly, association, movement, residence, and profession—while Article 359 empowers the President to suspend enforcement of other Fundamental Rights, excluding those under Articles 20 and 21. These provisions ensure the state gains flexibility during crises, though with safeguards introduced later.
Under Article 358, the rights in Article 19 stand automatically suspended upon issuance of the emergency proclamation—no separate order is needed. During this period, the state is absolved of Article 19's constraints, allowing it to enact laws or executive actions that curtail these freedoms without judicial challenge on those grounds. Once the emergency ends, Article 19 revives fully, and any inconsistent laws lose effect to that extent. Crucially, however, no legal remedies are available for violations committed during the emergency, even afterward; past legislative or executive measures remain immune from challenge.
The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, curtailed Article 358's scope in two key ways. First, suspension applies only to emergencies declared due to war or external aggression, not armed rebellion. Second, protection extends solely to laws and executive actions directly linked to the emergency, shielding them from Article 19 challenges.
Article 359 takes a different approach: it does not suspend Fundamental Rights themselves but authorizes the President to suspend the right to approach courts for their enforcement. This leaves the rights intact in theory, yet practically unenforceable through specified Presidential Orders. These orders target only designated rights (excluding Articles 20 and 21 pre-amendment), apply for the emergency's duration or a shorter specified period, and cover the entire country or parts thereof. They must be tabled before both Houses of Parliament for approval.
With such an order in force, the state may pass laws or take actions infringing the specified rights, immune from challenges alleging inconsistency. Upon the order's expiry, inconsistent laws cease to operate, but—as with Article 358—no remedies exist for actions taken during its operation.
The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, further limited Article 359. The President can no longer suspend enforcement of Articles 20 (protection against conviction for offenses) and 21 (life and personal liberty), ensuring these core rights remain justiciable even in crisis. Additionally, only emergency-related laws—and executive actions under them—gain protection, excluding unrelated measures. These reforms, born from the excesses of the 1975 Emergency, strike a vital balance between security and liberty.
Distinction Between Article 358 and **Article 359
Articles 358 and 359 of the Indian Constitution provide mechanisms for suspending fundamental rights during a national emergency, but they differ significantly in scope, operation, and safeguards. These provisions balance the state's need for extraordinary powers with constitutional protections, a distinction vital for understanding emergency jurisprudence.
Article 358 is narrowly tailored to fundamental rights under Article 19—covering freedoms like speech, assembly, and movement—while Article 359 casts a wider net, allowing the President to suspend enforcement of any fundamental rights specified in the order, except for Articles 20 and 21 (which protect against conviction for retroactive offenses, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and the right to life and personal liberty). Under Article 358, the suspension of Article 19 rights occurs automatically upon declaration of an emergency, requiring no further presidential action. In contrast, Article 359 does not trigger automatically; it merely empowers the President to issue an order suspending enforcement of the chosen rights.
The applicability of these articles also varies by the nature of the emergency. Article 358 activates solely during an external emergency—declared on grounds of war or external aggression—and does not apply to internal emergencies (proclaimed due to armed rebellion). Article 359, however, functions during both external and internal emergencies, offering greater flexibility. Durationally, Article 358 halts Article 19 rights for the full length of the emergency, whereas Article 359 limits suspension to the period stipulated in the presidential order, which could be shorter than the emergency itself. Territorially, Article 358 blankets the entire country, but Article 359 can target the whole nation or merely a specified part.
Both articles enable the state to enact laws or executive actions inconsistent with the affected rights—Article 19 under Article 358, or the suspended rights under Article 359—without immediate constitutional challenge. A key similarity lies in their protective scope: immunity from judicial review extends only to laws and executive actions directly linked to the emergency, not unrelated measures. This ensures that emergency powers remain tethered to the crisis at hand.
National Emergencies and 44th Amendment
India has witnessed the proclamation of a National Emergency on three occasions: in 1962, 1971, and 1975. These declarations, rooted in Article 352 of the Constitution, allowed the central government to assume extraordinary powers amid grave threats to national security.
The first such proclamation came in October 1962, triggered by Chinese aggression in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh). It remained in effect until January 1968, encompassing the 1965 war with Pakistan and obviating the need for a fresh declaration at that time. The second proclamation followed in December 1971, amid Pakistan's attack during the Bangladesh Liberation War. Remarkably, even as this emergency persisted, a third was issued in June 1975 on grounds of "internal disturbance"—specifically, reports of individuals inciting the police and armed forces to disrupt their duties. The first two emergencies invoked the ground of "external aggression," while the 1975 one marked the first use of "internal disturbance." Both the 1971 and 1975 proclamations were revoked together in March 1977.
The 1975 emergency stands out as the most contentious, drawing sharp criticism for the alleged misuse of its sweeping powers, including curbs on civil liberties and press freedom. Public outrage culminated in the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, where Indira Gandhi's Congress Party suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Janata Party. The new government responded by appointing the Shah Commission to probe the circumstances surrounding the declaration. The Commission's findings rejected the necessity of the emergency, prompting the enactment of the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978. This reform introduced vital safeguards, such as replacing "internal disturbance" with the narrower "armed rebellion" and mandating parliamentary approval within one month, to prevent future abuses.
Presidents Rule under Articles 355–365
Article 355 of the Indian Constitution casts a fundamental duty on the Union government to protect every state from internal disturbances and ensure that its administration adheres strictly to constitutional provisions. This obligation forms the bedrock for the Centre's intervention when a state's constitutional machinery collapses, leading to the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356. Often termed "State Emergency" or "Constitutional Emergency," this measure allows the President to assume direct control of the state's governance, suspending its elected apparatus temporarily.
The proclamation of President’s Rule rests on two primary grounds, one explicit in Article 356 and the other linked through Article 365. Under Article 356, the President may issue such a proclamation if satisfied that a situation has arisen where the state government can no longer function in line with the Constitution. This authority can be triggered by a governor's report or even independently, without one. Complementing this, Article 365 provides that if a state fails to comply with or implement any directions issued by the Centre, the President is entitled to deem it a constitutional breakdown, paving the way for President’s Rule. Together, these provisions safeguard the federal structure while empowering decisive action in times of crisis.
Parliamentary Approval and Duration of President’s Rule
A proclamation imposing President’s Rule in a state requires approval from both Houses of Parliament within two months of its issuance. This ensures parliamentary oversight from the outset. However, if the Lok Sabha stands dissolved at the time of issuance—or dissolves within those two months without prior approval—the proclamation remains valid until 30 days after the Lok Sabha’s first sitting following its reconstitution. In such cases, interim approval from the Rajya Sabha keeps it alive during the gap.
Once approved by both Houses, President’s Rule lasts for six months. Parliament can extend it in six-month increments, up to a maximum of three years. A similar safeguard applies during Lok Sabha dissolution: if it occurs midway through a six-month period without fresh approval for continuation, the proclamation endures until 30 days after the reconstituted Lok Sabha’s first session, provided the Rajya Sabha has approved the extension in the interim. Notably, every resolution for approval or extension passes by a simple majority in each House—that is, a majority of members present and voting—making the process straightforward yet accountable.
The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 imposed vital checks to curb prolonged misuse. After the first year, extensions of six months are permissible only if two strict conditions hold: a National Emergency must be in effect across India or the affected state (in whole or part), and the Election Commission must certify that general elections to the state’s legislative assembly cannot occur due to insurmountable difficulties. These provisions prevent indefinite central intervention.
Finally, the President can revoke President’s Rule at any time through a subsequent proclamation, without needing parliamentary approval. This flexibility allows swift restoration of normalcy when conditions improve.
Consequences of President’s Rule
When President’s Rule is imposed in a state under Article 356 of the Constitution, the President assumes extraordinary powers to manage the breakdown of constitutional machinery. These include directly exercising the functions of the state government, including those vested in the governor or other executive authorities. The President can also declare that the powers of the state legislature will be exercised by Parliament itself and take any necessary steps, such as suspending constitutional provisions related to state bodies or authorities.
In practice, this leads to the immediate dismissal of the state council of ministers, headed by the chief minister. The state governor then administers the state on behalf of the President, assisted by the chief secretary or advisors appointed by the Centre. This arrangement explains why a proclamation under Article 356 is commonly called President’s Rule. Additionally, the President may suspend or dissolve the state legislative assembly, shifting legislative responsibilities to Parliament, which then enacts state bills and approves the state budget.
With the state legislature suspended or dissolved, Parliament gains enhanced authority. It can delegate law-making powers for the state to the President or another specified authority. Such laws may confer powers or impose duties on the Centre or its officers. When the Lok Sabha is not in session, the President can authorize expenditures from the state’s Consolidated Fund, pending Parliament’s sanction. Moreover, in Parliament’s absence, the President can promulgate ordinances to govern the state.
Laws enacted by Parliament, the President, or any delegated authority during this period remain in force even after President’s Rule ends—their duration is not tied to the proclamation itself. The state legislature can later repeal, amend, or re-enact them as needed.
Importantly, these powers have clear limits: the President cannot assume the functions of the state high court or suspend constitutional provisions relating to it. The high court’s position, status, powers, and functions thus remain untouched throughout President’s Rule, safeguarding judicial independence.
The Frequent and Controversial Use of Article 356
Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1950, Article 356—which empowers the President to impose President's Rule in a state—has been invoked over 125 times, averaging roughly twice a year. Far too often, this provision has been wielded arbitrarily for political or partisan motives, earning it a reputation as one of the most debated and criticized elements of India's constitutional framework.
The first instance came in Punjab in 1951, and by now, virtually every state has experienced President's Rule at least once, and often multiple times. Detailed records of these impositions appear in Table 16.2 at the end of this chapter.
Partisan misuse became glaringly evident during shifts in central power. After the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, which ended the Congress Party's dominance following the Internal Emergency, the incoming Janata Party government under Morarji Desai promptly imposed President's Rule in nine Congress-ruled states. The rationale? The state assemblies no longer reflected the electorate's will in light of the national mandate. When Congress regained power in 1980, it mirrored this action by dismissing governments in nine states on identical grounds.
A similar pattern emerged in 1992, when the Congress-led Centre imposed President's Rule in three BJP-ruled states—Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan—for their alleged half-hearted enforcement of a central ban on certain religious organizations. The Supreme Court's landmark ruling in the S.R. Bommai case (1994) upheld these proclamations, affirming secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution. However, the Court struck down earlier impositions in Nagaland (1988), Karnataka (1989), and Meghalaya (1991), setting important judicial limits on the provision's abuse.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, defending Article 356 amid criticism in the Constituent Assembly, envisioned it as a provision that would remain a "dead letter," invoked only as an absolute last resort. He cautioned: "The intervention of the Centre must be deemed to be barred, because that would be an invasion on the sovereign authority of the province (state). That is a fundamental proposition which we must accept by reason of the fact that we have a Federal Constitution... If at all they are brought into operation, I hope the President who is endowed with this power will take proper precautions before actually suspending the administration of the province."
Sadly, history unfolded otherwise. What Ambedkar hoped would be a dormant safeguard evolved into a potent weapon against opposition-led state governments and assemblies. Reflecting on this irony a decade later, Constituent Assembly member H.V. Kamath wryly observed: "Dr. Ambedkar is dead and the Articles are very much alive."
Scope of Judicial Review under Article 356
The scope of judicial review over the President's proclamation under Article 356—which empowers the Centre to impose President's Rule in a state—has evolved significantly. Initially, the 38th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1975 declared the President's satisfaction in invoking this provision as final and conclusive, shielding it from any court challenge. However, the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978 reversed this by deleting that clause, paving the way for judicial scrutiny and affirming that the President's decision is not immune from review.
This principle crystallized in the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), where a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines to prevent misuse of Article 356. At its core, the Court held that a presidential proclamation imposing President's Rule is subject to judicial review. The President's satisfaction must rest on relevant material; courts can strike it down if based on extraneous, irrelevant grounds, malafide intent, or perversity. Notably, the burden of proof lies with the Union government to demonstrate the existence of such material, though courts refrain from assessing its correctness or sufficiency—they only verify its relevance to the constitutional breakdown alleged.
The ruling also outlined practical safeguards. If a court deems the proclamation unconstitutional, it can restore the dismissed state government and revive a suspended or dissolved legislative assembly. Dissolution itself must follow parliamentary approval of the proclamation; until then, the President can only suspend the assembly. Should Parliament withhold approval, the assembly automatically reactivates. The judgment further embedded secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution, making a state government pursuing anti-secular policies vulnerable to action under Article 356.
Equally vital were directives on political stability and federal comity. The Court mandated that claims of a state government losing legislative confidence be tested on the floor of the House through a vote, rather than preemptively unseating the ministry. It rebuked arbitrary dismissals, ruling that a new party at the Centre cannot invoke Article 356 to oust opposition-led state ministries. Ultimately, the power under Article 356 is exceptional, reserved for rare emergencies, ensuring it serves as a last resort rather than a routine tool for central overreach. These propositions have since fortified cooperative federalism, curbing the provision's historical excesses.
Bommai Judgment: Limits on Article 356
Drawing from the Sarkaria Commission report on Centre-State relations (1988), the Supreme Court in the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India case (1994) delineated the circumstances under which the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution would be justified or, conversely, an abuse of power. This judicial guidance aimed to curb arbitrary invocations of the provision, ensuring it serves as a last resort to uphold constitutional order rather than a tool for political expediency.
The Court outlined several scenarios where invoking Article 356 would be proper. These include a hung Assembly after general elections, where no single party secures a majority. Similarly, it is appropriate if a majority party refuses to form a government and the Governor cannot identify a viable coalition. The same holds when a ministry resigns following a defeat in the Assembly, yet no alternative stable government emerges. Beyond such political deadlocks, the provision may be legitimately used if a state government disregards a constitutional directive from the Centre, engages in internal subversion—such as deliberately undermining the Constitution, law, or fomenting violent revolt—or wilfully neglects its duties, leading to a physical breakdown that threatens the state's security.
In contrast, the imposition would be improper in a range of avoidable situations. For instance, it is unjustified if a ministry loses its majority, resigns, or is dismissed, and the Governor recommends President’s Rule without first exploring the prospects of an alternative ministry. Likewise, a Governor's subjective assessment of a ministry's support, without allowing it a floor test in the Assembly, renders the action invalid. The Court explicitly disapproved using Article 356 merely because a state’s ruling party, still backed by an Assembly majority, suffers a crushing defeat in Lok Sabha elections—as occurred in 1977 and 1980. Other misuse cases encompass routine internal disturbances short of subversion or breakdown; allegations of maladministration, ministerial corruption, or financial crises; failure to issue a prior warning to the state government (unless extreme urgency risks catastrophe); and deploying the power to resolve intra-party disputes of the ruling dispensation or for purposes unrelated to its constitutional intent.
Grounds of Declaration
Article 360 of the Indian Constitution grants the President the authority to proclaim a financial emergency when convinced that a grave situation threatens the financial stability or credit of India—or any part of its territory. This provision serves as a safeguard against economic crises that could undermine the nation's fiscal health.
For a time, the 38th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1975 insulated these proclamations by deeming the President's satisfaction "final and conclusive," barring any court from questioning it on any grounds. This shield was short-lived, however: the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978 removed the clause entirely, restoring the principle that such executive decisions remain open to judicial review.
Parliamentary Approval and Duration of Financial Emergency
A proclamation declaring a financial emergency under Article 360 of the Indian Constitution requires prompt parliamentary endorsement. Both Houses of Parliament must approve it within two months of its issuance. This timeline ensures democratic oversight while allowing swift action in fiscal crises.
Special provisions apply if the Lok Sabha stands dissolved at the time of issuance or dissolves within those two months without prior approval. In such cases, the proclamation remains valid until 30 days after the Lok Sabha's first sitting following its reconstitution—but only if the Rajya Sabha has approved it in the interim. This mechanism bridges gaps in the lower House's availability, preventing undue disruption.
Once both Houses grant approval, the financial emergency persists indefinitely until the President revokes it. Notably, no maximum duration is prescribed, and Parliament need not renew its approval periodically. Resolutions for approval pass by a simple majority in each House—that is, a majority of members present and voting—keeping the threshold accessible yet deliberate.
The President holds unilateral power to end the emergency at any time through a subsequent proclamation, without needing fresh parliamentary consent. This flexibility balances exigency with accountability in managing national finances.
Effects of Financial Emergency
When a Financial Emergency is proclaimed under Article 360 of the Indian Constitution, the central government gains sweeping authority over state finances, effectively centralizing control to address severe economic threats. The President can direct any state to adhere to specified canons of financial propriety—principles ensuring prudent fiscal management—and issue other necessary instructions to stabilize the situation. These directives may go further, mandating reductions in salaries and allowances for state employees across any class or requiring the state legislature to reserve all money bills and financial bills for presidential approval after passage.
The President's powers extend beyond the states. During such an emergency, salaries and allowances of Union government employees, as well as judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, can also be scaled back as needed. In essence, this provision hands the Centre near-total oversight of financial matters at both national and state levels, curtailing state autonomy in a time of crisis.
This mechanism drew sharp debate in the Constituent Assembly. H.N. Kunzru warned that these provisions posed a grave risk to the financial independence of states. Defending their inclusion, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar drew parallels to the United States' National Recovery Act of 1933, which empowered the President to enact similar measures amid the Great Depression's economic turmoil. As Ambedkar explained, the Indian version mirrors that model to tackle profound financial and economic challenges.
Remarkably, despite a severe financial crisis in 1991, no Financial Emergency has ever been declared in India, underscoring the provision's role as a dormant but potent safeguard.
Criticism of the Emergency Provisions
During the debates in the Constituent Assembly, several members voiced strong objections to the inclusion of emergency provisions in the Constitution. They argued that these measures would undermine the federal structure by rendering the Union overwhelmingly powerful, concentrating authority in the hands of the Union executive at the expense of both central and state legislatures, and effectively turning the President into a dictator. Critics further warned that state financial autonomy would be eroded, while fundamental rights would lose all meaning, ultimately dismantling the democratic bedrock of the Constitution.
H.V. Kamath captured this alarm in vivid terms, lamenting that the provisions laid "the foundation of a totalitarian state, a police state"—one antithetical to India's cherished ideals of liberty. He envisioned a grim future where citizens' rights hung in perpetual jeopardy, marked by "the peace of the grave and the void of the desert," and where the President's unchecked powers would stand without parallel in any democratic constitution. K.T. Shah similarly decried the chapter as one of "reaction and retrogression," designed to empower the Centre against the states and the government against its people, leaving only the hollow names of liberty and democracy intact. T.T. Krishnamachari cautioned that they enabled a "constitutional dictatorship" by the President and executive, while H.N. Kunzru highlighted the grave threat to states' financial independence.
Yet, not all views were critical. Supporters like Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar hailed the provisions as "the very life-breath of the Constitution," essential for its survival. Mahabir Tyagi saw them as a vital "safety-valve" to preserve constitutional order amid crises.
Even Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while robustly defending the provisions, acknowledged their potential for abuse. "I do not altogether deny," he conceded, "that there is a possibility of the Articles being abused or employed for political purposes." This balanced perspective underscored the framers' awareness of the delicate balance between security and liberty.